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
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
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





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The Wartburg.

HISTORY

OF THE

GERMAN PEOPLE

**FROM THE FIRST AUTHENTIC
ANNALS TO THE PRESENT TIME**

VOLUME SIX

The Reformation

Edited by
EDWARD S. ELLIS, A.M.
and
AUGUSTUS R. KELLER

ILLUSTRATED

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
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THE REFORMATION

I

THE PEASANTS' WAR

THE greatest insurrection of the masses known in German history was not due to religious but to social causes. No one could justly say that the Reformation caused the Peasants' War. To the man of the sixteenth century the ecclesiastical movement was the center of all interests, and the religious conception had a marked influence over him. It must needs encourage the preaching, or else prevent the new doctrine as affecting the revolution which spread under the Protestant banner. While the Catholics believed the basic cause was the very fruits of the Lutheran heresy, and while the Catholic preachers named the "great murderer" of Wittenberg as the chief cause, the Protestants laid the blame upon the radicals and maintained that the persecution of the right and true teachers by the old Church had brought impure Protestant elements into activity.

Everyone regarded the deeper motive of the movement in that which most occupied the minds,

and in no act of the "Lutheran Tragedy" did the "thousandfold master Laton" seem to play so important a rôle for both Luther and his enemies. In addition, there were many real grievances of the peasants, and numerous agrarian upheavals of the recent past.

The course of any period is expressed through literature, and so much the more must we endeavor to learn the varied wealth of historic life which is frequently distorted by contemporary prejudices. We must not be deceived by the fact that the rebellious peasants accommodated themselves to their epoch, incessantly talking of the gospel, the pure Word of God, Christian freedom and love for the neighbor. Behind these expressions were hidden, as behind the philosophical phrases of the French Revolution, a tangible purport of agricultural, political and social desires. There was no close connection between the gospel of Luther and that of the peasants.

The term "Peasants' War" has been protested against, since the proletariat of the city, lower clergymen as well as individual elements of the minor nobility, also took part. But as the great masses of the revolutionary armies consisted of peasants, the generally adopted programme of the twelve articles had a purely agrarian character. Consequently Lassalle would ascribe a reactionary character to the Peasants' War, which aimed at the

more rightful carrying out of medieval social order, that was entirely based upon the possession of land and fought against the modern powers of the princely states and the capital of the cities. Such conception is by no means wrong, for to a certain extent the German revolution represented the tragic conclusion of a long series of agrarian upheavals which, in the later centuries of the Middle Ages, accompanied great agricultural changes, and usually strove to give a religious consecration to their tendencies. But we cannot regard as parallel happenings the Peasants' War of the period of the Reformation and the Frisians' or Swiss struggles for freedom. There was missing that striving for general social change. The rudest forms of an agrarian revolution were to be found in France; while the so-called Pastorals of 1251 and 1320 ascribed religious motives to their plundering of the clergymen and the Jews, the well known *Jacquerie* of 1358 represented the upheaval of an oppressed country population, whose utter beastliness gave us sufficient information of the crimes of their masters,—which, according to a French historian, could compare only with the horrible insurrection of the negroes in San Domingo. "They fought to repay torture for torture, and disgrace for disgrace." Their principle, if such it can be termed, was merely a consciousness of their multitude, filled with the insatiate desire for

vengeance. The oppressed ones, according to the description of an older insurrection of peasants by a Norman poet of the thirteenth century said: "We are human beings like them [the nobles]; we have the same limbs, equally big bodies, and are thirty or forty peasants against one knight."

An entirely different picture was presented by the English revolution of 1381 which, like the German Peasants' War, was preceded by a number of minor upheavals and by a rich popular literature of complaints and satire, as well as by the fact that contemporary enemies of Wickliffe put all the blame upon the great English reformer. As in Germany, no matter how little Wickliffe had thought of exciting an insurrection, the biblical propaganda of traveling preachers, the "poor priests," greatly increased the number of existing malcontents. We are reminded of the apocalyptic attitude and prophecy in Germany, through the English hope of a coming king who would punish the clergy according to Holy Writ and would deliver the poor man from his bondage. The lower clergymen, especially the beggar monks, took part in the movement as such did in the German war. "When Adam dug and Eve span, who was then a noble man?" was a favorite topic with the preachers, who labored to stir up the masses. Noblemen were forced to enter into the most intimate relations with the peasants. The rabble of London joined them, yet the demands of

the armed insurgents were purely agrarian, and above all they insisted upon the abolishment of slavery, and English popular poetry created a mystical ideal figure of the poor peasant which was at variance with the rude figure of the German. "Peter the Ploughman" alone was blameless; he alone knew the road to truth and understood the sufferings of mankind better than anybody else.

The relation between the English and the German movement was a close one; the outcome at first sight seems also to have been the same, since the flames of revolution were most severely quenched both in England and Germany. Yet, while slavery was totally abolished in England, the German Peasants' War only introduced the worst periods for the German country population. Perhaps the difference in time should also be considered, and we can therefore speak of a late setting in of the agrarian revolution in Germany. At any rate, the economical prince of the German peasants was gone, without the country population becoming an independent member of the political organization, either in the empire or in most of the territories. The freeing of the slaves and the tributes in the form of field products were stopped when the noble landowners made the discovery that the interest from the peasants could no longer satisfy them. The nobility took no part whatever in the toiling

of the fields, and were interested only in what they produced. Not until a later period did the knight begin to till his own soil, of course not for the benefit of the peasant. We cannot overlook the fact that since the close of the fifteenth century the ominous symptom of an increase in the agrarian debts appeared. The so-called buying of rents, a beneficial form of agricultural credit, was disastrous to the peasants. A pamphlet described the trick of the city capitalist who loaned to the peasant 20 florins on his estates worth 100 florins, hoping that the debtor would not be able to pay the annual rent. "Then I take the estate and drive away the peasant," said the man of the city; "thus I obtain estate and money." In addition to this there was a more dangerous method of borrowing money in the form of the future harvest. Luther regarded the buying of interest as the ruin of the nation; he believed that the owner of 100 florins could devour a peasant every year. We must remember that in many sections a great dismemberment of land had taken place. As early as the fourteenth century there was real speculation in Southwest Germany regarding agricultural values, and it was certainly noteworthy that territories of the most distinctive dismemberment, like the Tauber and Neckar valleys and others, were in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the centers of the agrarian upheaval. Regarding the Moselle and Rhine districts Lamprecht

holds that an attempt to limit the partition created only a country proletariat without land.

That the introduction of foreign laws was not brought about without unfavorable reaction upon the conditions of the country population is a well established fact. The old judicial and economical alliances of the community, of the March and court association, existed after the catastrophe of the Peasants' War and only gradually sank into insignificant institutions; but this self-government of the peasantry was enabled "not to display the needed reorganizing power during the great crisis of the agricultural civilization," as the historian Gierke said. The privilege of jurisdiction and the ability to protect themselves against the superiority of the modern state benefited the peasants little. It was also insignificant regarding the conception of the agrarian revolution, if we refer to the fact that the severest idea of slavery cannot be applied to the conditions of independence of the peasantry in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Wrote Freytag: "Whoever judges conditions of the German past must be cautious to judge actual conditions of a class after its rights." This depends upon how much the peasants of that time had felt this sort of dependence, and there is no doubt that the majority of them considered it all a great injustice, foreign and unpleasant, but still they regarded as superior the intellectual powers of the new era, the princely

state, Roman law, and humanistic education; their own laws, greatly influenced by their barbaric past, were once more laughed at by the higher classes.

As time went on, there developed a literature of reactionary character and of a highly democratic nature; the most sneered-at peasant became the type of genuine popular power, the hero of the coming revolution, and was glorified as noble, pious and holy. Apocalypse and astrology had sided with the lower classes, with the humble and impoverished, promising them who were deprived of the present at least a future, though a bloody one, filled with slain masters and priests. And with these elements of superstition, before which heart and head of the oppressed ones easily bowed, a biblical radicalism was closely connected, since the fifteenth century and the victorious battles of the Hussitic armies. The German peasant and the entire nation now listened to the appealing and inflaming speech of the great son of the peasantry; the gospel was come again, all human doctrines had proved impotent, nay, diabolical and intolerable, and the freedom of Christian man had been announced by all external signs. The pope was antichrist, and emperor and princes were not any better; the scholars were deceivers, the universities temples of Moloch; the merchants were usurers, the priests thieves, and wealth, power and education were nothing; the Word of God was all, and more easily accessible

for the simple one than for the darkness of science: this was vain solace and recreation for hopeful downtrodden man. Now or never again had his time come.

Of the inciting character of the pamphlets and of the significant rôle which the poor man assumed as the advocate of the gospel, we have already spoken. Two more important factors of special importance regarding the great social upheaval must be considered,—astrology and radical preaching. Though we cannot regard them as the real cause of the revolution, none the less they intensified the exasperation of the people to that degree that an explosion was inevitable. Astrology, the only science of that time known to the country population, made the peasants believe that they were children of the planet Saturn, that is, born to suffer like criminals and vagabonds. Yet astrology also foretold the future vengeance of the common man, the whole in accordance with other forms of prophecy. And just as during the Reformation there appeared the apocalyptic compendium of the bishop of Lake Chiem, the astrologic literature greatly increased and would have surpassed as to quantity that of the period of the Reformation.

Above all, there was the announcement of a deluge for the year 1524. "Big posters and booklets with many curious and dreary pictures" arrested the interest even of the uneducated. How

the common man must have been pleased to behold on a woodcut pope, emperor and clergymen fleeing from the weapons of the peasants led by Saturn! The famous Viennese mathematician Tannstetter attempted openly to offer his science to the Reformation, and to foretell to the tyrants who opposed the gospel their approaching punishment: "Heaven prophesies much misfortune to the clergy; the peasants must stand up against the empire, and chiefly against the bishops and priests." He added that the union of the peasants would fight with little skill and bring misfortune upon them. The people, however, believed only what pleased them and cared naught about the rest. The astrologers themselves, whose audience consisted of noble and educated classes, seldom intended to incite the masses; only now and then came forward personages like the Suabian physician Alexander Sytz, who had fought against the nobility before he sent his letters to the diet of Worms foretelling the disastrous year 1524. In this accurate scientific ascertainment of the time during which all dreams of revenge would come true, lay the fatal importance of this astrological publication. A terror must have fallen upon the higher classes when there broke out—not the announced deluge, but a revolution, "a flowing of blood, and not of water."

The results of radical preaching were not so powerful, for the sermons were partly biblical or

mystical and were delivered from the pulpits of the churches, on the streets of the cities, or in the open fields of the country. Luther's activity had brought to an end, for a brief time at least, that popular mysticism of the prophets of Zwickau. Carlstadt was no longer leader; he abandoned the reformatory work of Luther and went his own way. In a neighboring village the former doctor settled as a plain peasant, wandered about in a gray smock as "Neighbor Endres," and as the youngest, fetched beer for the elder members of the community. He had already declared that poor workers knew better how to serve God than idle monks and nuns did. Shortly afterward he returned to his parish. At Orlamünde he displayed the fullness of his mysticism, whose "calmness," "speedy loneliness," and "lonesome yearning" he praised in a number of publications. One cannot say that he attempted a social revolution; only in the ecclesiastical field did he emphasize the independence of each individual community, and demand that the layman should be allowed to refute the statement of the preacher. His open fight against Wittenberg was connected with the doctrine of the Last Supper, which he conceived with a half-rationalistic idea, not without occasionally introducing as witness for his conception a peasant endowed with divine inspiration. His community was enthusiastic over him. "There live"—so said Luther sarcastically

with regard to it—"God and the Holy Spirit with all feathers and eggs."

But when Luther went to Thuringia in the summer of 1524, he encountered strong opposition. The people of Orlamünde, who had sent him a rough letter some time before, gathered around him, "as if they would devour him," and Luther, annoyed by the questions of an enlightened cobbler and other laymen, soon broke off the conversation and speedily left the city. "I was glad," he related, "that stones and mud were not thrown upon me." Carlstadt who had challenged his adversary to a literary combat at Jena, and had accused him and his community before the elector, was exiled by the latter, or, as he said in his letters to the men and the women of his community, "exiled by Martin Luther, in a manner unheard of and intolerable." He spent his life in wandering about; at Rotenburg, Strasburg, Basel, and other places the erudite, whimsical man, who attacked Luther as "the new papal sophist" and "antichrist's posthumous friend," found a good number of adherents, though not always shelter. An enthusiastic citizen of Rotenburg, the Latin teacher Ickelsheimer, severely attacked Luther as a persecutor of Christianity, a despiser of the common man, and a libertine. He compared the gray cape of Carlstadt, which Luther despised, with the worldly costume of the Reformer of Wittenberg, his "shirts adorned with little rib-

bons,"—and criticised his playing of the harp, not without mentioning the little chamber, "which stood above the water, wherein they drank and made happy with other doctors and gentlemen."

It is interesting to observe that Luther was at that time no longer the hero of the whole of anti-Roman Germany, that with many a Protestant group the charm of his personality was gone, and his position was regarded as being surpassed by others. The ideal of the Protestant radicals, "a humble and conquered Christian who is only a Christian," seemed to rank higher than the naturalness of the great translator of the Bible into German. Just as the impression had been when Luther declared that peasants and children knew more about Christ than the entire hierarchy, so it was now when Carlstadt said that the peasants at Hellingen, Neustadt, Fri-Ortla and other villages could speak in a manner more Christian and skillful than Doctor Luther.

This reference to the peasants must be taken quite literally.

Not only the honest workmen in the cities, but the men from the fields, sometimes took seriously the idea of universal priesthood and of the duties of each individual Christian; for, as the Suabian furrier Lotz remarked, the disciples had also been "wicked laymen," and the true doctrine could not be obtained from men, but from the Lord as the

only true "teacher." Many Protestant preachers, for instance, Matthew Waibl of Kempten, attempted to induce ordinary laymen to announce the Word of the Lord. Thus the peasant Häberlin was preaching before an immense audience at Allgäu, and intended to distribute the Last Supper among them. He was induced to preach by a peasant who had also stood "on the pulpit," and he knew well how to tell his audience of the hosts which do not contain Christ but the very devil.

The existing state of affairs was best characterized by the fact that clergymen acted as mere laymen, and educated people as peasants. Thus a Suabian priest gathered a large audience about him by roaming around as a wandering preacher in country costume, and displaying such buffoonery as holding his books upside down, and putting his feet on tables or chairs. This so-called "Peasant of Wöhrd," whose eloquence made a deep impression upon everyone, came to Franconia from Suabia and was active at Nürnberg and Rotenburg. Nicholas Storch, the prophet of Zwickau, also boasted of his inability to read and write. Besides the sermons of the Peasant of Wöhrd there were a good many others by pretended illiterates.

While numerous preachers were furthering the competition of the laymen and taking part as pious deceivers, others roused the country population by their severe attacks upon the ecclesiastical tithe and

the custom of taking interest. Thus the Swiss Jacob Strauss, after he had been active at Berchtesgaden and Hall, severely denounced "usury" while preaching at Eisenach, and his words the pope as well as jurists tried to palliate, speaking of them as showing a "rude unchristian spirit." He exhorted not to use violence, but demanded that the poor man should obey God more than man, and not succumb to antichristian usury. Schappeler of Memmingen regarded all usury and tithe as wholly unchristian; heaven was open for the peasants, while closed to nobility and clergy. Waibl of Kempten, Brumfels of Strasburg and others spoke and wrote similarly. Doctor Mantel of Strasburg referred the "poor pious man" to the Jewish jubilee, during which all debts had been cancelled. How then could all warnings not to rebel be of any avail among such words? The little man, the peasant, suddenly saw all his dreams come true; the preachers of the gospel themselves had granted him full franchise, and the refusal to pay those heavy and hated taxes became a sacred duty with him.

Most of those apostles of the newly recognized truth believed in the irresistible power of the Word; "Christ," said Strauss, "will lay low by the power of speech the tyrants, and the sword of the gospel will destroy everything unchristian without causing bodily wounds." Carlstadt and his followers openly deserted Thomas Münzer and his adherents; in

1524, the people of Orlamünde wrote to those of Alstedt that they could not enter into an alliance with them, who were armed only with the harness of faith, whereas they were free Christians. For, in the small Thuringian city of Allstädt, Münzer had introduced not only a real German service, but he sought to found there a center for a radicalism whose fantastic forms could not fail to win the susceptible minds of the people. We cannot deprive of a sincere idealism the man who had made himself the prophet of the "lower rude classes" and the peasants, and who was indignant over the miserable condition of those people. The passion of revenge was but dimly buried in this firm Lower Saxon. Like Luther, he had responded to the influence of a citizen of Taul, and at the same time had learned the apocalypse of Abbot Joachim, the source of late medieval fanaticism. Through the "waves" of attacks directed against him and much reflection he had obtained an inner conception of God which, according to his idea, could never be obtained by means of the "Holy Letter," even if one would devour a hundred thousand Bibles. The Bible was made to kill, he further maintained, and to revive. The extremest hellish tortures of despair, "cruel roaring of streams," were an indispensable preparation for the Chosen One; "such miserable people were the best of all." Yet the favored ones should, therefore, as the theory of the Taborites demanded,

be rewarded with the dominion over the world. "Kings should obey them, and that nation that would refuse to obey them should be destroyed," insisted the radical Hussite, using the words of the prophet. "Then cometh the Lord," wrote Münzer to his brethren at Stolberg, "and overthroweth the tyrants; He aideth whoso with patience awaiteth the Lord."

In strong contrast to the teaching and practice of the people of Wittenberg, stood that "spirit of Allstädt" which did not despise the gaining of strength through visions and dreams. Münzer's actions were frequently not wholly normal; he often awoke the people at night on the ground that fire was destroying the city and himself, and ran about with weapons as if some one was trying to seize him.

Yet his appearance and teaching made a profound impression upon the lower classes. From many Thuringian cities they journeyed to Allstädt, till the destruction of a neighboring chapel induced the government to banish the dangerous prophet who had regarded the christening of children as a "beastly apish play." Previously Münzer had preached before the elector and Duke John, calling upon the "dear rulers" to stand up against all enemies of the gospel; "the godless had no right to live," he contended. If the princes, however, did not obey the word of Christ they would be devils instead of servants of God. He told them plainly that the

power of the sword was with the entire community, and that princes and lords were the source of usury, theft and robbery. After his exile he resided at the imperial city of Mühlhausen, where the previous Cistercian, Henry Pfeiffer, had preached the gospel and incited the population against the counselors. At Langensalza, too, the workmen and their wives became quite active, desiring to share in the wealth of the rich.

Soon afterward we meet Münzer at Nürnberg, where he published his "Noble Speech and Reply against the effeminate, spiritless Flesh of Wittenberg." Other attacks upon Luther had been published. Münzer summed up his opinion shortly and concisely: "Those who merely preach the gospel are fattened swine." Luther, who was nicknamed Doctor Liar, Virgin Martin, Arch-Papan, Pope of Wittenberg, Chaste Babylonian Dame, appeared, as he did in all the Catholic pamphlets, as a libertine and miserable servant of the princes. His "Christ as sweet as honey" was sneered at, his denial of the freedom of will was regarded as forward and vicious. The "World-devouring Spirit," as Luther called him, was believed to conjure up the old ghosts of the German Taborites, and to cause a revolution whose motto it was to slay all the godless and not pity the "weed in the fields." One of those pamphlets bore the signature, "Thomas Münzer with the Hammer."

We must not forget that, in addition to such offsprings of a radical mysticism, serious, positive propositions regarding the changing of modern Germany were also current, propositions whose reasonableness and consequent carrying out of certain general principles remind us of the eighteenth rather than of the sixteenth century.

The plans of a new formation of the ecclesiastical and civil classes, as laid down by Eberlin in his "Statutes of the Land Wolfaria" (1521), show many fantastic peculiarities, but the effort of simply and systematically organizing the future community was quite modern. All offices, even that of the king, should be subject to election; every village was to have a nobleman as mayor; 200 farms secured one knight as bailiff, 10 bailiwicks were governed by a city or its counts, and finally 10 cities were ruled by a duke or a prince. One of the princes was to be elected king, who was to depend upon the council of princes. The bourgeois were of no importance whatever; agriculture was regarded as the noblest way of supporting oneself, and everybody was allowed to make use of wood and water; the counselors were partly peasants and partly noblemen, who also supported themselves by means of tilling the fields. Importation of wine and cloth was forbidden, and that of wheat was permitted only on special occasions, while the prices of bread and wine were fixed by the government. The number

of workmen should not be too great, else there would be overproduction. All the proceedings against luxury and immorality, were to be of Draconic severity, and drunkards and adulterers were to be put to death. Eberlin further demanded that boys and girls should be at least eighteen and fifteen respectively when they married; widows or widowers should be allowed to marry within ten weeks. Excellent was the idea of compulsory education, which was to be gratuitous, whereas the plan of Eberlin which required that children should study, until their eighth year, Latin and German, Greek and Hebrew, astronomy and medicine, carried the system into Utopian regions.

More effective than these widely spread pamphlets were the so-called "Reformations," which were current and adorned with the name of the emperor. In addition to the recently imposed reformation of Sigismund, there was one by Frederick III, known as the "German Nation's Need," which paid chief attention to the lower classes of the bourgeois, while the former revolutionary pamphlet of 1438 was chiefly devoted to the interests of the peasants. All cities and villages of the empire were to obtain an entirely new constitution. A whole series of demands related exclusively or chiefly to the interests of the cities. Workers and craftsmen should receive decent wages, all roads should be free, and tolls and taxes abolished, especially the indirect ones;

business concerns and individual merchants should be allowed a capital of 10,000 florins at the most, and the rest should fall to the government, which was to make loans to "poor skillful fellows," at the rate of 5 per cent. There should also be uniformity of mintage, weights and measures. The Roman and canonic law was to be abolished. Doctors, priests and princes were to be proceeded against very severely. This pamphlet, on the whole, represented the interests of the common man in the cities, rather than those of the peasant, and we find in it no traces whatever of an agrarian revolution. None the less, the booklet became the model of an imperial reform, drawn up in the peasant chancery at Heilbronn.

There is a spark of truth in the statement that the cities were the actual cause of the Peasants' War; for the revolutionary spirit had its home in the cities, where were cultivated the mystic, astrologic, and apocalyptic dreams, and there the new preachers of the gospel attained dignity. The idea of the moral superiority and reformatory character of the future was obtained from the city, where a number of democratic pamphlets were published. Once more city and country united against their masters, though greatly at variance with each other over education and material interests.

After the quenching of the last insurrection of

the peasants in southwest Germany and the Alps, new difficulties arose in 1521. From southern Tyrol down to Venice the peasant began to nurse grievances and refuse obedience. With the activities of the exiled Ulrich of Württemberg, who signed his pamphlets with "Motz Bur" (that is, "Ulrich the Peasant"), was connected the fact that at Hegau and Thurgau, in 1522, the peasants had planned an invasion of Württemberg. Their banner contained a golden sun and the inscription, "Whoever wants to be free, let him join this sign of the sun." From Alsace also riots of peasants were reported; in Suabia and Switzerland the subjects of ecclesiastic lords refused the payments of tithes and other taxes. During the spring and summer of 1524, a great insurrection seemed to draw nearer. In May, the people of Forchheim defied the counselors and were joined by the country population of the vicinity. This uprising embraced likewise the peasants of Nürnberg, all of whom demanded free hunting and fishing. Shortly afterward the democrats of Augsburg planned a mutiny because of the exile of a Protestant preacher, but the radical weavers, tailors, and saloon keepers thought the occasion ripe to overthrow the government and attack the rich. It was stated that the community was more than the counselors, and the latter ought to be thrown out of the windows, as was done in Austria some time before, (at the Hussitic Prague). They demanded

that all ecclesiastical taxes and the liquor impost of the city should be abolished.

All these preludes of the revolution could be suppressed but the fear grew when new insurrections of the Suabian peasants were reported. "It might happen that even imperial cities would join the insurgents." It was believed further that the Upper Suabian peasants would enter into an alliance with the Swiss. In July, 1524, the peasants of Thurgau, numbering several thousand, set an example of protection of the gospel by force when they destroyed the monastery of Ittingen after the exile of a preacher, warning at the same time that "they would do so to all the other monasteries."

Entirely free from all Protestant elements appears that great movement which is regarded as the real beginning of the great Peasants' War. When in June, 1524, the peasants of the landgraviate of Stühlingen (near Schaffhausen) stood up against their masters, the counts of Lupfen, it was only a protest against slavery and exorbitant taxes. There is a well-known story according to which the countess had asked the peasants to gather little snail shells for the winding of cotton. The working time and the working power of the peasants were misused by their masters in a most disgraceful manner.

It will be interesting to discuss more fully the

complaints of the people of Stühlingen. The power of the court was employed most arbitrarily; stolen things were not returned to the owner but confiscated by the court; the forests and the rivers were closed, and there were many personal services which resembled that named in the above story. The peasants were compelled to do all sorts of farm work for the counts or their bailiffs, to assist them during the chase, to fish for them, etc. Whenever the counts established a hunting territory on the soil of the peasants, the latter could not till the field, nor catch nor chase away for more than twenty feet the animals which destroyed their acres, under penalty of losing one eye. They were forced to feed their masters' dogs, but must not prevent them from killing chickens or other fowl. They were permitted to sell their ducks and geese only to their masters. They had to supply the castle with coal and wood, and whenever sentenced to death were forced to furnish the wood for the erection of the pyre.

The inevitable and woful result was a peasantry which could no longer resist the frightful and ever-increasing demands upon them, which could no longer support their wives and their children, and no longer obtain unbiased law and justice. As the only means of self-preservation, they took up arms, numbering at first about 1,000 men, "and chose leaders and other officers, and painted one flag,

white, red and black." The people of the Abbey St. Bläsen of Hegau, Kletgau and Thurgau joined them; attempts to mediate were futile, for the peasants did not feel like imploring forgiveness on their knees and barefooted, and "they knew not," said the chronicle of Villingen, "who would help them and were wild like foxes." Their leader, Hans Müller of Bulgenbach, who had donned a red cap and red cloak, occupied the Austrian city Waldshut. By this act the insurrection of the peasants was not turned into a Protestant organization, as some have believed, for even later the people of Stühlingen knew nothing of the gospel; yet a connection was established between the agrarian and the religious movement, and also between city and country. For the people of Waldshut were openly opposed to the government, which a short time before had set a horrible example by punishing the "heretics" of Kenzingen im Breisgau. Many were beheaded, including the city clerk, the latter in the presence of his wife and children, and kneeling before a heap of ashes of burned gospels and Lutheran writings. But Waldshut sided with its preacher, the fiery Balthasar Hubmaier of Friedberg, who had been a pupil of Eck and caused a massacre of the Jews at Regensburg.

Many Zurich volunteers came to the aid of their Waldshut "brethren"; "Christ Jesus," they wrote to their counselors, "is our head and our

leader." The government of Zurich also furthered the insurrection by advising the peasants of Kletgau, who originally would not join the people of Stühlingen, to cling to the true godly word; it thought that the movement was a purely Protestant one, while the Catholic cantons for political reasons did not by any means wish an armed intervention on the side of the archduke. It was frequently believed in the German empire that the Upper German cities contemplated an alliance with the Swiss; in December, 1524, the Protestant confederates actually spoke of an alliance with Strasburg. In southwestern Germany there was ancient revolutionary soil and, aside from the dangerous vicinity of Switzerland, Duke Ulrich was quite active in those regions. He resided on the Hohentwiel, and negotiated with the nobility and its worst enemy, the peasants, for it was indifferent to him how he should obtain his country. Archduke Ferdinand and his Innsbruck Regiment had good grounds to fear a "main war" and to avoid it, especially since the occupation of Milan by the French called the young Hapsburg's attention to the Italian war theater. "Thus it happened," says Baumgarten, "that nothing serious was undertaken, either against the religious-rebelling Waldshut or against the social-revolutionary peasants."

We have no definite information regarding Thomas Münzer's activity during his stay at

Kletgau. After one winter had passed without the government undertaking anything worth while, a victorious advance of the revolutionists and their inseparable union with the "Gospel" and the "Divine Right" took place. The latter phrase of the divine right or the righteousness of God was by no means new, so that it is interesting to notice that the people of Stühlingen made almost no use of it in their protests, and referred rather to common right and justice or to traditions.

The ever-growing movement could not but recall so valuable a means, which obtained dignity through the Reformation and which the peasants regarded as being of great importance. What had been previously uttered by insignificant groups,—poor people, or bands of fanatic peasants,—could now be spoken with greater boldness. Throughout Germany the great themes of the gospel and Christian freedom, were verified by proverbs from the Bible. As early as 1525, the people of Kletgau declared they would be willing to offer their masters all that was just, godly and Christian, if they would permit them to remain with the divine word and justice. The wishes and demands of the peasants were the same as before; if they asked for stronger preaching of the divine Word, they meant that kind of preaching which considered the tithes and other unbearable things contrary to the Bible. "The right of gospel," said Leonhard of Eck, the greatest

enemy of the oppressed, "to the peasants means nothing but freedom and that they would give nothing nor owe anything." And with regard to these events the statement of Schmoller seems to be true, that economical injustice after one decade must finally destroy the dams of the existing order; "there are no other causes of great social movements." Thus Christian freedom, which Luther had revealed to his contemporaries as the choicest fruit of religious life that had grown ripe, was turned to a worldly ideal, and as the battle cry of infuriated peasants did not govern or improve the social revolution, but had to serve it.

After spreading throughout Upper Suabian territory, the revolution began to learn of its own strength and the weakness of its adversaries. At Allgäu it found a people quite similar to the Swiss, who had revolted against their masters more than a century before, and the city of Memmingen was the natural center of attraction for the "bands" that organized themselves in the mountains and on the Suabian plains as well. While the stirring speeches of Schappeler had as early as 1524 roused the peasants of Memmingen and induced them to refuse the payment of the tithes, the traditional system of oppressing the peasants caused them to revolt at Kempten. They first attempted to settle peacefully all affairs before the Suabian Confederacy, but its recognized leader, the dyer George Schmid, whose

father is said to have perished in one of the prisons of Kempten, knew how to incite his friends as well as the subjects of the neighboring masters. At a meeting held at Südofen February 14, 1525, it was decided that masters were no longer needed, the people should protect themselves by force and obtain their God-given rights, as had been demanded a short time before by the peasants of Ried on the Danube. After December, 1524, the peasants of Ried met in saloons, "as if they would have beer-parties"; their headquarters were at Baltringen, near Biberach. Ulrich Schmid of Sulmentingen, through whom "the Holy Ghost apparently spoke," was made leader. On February 9, 1525, he notified the Suabian Confederacy, through an embassy of 4,000 which was sent to Baltringen, that his people would not rebel, but would free themselves from all complaints on account of the godly right.

During the ten following days the band increased to 12,000, and after ten more days 30,000 under arms gathered around Schmidt, who regarded the godly right as the only authority after the confederacy had advised him to appeal to the imperial court. Meanwhile, the people of Allgäu had also adopted a constitution, according to which all brethren of Jesus Christ should be treated in accordance with the holy gospel, the godly word and the holy right. At the same time they notified Archduke Ferdinand of their peaceful plans; they

appealed to him as the imperial governor, the lover of justice, the cause, originator and protector of the godly right. We cannot help being moved by these insignificant people, tortured by their masters and driven toward self-protection, who in the last moment, however, turned toward the emperor, from whom the lower classes of the nation had been accustomed to obtain help and salvation. But the emperor was far away and, like the young Infante who was to represent him, he would not have lent his ear to the misery and sufferings of the heretical German peasants.

The people of Baltringen and those of Algäu were soon joined by the so-called "band of sailors," who were settled chiefly near Lake Constance and were "the most valiant of all Suabians." They held very radical intentions against their masters and the cities, but knew little of a new Protestant conception of the godly right. As among the Hussites, noblemen were their leaders. On March 7, the "Christian Union" was organized at Memmingen, through the decisions of which the Protestant tendencies of Schappeler, Ulrich Schmid and the furrier Sebastian Lotzer, who was made field-clerk, were laid aside for the time. Shortly afterward, at a new meeting of the peasants at Memmingen, the famous Twelve Articles were created which, disregarding localities and without confining themselves to any nationality, contained the demands of

"all peasants and subjects of ecclesiastical and worldly magistrates."

Thus the people of Memmingen and the personality of Schappeler proved victorious. The Twelve Articles were to a large extent identical with a proposition of the peasants of Memmingen, made before the council of peasants. According to Baumann, these people were greatly aided when drawing up the Articles by a group of reformers of Memmingen. To this group belonged Schappeler and Lotzer, who also participated in the organization of the Christian Union. Lotzer had proved by his popular writings that he could use the pen as well as the sword and was entitled to be regarded as a "Sage in the cities." His social-political attitude, without the communistic feature of which he was often accused, made him a sharp critic of the anti-Protestant rich people who feared for their possessions. His sincere desire was to "help the poor." Just as Schappeler had become the right preacher of the Upper Suabian peasants, so Lotzer represented that Protestant democracy in the cities whose sympathies would greatly benefit the peasants.

The Twelve Articles were a genuine agrarian programme if their biblical argumentation was disregarded, and established the principle of the community. Upon that religious coloration depended the immense effect of the Articles and their general acceptance. The language was modest, full of

vigor, much adorned with biblical sayings, and offered always to turn people to the better by means of the godly word, the whole being in wonderful harmony with the existing religious conditions. The accusation of rebellion was rejected as an offense against the gospel after which the peasant would live.

We see nothing of the passion of Luther's works; only in the introduction is found a somewhat stronger tone. "Who will stand up against the Lord? Has He not listened to the woes of the children of Israel, and saved from the power of Pharaoh, and will He forsake his children today? Yea, He will save them, and in brevity." They humbly requested that the community should possess the power of electing and deposing its priests; for only through real faith could one approach the Lord according to the Bible. The Articles contained a well wrought-out system of demands, with frequent reference to the godly word. The second Article promised liberation from the payment of tithes, with the only difference that the community itself should exact them, to maintain the priests, to aid the poor, and finally for military purposes. In the third Article slavery was abolished; "Since Christ has redeemed and saved us all through his precious blood, both the shepherd and the king, excepting none; hence in accordance with the Holy Scriptures, we ought to be free and want to be

free." This was not to be understood that they demanded to be entirely free from any higher power; for they fain would obey their magistrates "installed by the Lord in Christian and many other affairs." The following two articles demanded freedom of water and woods, chase, fisheries, wood for burning and building. Concerning market or hunting privileges, which their masters had bought, they should "settle in a manner Christian and fraternal."

A number of articles dealt with taxes and the rendering of service; the latter was to be limited, the people "should serve as did their parents, yet in accordance with the word of the Lord." The heavy taxes should be abolished, including capital punishment as being contrary to "God and Honor"; partiality of the courts and heavy penalties should cease.

The quintessence of that peculiar pamphlet was the "godly right." To abolish slavery, that is to establish freedom, was the central desire of the peasants; the granting of this prayer would mean a perfect emancipation of the country population and a certain participation of the liberated communities in political affairs. There were two facts which opposed a peaceful settlement of the agrarian programme: in the first place, lack of good will on the side of the majority of the masters; then that evangelization of the "godly right" which furthered a

revolutionary propaganda, yet made impossible a peaceful settlement because of its demand to settle it in strict accordance with the Bible. The peasants drew up a list of competent interpreters of the "godly right," among whom were Luther, Melancthon and Zwingli, while Schappeler's name was missing. In a later appeal to the Suabian Confederacy, we find the names of Luther and Melancthon alongside of those of the archduke and the elector of Saxony. Of course all knew that the confederacy would not grant their demands; and to what extent the peasants were to find themselves deceived in the confidence which they had placed in Luther, we shall see later on.

From the beginning the peasants were prepared to have their demands rejected and to make use of violence should it become necessary. The three bands began to fortify all castles and monasteries that did not belong to the Christian Union. To the Twelve Articles was added a letter which forbade anybody to join the Christian Union, under pain of worldly excommunication, and imposed ban upon monasteries, castles and churches as being places of treachery, force and misery. The sign of worldly ban, a measure advocated by the reforms of Sigismund, consisted in the erection of a pillar in front of the house of the one who was then regarded as outlawed.

The suppliants had good reason to be prepared

and under arms. When the government of Innsbruck advised negotiations with the people of Stühlingen while preparation should be made, Archduke Ferdinand attempted with all his might to suppress the insurrection. "Suspicious places," he said, "should be occupied, the subjects should be forced to confess, and the leaders stabbed, choked, and not to be pitied in any wise." It was no easy matter to win the lords to this bloody enterprise or, as Leonhard of Eck, the representative of Bavaria in the Suabian Confederacy, said, "to rouse a more manly spirit within the magistrates." Even in the Suabian Confederacy, which was the only protection of the endangered South German lords, the ferocious attitude of the Bavarian statesman was not agreed to. The leader of the confederacy, the grim Augsburg Ulrich Artzt who once said he would love to flog one of the Lutheran preachers with his own hands, did not hate the peasants so much as did the Bavarian Eck.

The revolution was greatly aided by the fact that the councilors of Ulm were much occupied with Duke Ulrich of Württemberg who, in February, 1525, attempted to reconquer his province. He had allies everywhere as far as Bohemia; here Hartmut • of Kronburg and the suspicious John of Fuchstein were working in his behalf. Yet Ulrich's expedition was brought to naught before the middle of

March, the chief blame for which was to be put upon his Swiss soldiers, who deserted the duke, influenced by Austrian money. Only with considerable difficulty did Ulrich escape captivity. The results of the battle at Pavia had affected these events; returning soldiers furnished excellent material for the army of the confederacy and the princes, but many of them joined their old companions, the peasants.

As early as March the peasants said they would start a campaign to obtain money for a bigger army; they boasted that they had dispatched embassies to Bohemia, to the imperial soldiers in Milan and the elector of Saxony. On March 25, the council of Ulm entered into an armistice with the Christian Union, while in the meantime the peasants were to undertake nothing and to intrust pending difficulties to the courts of arbitration. Thus they would have lost all their military advantages and have renounced the basis of the godly right. Again, who guaranteed that their masters would grant general amnesty or accept any arbitration of the courts? But they were well prepared to enter into alliances with all villages, castles, monasteries, and cities. Leipheim opened its gates before them and, north of the Danube, they began to be active in Württemberg, at Ries, and as far as Franconia. Of course the armistice was not observed, though the horsemen of the confederacy ceased fighting against

smaller groups of peasants. Attempts to bring about peace remained futile.

Toward the end of March the leader of the confederacy, George Truchsess of Waldburg, declared against the peasants, and on the 4th of April he put to flight those of Leipheim, amounting to several thousands. There was no serious resistance on the side of the peasants; those who escaped the slaughter were driven into the Danube. Artzt maintained that none of the Suabian confederates was killed and only a few horses were injured. A few days previous the people of Leipheim had taken to flight, after a futile attack upon the city of Weissenhorn. Humorous and pitiful was the terror which overtook the peasants of Schwäbisch-Hall after the people of the city had attacked them also on the 4th of April. They "trembled as though they were ants, and tottered like geese." They fell down after hearing the mere noise of the cannons though no one was killed, and they rose again after the shooting was over, like "the Jews on the Olive Mountain," and "ran as fast as they could," led by their "valorous" Stephen. What a contrast to the death-defying and warlike Hussites! "Thus," wrote Eck, "did the peasants have a miserable beginning."

After Leipheim and Günzburg were surrendered, their leaders were beheaded, including the preacher Jacob Wehe, a relation of Eberlin. He met his death with pious countenance, maintaining that he

did not preach insurrection, but only the godly word. Meanwhile, the separation of the people of Baltlingen gave the elector an opportunity to return to his own endangered province, and on April 14 he defeated a strong army near the city of Wurzach. As we learn from an old knight who took part in the expedition, "it was raining peasants everywhere."

Those who were defeated at Wurzach retreated to Weingarten, but only to obtain a more favorable position and reinforcements. They dispatched men to Hegau, the Black Forest and other places, to seek aid. There was a large number of trained soldiers among them; the main army stood on the hill, and below were trenches dug in the field and guarded by several thousand bowmen. The offensive opened April 17, and the elector thought it advisable to resume negotiation. The peasants promised to dissolve their unions and make their complaints before a court of arbitration; they also surrendered a good many of their flags, which the elector soon tore asunder. He was fortunate in not being attacked by the people of Allgäu, who came to the aid of the peasants. It was human nature that peace and a miserable life were considered of more importance than anything else, and the majority of these warriors knew nothing of the voluntary homelessness of their Hussite brethren. Yet this treaty concluded on April 22 remained merely a "scrap of

paper," for hostilities now opened everywhere. When the Upper Suabians were about to lay down their arms, the insurrection broke out all over Alsace, Franconia, Hesse and the electorate of Saxony, and the peasants stood by the proletariat of the city. The "Bloody Palm Sunday" at Weinsberg was like the beginning of the day of judgment for the lords. Concerning these stormy weeks in April and May, 1525, there is a very good account written by Valerius Anshelm, chronicler of Berne. At first it was believed that the movement was directed against the hierarchy, but later on such an order was annulled. "While churches and castles were attacked," said a Regensburg contemporary, "all was right, and the whole world laughed," and noble lords sometimes surpassed the peasants in maltreating a priest. Horrible scenes took place after the occupation of monasteries and the brutality of degraded nature showed itself in all its dreadful hideousness. It was accepted as a matter of course when a Franconian peasant of Kitzingen was seen bowling with the skull of St. Hadilogis, highly honored as a relic.

The comparison of the rebelling peasants with the beasts of the field was often correct, when those ferocious fellows were splashing along in wine that reached to their knees, tumbling down intoxicated, or jabbing their swords and javelins into the cattle that belonged to the monastery. The lust for booty

and to destroy everything went hand in hand. Seldom did they turn against priests; and when they did so, their leaders usually intervened. Of course the priests were alarmed when they saw their former servants approaching. "One roared like a wild bull," said the monk Furter of Irrsee. "Another lifted up his hand and shouted, 'ough!' a third jumped and danced." Everything was destroyed, books and documents were torn to pieces, and even the windows were smashed.

The peasants burst into the pipes of the broken organ, while the trembling monks waited before the altar till an attack upon the inner sanctuary compelled them to carry the endangered Body of the Lord outside of the devastated monastery. Often a grim humor appeared. "If we had not been in great distress," related a nun of the convent at Hegbach, "it would have been a miracle, if one of us did not die from laughing, while seeing all that took place; some had two or three shawls in their hands, others wore two veils each, others put many things into their bosoms, and many on their backs, some put three petticoats on, a fur costume, a white and a gray dress."

The laughing, of course, was dearly paid for when one considers the dreadful devastation of ecclesiastical estates, of buildings and arts, because of which the short-lived mastery of the peasants will never be forgotten. It was a frightful protest

against a civilization in which they had had no part whatever. The Alsatian peasants trampled through torn books and manuscripts which reached to their knees, and they kindled a fire with the library of the Monastery of Mauersmünster. Thus the Taborites destroyed whole libraries, even as the English revolutionists in 1381 strove to do away with all that related to education.

It is difficult to ascertain how much the religious element can be made responsible for these outrages; social distinctions were probably the main cause. A superficial study of the agrarian revolution of 1525 could easily make it a religious war. In addition to the statements of the peasants that they demanded only the godly right, the gospel, pure preaching, Christian and fraternal love, traces of a radically mystical attitude appeared now and then, for a few leaders of the peasants regarded the wild behavior of their drunken bands as the will of God. "God and the Holy Ghost were working in the people," they said, "and before the people of Allgäu firebrands were shining as before the children of Israel in the wilderness,"—a phenomenon which could be observed quite frequently in the course of the burning and destroying expeditions. The preacher Vogel of Eltersdorf in Franconia, gathered all his people round him with the purpose of forming an earthly divine empire.

Interesting also were the addresses of the peasants.

and their leaders, written to "the beloved brethren in Christ." The people of Baltringen started their letter to the city of Ehingen which asked for assistance, with "Much hail, grace, peace and strong faith in Christ." The peasants from the Black Forest, before the siege of Freiburg, wrote, "Peace and Mercy from God the Almighty ever with us through our Lord Jesus Christ," after they had notified their friends that they were near the city, in which they intended to preach the holy gospel to the common people, and obey all magistrates both ecclesiastical and worldly, in accordance with the gospel. To this bold statement, many threatening words were added; the heading of the second letter read like a menace: "Evangel, Evangel, Evangel."

These armed bands of peasants called themselves Christian or holy Protestant groups. Their marks of distinction, the "little flags" which played a quite important part, usually contained pictures of the tools of the peasantry, such as a plowshare, flail, dungfork, etc., and also religious symbols, crosses, the name of Christ, or the letters V. D. M. I. E. (*verbum domini manet in eternum*), which the courtiers of Elector Frederick had embroidered on their sleeves for years. The peasants of Württemberg adopted the figure of the Holy Virgin, a reminiscence of former insurrections. Very interesting was the little flag of the people of Hermeberg, on which were painted a crucifix, a bird,

a stag, a fish, and a forest, to indicate what they meant by godly right and Christian freedom.

There were always plenty of ecclesiastical leaders and counselors of the peasants; they were sometimes forced to join the rebels, but often volunteered. It frequently happened that the priest participated in emptying wine cellars and, being drunk, seized a little flag, calling his own people under arms. Clergymen were almost always found among the rebels, generally as their leaders. They were a heterogeneous band of people,—pious fanatics, or social outcasts, that “could no longer earn their livelihood,” hence took up arms. Many of these poor priests and preachers knew the misery of the country population of which they themselves were part and parcel. The haughty and wealthy monasteries ought not to remain unpunished for their indifference at, and even furthering of, an ecclesiastical proletariat.

Thus the significance of the ordinary clergyman as against the prelate and the monk was augmented, while on the other hand, through protesting against the payment of tithes and other ecclesiastical taxes, the clergymen were depriving themselves of their previous support. Consequently the Twelve Articles guaranteed sufficient sustenance to the village priest, for the old hatred of the peasants against the clergymen had no religious background; that hatred was—aside from the general moral protest of the lay-

men against the shameless behavior of the clergymen—turned upon the lords in the ecclesiastical tunic, the numerous little “papal dominions,” the landownership of the priests, and finally the financial system of the Church and its heavy taxes.

How could the worldly lords assume that a “Protestant” revolution which destroyed monasteries and churches, would spare their castles? The “Articles concerning Castles and Monasteries” changed the attitude of those who had not clearly understood the beginnings of the movement which was directed against worldly lords.

The peasants of Baltringen began their attacks in March, and five castles were destroyed by fire during the first few days. At the same time, a number of armies were created north of the Danube, where the godly right was accepted more radically than in Upper Suabia. The Franconians, who were easily influenced by Hussites and other heretics, surpassed the Suabians in their ferocious cruelty. Peasants of Rotenburg and vicinity gathered at Ohrenbach on March 21, and with pipes and drums, laughter and cheers marched through the city. The whole country flew to arms. On March 26 a group of peasants met at Oberschopf, “took a drum and a bear on which they had set a hat and marched turbulently against Unterschopf, whose peasants came out to meet them, with crucifixes in their hands. Undismayed, they crowded together into

the inn, to the holy wine." Lorenz Fries, secretary of the bishop of Würzburg, who related the above said one might doubt whether the Peasants' War should not be called the "Wine War." The inns were beloved of the peasants and frequently, as during the Tyrolean Insurrection of 1809, the innkeepers headed the revolutionists. Thus the landlord George Metzler became leader of the peasants in the Oden Forest and, subsequent to March 26, the "Protestant Army" gathered round him. The rebel of the Neckar Valley, Jäcklein Rohrbach of Böckingen, sitting in an inn and conversing with his Heilbronn companion over the wine said, "I shall begin to lead a Christian life and organize a band of peasants." The people of the Oden Forest and Neckar Valley were united and spread terror throughout the border lands of Württemberg. They were strengthened by the so-called "Black Band," which consisted of Rotenburg peasants and soldiers, under the leadership of a radical knight. Florian Geyer of Giebelstadt left his castle and joined the union of the peasants; eager to destroy all castles, and leave to his former companions "only one door." He boasted that he and his brethren had carried on the war in such a way that every prince should have the dancing before his own door, and not be able to aid his neighbor. Naturally he felt at times as if "he had entered into an alliance with the devil, and did not act according to the gospel."

Many Franconian noblemen joined the revolutionists. Götz von Berlichingen was probably not forced to unite with the peasants, as he had once asserted. He is said to have remarked that princes oppressed the noblemen as well as the peasants, and for a time he was leader, together with George Metzler, whose bands had gained notoriety. They were not content with the oath of loyalty which some lords had taken before them, nor with the fact that two counts of Hohenlohe were compelled to recognize the Twelve Articles under oath, while the two young counts of Löwenstein had to follow the army of the peasants in smocks and carrying sticks.

After the capture of Weinsberg, the wild demands of the peasants that all knights must die was carried into effect in a most appalling manner. Dietrich of Weiler and many others were hurled from the church tower, the captured lords and servants were put to death with shocking brutality, in order "to frighten and scare the nobility." A peasant musician seized the hat of Count Louis of Helfenstein, put it on, and stalked along the streets whistling gayly. He smeared his spear with the grease of the slain, and the black servant, the witch-like follower of the band, polished her shoes with it. This atrocity, however, was not new, for thus did the victorious soldiers conduct themselves with a slain Swiss in 1515. Helfenstein's wife,—a legal

daughter of Emperor Maximilian,—with her two-year-old child in her arms, begged vainly for mercy. The “little lord” was stabbed to death. Another of those outcasts donned the clothes of the slain count, and regarded it as a wonderful prank to sneer at the countess, who was deprived of her jewelry and clothing with the exception of one skirt, whose velvet embroidery was also ripped off. She was then seated on a dung-wagon and led to Heilbronn.

Such was the “Bloody Palm Sunday” (April 16) of Weinsberg, and its orgies of revenge make an undying impression, for the Peasants' War, upon the whole, did not show the furious cruelty with which it was charged by all contemporary and later historians. Unique were the bloody judgments of Weinsberg and the many fearful scenes in the Tyrol. We must not forget the cruelty of the ecclesiastical and worldly lords to the peasants; and the wonder is that people so oppressed did not commit more horrible crimes. By and by, the lords were able to prove their superiority in that respect. For awhile, they seemed “old women and almost dead,” according to Eck. A great many Franconian noblemen had joined the peasants, accepted the Twelve Articles, and promised to assist in destroying the monasteries. Some undertook to do it themselves. The South German lords were fortunate in that the peasants did not imitate the example of Weinsberg,

the leader of the Württemberg peasants. Matern Feuerbacher, an innkeeper like Metzler, but an able man, agreed to become leader on condition that the band of Weinsberg should be kept aloof. He took great pains with the discipline of his men and did his utmost to protect noble women from disgrace and plunder. He did not always succeed in restraining his soldiers, but he had many imitators who successfully checked the wildest atrocities of the revolvers, thereby risking their own lives and liberty. This fact alone shows that it was not religious fanaticism which dominated the South German peasants.

But the revolution could not remain confined to a series of economic demands after the Protestant preaching had seized one-half of Germany, from Lorraine in the West to the eastern Alps, and after the radicalism of the cities had entered into an alliance with it. The Twelve Articles of the Alsatian peasants went beyond the famous Upper Suabian programme, by not only omitting its harmonizing points, but by demanding the privilege of instituting officers and not recognizing any princely power they did not desire. Thus the movement began to assume political aims and it is interesting to observe in how many regions these aims bore the character of particularism, though in others they took on a general national character. In addition to the desire to displace many minor lords by one mon-

archic rule, the idea of sovereignty of the people was apparent in various guises. The revolution displayed a perfect particularism in a few ecclesiastical regions, directed toward a political change within the territory. The citizens and peasants of Bamberg notified their bishop that they would recognize him as the only ruler, and confiscate all estates of the clergy and nobility. The meeting of peasants at Herrenalt made the same proposition to the bishop of Speyer.

This confinement to domestic interests was seen also in the insurrection of the peasants, which after the beginning of May overturned the Austrian lands and chiefly the county of Tyrol. The connection between Bavaria and Austria was broken because Bavaria had been quite successful in preventing the revolution from spreading further. The mere putting on of a soldier's costume, or the intention of handing in an application at court, sufficed to throw the poor country people into prison, and to subject them to torture. Despite the Suabian proximity the peasants seemed to be ready to "betake themselves to the Suabian peasants," but "to stake their life and liberty in behalf of their princes." At the Peissen Mountain they took up arms to repel eventual attacks of the Suabians, and the dukes issued an appeal to their people, that they should "faithfully assist in preserving, saving and protecting the old Fatherland, themselves, honor, wives,

children and property." The waves of upheaval which were raging round Archduke Ferdinand, who resided at Innsbruck, were different. The Tyrolean people could not comprehend how "a count of Tyrol, Spanish himself and Spanish through and through, despising everything German and not knowing the language, should rule over a free country and introduce a Welsh tyrannic régime." Their hatred was directed against two,—the "stinking heretical Asarianic Jew" Salamanca, and the Smith Fabri. The imprudent cruelty of the government could not but increase the fury of the insurgents. At Brizen, where within three weeks forty-seven persons were handed over to the henchman, the insurrection broke out shortly before such an execution (May 10). The peasants freed a man from the Puster Valley, who was led to the place of execution, and they began to rage against clergy and nobility, and plunder and maltreat. In the convent of Dominican nuns at Steinach only one escaped outrage by the beastly creatures. Everywhere, north and south, the clergy, nobility and government could not possibly protect themselves against this elementary eruption of passion. "No matter how poor a priest was he had to lose all," said Kirchmair. Here, among a country population which was better situated than in most territories of the empire and even sent representatives to the country diets, foreign business organizations

with their extortion system, absolute régime, and the introduction of Roman law, had cleared the road for a revolution. Most of all, bishops and clergymen were hated; their worldly power should be abolished and a new Protestant organization established. The rest their leaders did.

The ablest among them was Michael Gaissmayr of Sterzing, former secretary of the bishop of Brixen. Tall and of noble countenance, he later on played the rôle of an Italian nobleman, but now as a rustic tribune of the people, he roused them by his eloquence. Still he did not go beyond Tyrol and the neighboring Alpine lands. In a letter of the rebels to the Lower Austrian lands, they referred to the German nation and the general insurrection of the peasants, and stated that they had decided to obey another power, or form a government of their own. At the parliament of the peasants at Meran, it was agreed that the county of Tyrol should become a purely worldly state, governed exclusively by the ruler of the country, with equal rights for all, and the priests and the officers of the court should be elected by the people. As the Tyrolean country diet drew nearer, a political change seemed to take place, together with a thorough secularization that would correspond to modern ideas of state, and would have given economic and legal superiority to the peasant.

At that time Cardinal Archbishop Matthaeus sat

in his besieged fortress Hohensalzburg, equally abominated by the citizens of his capital, whose freedom he utterly disregarded, and by his servants and peasants. Gradually the uprising spread among the Upper Austrian peasants, the workers in the Lower Austrian vineyards, and the Styrian miners, and iron-workers. What consequences might have flowed therefrom had these new sources come in contact, not only with each other, but also with the other German revolutionary armies! But while they hardly lifted their banners, the insignia of the peasants from the Vosges to the forests in Thuringia were trampled in the dust. The highest rise and the greatest decline of the German revolution took place within a few brief weeks.

"For 500 years" said a letter from Trentino, dated April 29, "Germany had not been in such a confusion; there were probably 300,000 peasants united to gain freedom and recognize no lord but the emperor." This idea of a democratic monarchy appeared in various forms. The oath which the Suabians took was "to obtain the Protestant Truth, Godly Justice, and brotherly Love, and have ONE lord, and no one else." Margrave Ernest of Baden was notified by his subjects that they would recognize him as their future ruler if he would govern as representative of the emperor and in accordance with the Twelve Articles. The idea of a great emperor, friendly to the people and hostile to the

lords, had been thought of by many for centuries; now that such a dream seemed about to be realized, the miracle vanished and a wild desire spread for a democratic republic.

While there could have been only a very few who expected to win over the ruling emperor for the revolution, many emphasized their desire to establish the future state according to their own taste. Balthasar Hubmair, the preacher of Waldshut, once held similar ideas regarding the right of the sovereign people to institute magistrates, and to depose them if they proved incapable of performing their duties. The peasants themselves firmly believed in "creating a genuine Christian and peace government," as the people of Württemberg wrote to the city of Stuttgart. The adherents of George Metzler replied to the request of the counts of Hohenlohe to grant them a court of arbitration, that they would accept peace neither from the emperor nor from the various classes, but only what the association of peasants would decide. And the peasants of Kissingen declared on April 17 that they would recognize Christ as their master, "not because we wish to live to be without a ruler, but because we wish to obey a ruler chosen by God and the whole community." The Suabian peasants are said to have discussed in March the election of a Roman king.

No doubt a part of the Suabians, like their Fran-

conian brethren were dominated by the idea of a radical political reform, by which all existing forms of government would be overthrown, and the numerous middle and small powers would cease. Even in Bavaria, the question was raised as to who had created the first nobleman or prince, and whether the peasant had not five fingers on his hand the same as the nobleman or prince. These tendencies, however, had no purely political character; consciously or unconsciously they were connected with the idea of social equality. Princes, counts and knights had to become peasants if they wished to join the new union. The doing away with all nobility appeared to be the final aim of the agrarian revolution, and of the brotherhood of all Christians, proclaimed by means of fire and sword.

We must now return to the above hinted reciprocal effect between city and country, between the radicalism of the bourgeois and the peasants. For if, on the one hand, the origin of the ideas adopted by the peasantry was to be looked for in the cities, the democratic schemes of the movement, on the other hand, profoundly influenced the people of the cities. We know that the old contrast between the ruling nobility and the communities and the method of bringing about reforms by means of force, were not forgotten by many cities, and since that time the struggle against the Church had variously loosened the ties of order, and greatly influenced the

counselors of the cities. In the larger were often met the most singular and the boldest representatives of radical ideas, who always had a great number of adherents. Nürnberg, the most intellectual city of the empire, contained probably the choicest of those radical elements. Münzer boasted that he could, had he so desired, have played a "fine trick" on the gentlemen of the council during his brief stay, "for happy days pleased them greatly, the toil of their laborers tasted sweet, yet often turned to bitter gall." Münzer and some of his companions could not endure the keen eyes of the magistrates, yet the latter were unpleasantly surprised by the instructor of St. Sebald and the noble and morally blameless Hans Dueck, who had thought out a religion of enlightenment which was not in harmony with the new doctrine introduced by the council. He was exiled after he had proven "unapproachable, confused, and cunning." The same fate befell some of his friends, the so-called "godless painters," including three of the most talented pupils of Dürer, Barthel, Hans Sebald Beham and George Pencz. "Whenever he heard of Christ," said Barthel to Beham, "he felt as if he heard of Duke Ernest, who is said to have ridden into the mountain." Not only with respect to religion did these "able and defying" young men regard as a fake whatever the existing sentiment considered holy; they would know nothing of privileges of the magistrates, and

were accused of communism and of having said, "People should cease working, it is time to divide."

It was this that scared the nobility; in it lay the connection between the armies of the peasants and the poor men of the cities. If princes and princely politicians accused the magistrates of the cities of having caused the Peasants' War, or at least of having furthered it, it was a hideous misrepresentation of the truth, yet a large part of the cities was always on the point of joining the peasants. From the beginning, therefore, the agrarian movement strove to come in touch with the cities. As the people of Stühlingen entered into agreements with Waldshut, so the Upper Suabian people held meetings at Memmingen, and after the first signs of war Suabian and Franconian cities joined their rustic "brethren." Everywhere the mass of those who possessed nothing fought to obtain control over everything. A cynical, yet clever spectator like Eck said: "There is a great split among the cities; the Lutheran whichso are poor agree with the peasants; the non-Lutheran or the Lutheran whichso are rich, disagree with the peasants."

Following March, 1525, the agrarian movement including that of the cities spread rapidly throughout Suabia, Franconia, Alsace and along the Rhine down to Cologne; Münster and Osnabrück rose in Westphalia, and Mühlhausen and Erfurst in Thuringia. The participation of a number of conserva-

tive cities was interesting. Thus, in Cologne, Mainz, Münster and Regensburg, the citizens primarily rose against the insufficiently controlled finances of the council, indirect taxes, and the exemption of the clergy from them. They declared that ecclesiastical competition should cease, as did the people of Münster, for instance, to the nuns of a neighboring convent, whose looms they took away or destroyed. There was no direct connection with the revolution of the peasants. The people of Frankfort also fought a war that was not sanguinary, without the assistance of the peasants, yet their articles of April 20 showed evident relationship with the Twelve Articles, and above all, with the ideas of Carlstadt, whose brother-in-law, Doctor Gerhard Westerburg of Cologne, was exiled from Saxony and became the center of a Protestant fraternity at Frankfort. His friend, the shoemaker Hans Hammerschmidt of Siegen, the tailor Nicholas Wild, and other leaders of the people, established a revolutionary committee with the council not being represented, since they themselves were counselors, mayor, pope and emperor, and in perfect accordance with the manifestations of the peasants. The Holy Scriptures were regarded as the only valid norm, and all other statutes and privileges were to be abolished as pagan and non-Christian. The demand of the Frankfort Articles to establish more severe laws concerning the morals of the clergymen, also

showed the influence of the religious movement. The counselors and aldermen were very fortunate in not being attacked by the Black Band of Florian Geyer when it passed through the city; some of the craftsmen declared they could not promise to protect the Jews and the clergymen. Here on the Rhine was again exhibited the great hatred against the usury of the Jews, as was done in the prelude to the Peasants' War. Not only the Frankfort, but the Mainz Articles demanded that commerce of the Jews should be restricted, whereas the people of the Rhine country and the peasants of Alsace wished to drive them out of the country altogether. In southern Tyrol many declared that all clergymen were Jews, and the rabble of Trentino destroyed only houses of the priests and the Jews.

Though there cannot be proved any relation whatever to the Peasants' War, yet the half-Protestant, half-democratic movement at Stralsund, and even at the far-off city of Danzig, in 1521, was quite characteristic. No one will doubt that, in case of a decisive victory for the peasants, the revolution in the cities would have assumed a communistic character. At Münster there were some who said that 2,000 florins would suffice for the rich. There were plenty of Catilinas who, like the Würzburg piper and musician Bermeter, "gambled and caroused daily without possessing hereditary estates or any other sort of income."

Ragged workers, old soldiers, notorious burglars, who had often come near the gallows, mingled with the better elements of the democracy of the cities, discussing the tempting theme of a general division.

The prominent revolutionary rôle played by the women was especially characteristic. We read of oral, written and active defense of the gospel by the women; they went further than the men, whose wild passion they sought to increase and surpass. At Nördlingen the clever wife of the leader, Anton Forner, boasted of being able to cause an insurrection if she moved only one finger; the women of Windsheim armed themselves with axes and knives, those of Rotenburg with forks and halberds, while at Uffenheim a number of them brought about a treaty with the city and the peasants. Finally, at Heilbronn, the females displayed great abilities in word and deed; they did not allow the closing of the gates before the peasants, and one of them tumbled a counselor who was hostile to the people down from the walls. "Why should they lament?" asked one, "we shall do no harm to the poor, yet only stab the rich." Just as many of these women took up arms and followed the band, like the witch of Böckingen, so the people of Heilbronn competed with the band of Weinsberg. With bloody spears and halberds some returned from Weinsberg, and the rumor spread that all would be killed who wore spurs, that the counselor would be thrown from the windows,

and be received upon hayforks. The revolutionaries consisted not only of such as possessed nothing but one bed and from four to six children, but also of well-to-do people. The revolution did not last long enough for the communistic ideas to develop; the desire to divide all property was found in their speeches rather than in their official manifestations. Even when arraigned before the count, the demagogue Hartlieb of Bamberg expressed his regrets that he had not been able to reform everything according to the gospel of Matthew. He referred to the parable of the workers in the vineyard, where the last became the first and all shared alike.

Whatever we have hitherto learned regarding the ideas and periods of the revolution, from the purely agrarian programme of the Upper Suabians down to the individual statements of the radicalism of the bourgeois, is of minor importance compared with the really magnificent projects of political reforms, as found among the Franconian revolutionaries. The rudest forms of the movement were there, if we disregard Münzer and his theocratic insanities, but Franconia also made an attempt to create a future for the German empire by means of these untamed powers,—an attempt which greatly alarmed the endangered magistrates of the sixteenth century. Here connection between city and country was very close, here also were important places like Rotenburg, Würzburg and Heilbronn, which served the

peasants as political and military bases, and the number of those who traveled to Würzburg constantly increased. On May 7, both the Protestant army under Götz and George Metzler, and the Franconian army, to which Florian Geyer and his Black Band belonged, had their headquarters near Würzburg; further north, in the region of Kissingen, the so-called Boldhausen Band was active.

The Protestant soldiers, or the White Band from the Oden Forest, preferred the Würzburg enterprise to the march against Frankfort. At Würzburg the rebellious citizens, led by Hans Berneter, the famous artist, Till Riemenschneider and other radicals, waited for their "Christian brethren" to overthrow the episcopal garrison of the fortress of Frauenberg. The people from the Oden Forest compelled the governor of the elector of Mainz, Bishop William of Strasburg, to accept the Twelve Articles in the name of the archbishopric, to join the peasants, impose heavy taxes on the clergymen, open all monasteries and finally despise all clerical costumes. Count William of Henneberg, one of the first vassals of the bishopric of Würzburg and a former enemy of the Lutherans, quickly borrowed several thousand florins from his lord, and joined his new brethren of the White Band. He soon grew accustomed to the pillaging of monasteries, but by and by deserted the peasants, whose case grew worse. Unlike Würzburg, the imperial city of Rotenburg

refused for the time to enter into an agreement with the peasants. Here, too, the soil was ripe for a revolution, owing to the activity of Carlstadt, Doctor John Deuschlin, the blind and barefooted penitent monk Hans Schmid, and many enthusiastic laymen, including a skillful tribune of the people in the person of the suspicious Suabian, Stephen of Menzingen. However, a treaty between the city and the peasants was not brought about till May 15, on account of the military supremacy of the Franconian Band and serious negotiations of Florian Geyer.

At that time the leaders of the peasants made attempts to introduce more severe discipline among the soldiers, and to amend the Twelve Articles through a declaration to the effect that only slavery, the small tithes and capital punishment should be abolished, whereas all the other laws should be respected, and all duties should be fulfilled with certain restrictions. Inevitably it was easier on paper than in reality, after all that had taken place, to induce the peasants to obey their magistrates, and to pay taxes which they had rejected for some time. The originators of the declaration were threatened with death, and the position of the leaders could be maintained only with great difficulty against the ultra-democratic elements which tolerated no separate council without the knowledge of the entire band. It was easy for the Würzburg leader to

insist that the natural body must have a head, and that "no one could exist without a ruler."

The citizens who had hitherto sympathized with the peasants grew more and more afraid when their allies declared openly, "since they were brethren the rich should divide their property with the poor, and especially those who obtained their property from the poor, should do so." Many official pamphlets of the Franconian peasants showed clear traces of an agrarian socialism; thus the noblemen who intended to join the peasants were asked to destroy their castles, to possess no well equipped charger, and to have equal rights with peasants and civilians. An edict of the Bildhausen Band went still further. "None of the noblemen," it said, "should ride on horseback, but walk afoot, and eat and drink like the others; they should build houses and live in them as others live in cities or villages." The Jews were permitted to join, but not before giving up their property.

We must always remember the attitude of the armed peasants, in order to understand the apparent moderation of the constitution, which was one of the most important projects of their leaders. There were only two men who, with all seriousness, labored on a "Protestant godly reform" of the empire. Both had rendered services to lords,—Wendel Hippler as secretary to the count of Hohenlohe, and Frederick Weigant as secretary of the elector of

Mainz. Their political ability surpassed that of the other revolutionaries. Weigant thought he could solve internal questions by means of the imperial Regiment, which was to consist of twelve noblemen, the same number of representatives of the cities and of the peasants, and seven Protestant teachers. He also proposed to force all ecclesiastical princes to enter into "the union and alliance of the common bands, of the peasants and civilians," and to write to the emperor that the whole movement aimed at nothing else than Christian reformation, and obedience of the princes to the emperor. He believed that princes, noblemen, and imperial cities would follow the example of the clergymen. A letter of his has come down to us in which he calls upon nobility and cities, as allies against the princes. Unfortunately we know but little of the composition and activity of the chancery of the army of peasants, which was removed to Heilbronn. A planned congress, whither Upper Suabians, Alsations and Rhinelanders were to send representatives, was brought to naught because of a turn in the military affairs, as was a country diet called to Schweinfurt, June 1, by leaders and counselors of the Franconian army. The invited princes, lords and cities no longer deemed it necessary to negotiate with the imperiled rebels. For all the enterprises of the leaders of the peasants, the declaration of the Twelve Articles and other projects, including those

of Hipler and Weigant, were destined to be obtained from the nobility and the cities.

That complete project of an imperial constitution which was praised by many as a great political deed was, according to Hegel, nothing but a reaction of the so-called reformation of Emperor Frederick III. But there was no definite information concerning the latter, and hence we may assume that Weigant and Hipler had adopted that programme, which they enlarged and simplified. The moderate language and the skillfully built sentences remind us of the Twelve Articles, though we miss to a large degree the edifying and biblical tone, and note a democratic conception of state, demanding equality before the law and political unity for the new German empire, instead of purely agrarian tendencies. The latter must cease being a holy empire in the old sense, for the entire project was based upon a secularization of all ecclesiastical estates, by means of which the poor people without exception should be aided. The priests were to be elected by the people, receive a decent salary, and be excluded from every political and judicial office.

The reform of the worldly princes and lords was destined "not to increase the difficulties of the poor man, because of Christian freedom." There were still class distinctions, as, for instance, that of court officers, which revealed a division of the empire into four parts,—princes, counts and lords, knights

and servants, cities and communities. Only once was equality demanded for everybody, and all princes and noblemen were to become officers of the Holy Roman Empire. For all treaties of the princes, lords, and various classes, the privileges and regalia were to be abolished and only "imperial protection and peace" were to remain. The princes and noblemen also promised to be "godly, Christian, brotherly and honest" among themselves, to accuse nobody unfairly, and to "make just use of the godly word and right." In place of the numerous lords over the mintage, there was to be one uniform mintage with twenty or twenty-one places where money was to be coined; the coins were to contain the imperial eagle on one side, and the coat of arms of the lord over the mintage on the other side. Weights and measures should be uniformly regulated. Tolls, direct and indirect taxes were abolished, unless they were indispensable for general use; only the emperor should receive his tribute after every ten years, according to Matthew 22. The court was to be reformed on the basis of the godly and natural rights, so that the imperial court was to be divided into four aulic courts, each of these into four country courts, the last each into four free courts, and finally each free court into city and village courts. They were to be governed by sixteen officers chosen from the various classes; the noblemen were to fill the highest offices. Doctors of Roman law

should be tolerated only in the imperial universities, and not be admitted to court. It was also decided that all ground rents should be redeemed by a twentyfold sum payable at once.

We easily detect the democratic and socialistic nature of this project. But the ideas of the South German popular leaders were to be called moderate compared with those of a Gaissmayr or even a Münzer. Gaissmayr's project concerning a country constitution, dating from January, 1526, was a strictly agrarian socialism; no one so cruelly demanded "entire equality" as the Tyrolean demagogue, who would have all castles and walls of the cities destroyed, and "there should be henceforth no cities, but villages," lest anyone should regard himself as higher or better than another. Such equality, however, was only theoretical, for a strong government would deprive the people of the management of all public affairs, including forestry and mining, as well as commerce and industry. The universities, too, were to be supervised by the government and consist only of ecclesiastical professors.

A law against buying and selling, "lest anyone should be accused of the crime of usury" was very characteristic, while tilling the soil, feeding the cattle, and the making of wine were advocated. Here, as in the Heilbronn project, we observe that the economic interests were the real aims of the future state which was to be established in accord-

ance with biblical norms. This Protestant republic of the peasants, with its courts of the people and its state monopolies, reminds one of the imaginations of a St. Just and Babeuf, but we must not go so far, if we recall the socialistic and communistic ideas of the literature of the Renaissance. Thomas More's "Utopia" made agriculture obligatory upon all, permitted only the indispensable branches of craftsmanship, and did away with all continental commerce, while the necessary exchange with foreign countries was to be carried on by the state. Even Erasmus considered common ownership a postulate of real Christianity, an attitude which was not new, but was quite familiar to the clergymen. The Humanist combined Platonic and Christian matters here as he did on many other occasions. The revolutionaries of 1525, of course, disregarded a Platonic state; with them the communistic ideals had a biblical or mystical character, as in the times of the Hussites.

Stranger than all, as affecting the movement in Middle Germany, was the Czech radicalism of the fifteenth century whose leader, Thomas Münzer, caused a comparison with many peculiar types of the Taborites. It was believed that he had also influenced the movement in South Germany, where he is said to have been the author of that memorable pamphlet which was directed "to the meeting of the common peasantry of the High German Nation,

and of other places." Münzer could not have written this brochure, but it contained ideas different from those of the other South German leaders. The tendency to make the peasants dislike a peaceful settlement did not content itself with a highly effective description of the cruelty and depravity of the lords, but preached sovereignty of the people, in behalf of which it quoted instances from history. Nowhere was the hatred of the poor man against the "stabbers and runners, the gamblers and carousers," against princes and lords, expressed so vigorously as in this pamphlet of a Humanist, who proposed to the peasants a military organization with centurions and princes. The hereditary monarchy was expressly rejected, although there were exceptions, such as Frederick of Saxony and Philip of Baden; the "country or the people" had natural power to depose the chosen lord if he should prove harmful. "It greatly pleased God, because Moab, Agag, Achop, Phaloris and Nero had been hurled off the throne. The Scripture calleth them not servants of God, but snakes, dragons and wolves. Verily, perhaps there have come before the ears of the Lord Zebaoth the lamentations of the workers, that He hath gracefully heard them. And it shall come to pass when there will be slain all the fattened cattle that have rejoiced in the misery of the poor."

This reminds us of the Taborites, but only in

Thuringia and Saxony did the German revolution bear a purely theocratic character. Here the agrarian movement was preceded by that of the cities. We know of the upheavals at Erfurt and Gotha, of the communistic proceedings at Langensalza, and of the activity of Pfeiffer and Münzer at Mühlhausen, where the peasants of the vicinity joined the revolution only after serious negotiations. There was a horrid symbolism in the red cross and the sword which Pfeiffer and Münzer carried before them. In March, 1525, they succeeded in overthrowing the old council and by means of a new government organized the communistic divine empire which was the ideal of the Chiliasts of the Hussitic period, and which should become terrible truth later on under the Anabaptists of Münster.

John Lane of the German Order who, like many Hussitic zealots, held communion every day, regarded all estates as common property, the princes as goose-spoons, or rabid dogs. Münzer himself preached against the "idols in the houses and shrines," trinkets, jewels and money, yet his favorite theme was the destruction of all the godless. He therefore wrote to the miners of Mansfeld: "Have ye no pity even though Esau has good propositions to make? Do ye not look at the misery of the godless? They will beg, and weep and lament like children. Have ye no pity as the Lord hath bidden

through Moses? To us, He hath also revealed the same. To it, to it, to it as long as the iron is hot. Do you not allow your sword to become cold; from the blood do you forge your swords on the anvil of Nimrod. The Lord goeth before ye, do ye follow Him." As monotonous as beats of a hammer do these words sound, rending asunder every nerve of humanity; we hear that after Münzer's sermons young boys and girls sang the revelation of Jehovah to the sons of Israel "On the morrow ye shall go forth, and the Lord will be with ye." The prophet who dreamed of acting the rôle of a Moses or a Gideon loved to review the armed brethren and to preach when on the battlefield, seated upon his horse. With long beards and "briny" faces, his loyal friends gathered round him. On April 26, 1525, they went forth, "with a white flag whereon was a rainbow."

Still Münzer was not the man who could tame the wild elements he himself had conjured up. And since Pfeiffer and not he led the people of Mühlhausen, his dignity was gone. But even in Middle Germany a centralized leadership did not prevent the revolution from spreading. At the monastery of Fulda, where the rebels forced the coadjutor John of Henneberg to accept the Twelve Articles; at Hersfeld, in the neighboring counties, in Hesse and Brunswick, in ducal and electoral Saxony, everywhere, the people rose.

Five thousand peasants marched into Erfurt on April 20, after the counselors had obtained security for the citizens and their property by surrendering the churches and ecclesiastical houses. The redemption of the whole world "seemed to be at hand"; whoever wanted to find mercy before the lords, had to stand upon the same ground with the Christian brethren. The letters which Münzer had sent to the counts Albrecht and Ernest of Mansfeld on May 12 should be read; in them we find, in addition to biblical sayings, the announcement of the sovereignty of the people. The Catholic Count Ernest was threatened with destruction if he did not yield at once. "Behold, thou miserable wretch, who had made thee leader of the people which the Lord has obtained with his precious blood." On the same day they were to receive an answer or attack him in the name of the Lord of heavenly hosts. "I shall come, Thomas Münzer, with the sword of Gideon." He exhorted the people of Erfurt to assist him. "The entire German, French and Welsh countries are stirred up," he said in one of his letters.

If in addition to such words there had been a strong unity among the widely scattered armies of the peasants, German aristocracy, princely or not, would have been forced in all probability to enter into agreements with the revolutionists. For discord prevailed among the princes and the lords, and many had formed alliances with the rebels. Thus

not alone the archbishopric of Mainz, the bishop of Speyer, the Franconian bishoprics, the German Order at Mergentheim, but Elector Louis of the Palatinate (May 8) and Margrave Philip of Baden (May 22), and later Margrave Ernest, negotiated with the peasants, while the cunning elector of Brandenburg promised assistance only when the princes would have the upper hand. The peasants expected aid from Elector Frederick of Saxony, as the "Father of everything Protestant." It was his relation to Luther that caused this confidence, but it was probably also his gentleness, which was well known throughout German territory. Since the upheaval at Forchheim, the rumor had spread that the electorate of Saxony favored the cause of the peasants. Even the wild pamphlet of the "Upper German Brethren" most humbly separated him, as a real Christian prince, from his class, and a citizen of Allstädt wrote that of all the princes the peasants would spare only him, if he listened to their complaints and accepted the Twelve Articles. The wise Frederick, who had always regarded cruelty against the poor as a sure sign of a wicked character, preserved his humanity even in the midst of the insurrection.

No matter how one passes judgment upon the irresolution of this ruler, he was always a venerable and sympathetic personage; he exhorted to enter into agreements with the rebels, not because he

feared them, but because he was fully aware of the grave crimes of the rulers. With a quietude which was almost fanatical he spoke of a probable victory of the rebels. "If God wills it so, it will be brought about that the poor man will rule; if, however, He wills it not so, it will turn out differently." His death removed him from all the "wild events." He asked his servants to forgive him. "We princes commit all sorts of crimes against the peasants, and it is of no avail." In his dying hour he received the Holy Communion, *sub utraque specie*. He passed away on May 5, at Lochau, when the revolution was within hearing of its chimes.

In France, in the Netherlands, in Italy, the people spoke of an invasion of the peasants; it was believed that they would go to Rome to depose the pope and all priests. Many heard, in imagination, the clanking of arms in the far-off East and West; people talked of a great agrarian movement in Spain, and rumors spread that even in Turkey the peasants had revolted against the nobility and ruling classes.

And what of Luther in the midst of all this transformation and revolution? He, the idol of his nation, could not possibly refuse assistance in those woful days of distress. We have seen how the peasant looked upon him as the noblest interpreter of the godly right, and how his enemies regarded him as the real cause of this colossal catastrophe.

Indeed Luther raised his voice more ringingly than ever before or afterward. His old courage had not left him, and the enemies of the new doctrine charge him very unjustly with acting a twofold policy during the Peasants' War. He accused both parties of acting wrongly, and then with the full power of his passion he turned upon the victorious insurgents. All the same, it was a sad rôle for Germany's greatest son, the rôle of a reaction which, in its lack of humanity, had no equal. All his honesty and courage cannot excuse his failure to understand his own leading part in the stirring up of the masses.

His "Exhortation to make Peace, regarding the Twelve Articles of the Peasantry in Suabia," shows clearly that it was not his province to bring about peace. With logical clearness he declared that neither the lords nor the peasants were true Christians; that full right was with neither side. Luther, above all, sought to convince the peasants that their complaints were all contrary to the gospel he had preached. "Do ye let go the Christian name, I say unto you, and do ye not make it cover your impatient, unpeaceful and unchristian actions; I shall neither grant it to you, nor let you bear it. Thus your title and name, must and shall be, that you are men who fight it and that do not wish nor ought they to suffer injustice or evil, as nature has decided."

While he did not heed the references which the peasants made to the Bible, he at least should have arrayed himself against slavery, as being contrary to the Holy Scriptures. It was not sufficient to regard tyrants and bands as enemies of God, and to demand that the belligerents should grant certain concessions to each other. With that equanimity toward all legal and material oppression which Luther demanded from every Christian, he did not agree with the ruthless financial system of the magistrates. If he told the princes that the Lord himself, not the peasants, had stood up against them, and one could not, would not, and should not bear oppression any longer; if he announced the heavenly judgment over the lords, from the signs in the heaven and the miracles on earth, and if he quoted from the Scriptures to prove them tyrants, "how tyrants had seldom died a natural death, but had been strangled and slain," it was in accordance with his previous exhortations.

The great contrast between the action and the profession, of which Luther justly accused the Protestant bands, could be found in his own writings against the revolution. Yet the "exhortation" was soon forgotten, and while journeying to the Harz Mountain and through Thuringia he had to learn, to his great sorrow, that the power of his word no longer influenced the country population. But he was always convinced that the insurrection

could produce no good results, that the peasants were nothing but stubborn instruments of the devil, and that the day of judgment was at hand. While in this mood he composed his fearful pamphlet, "Against the murderous and robbing bands of the peasants." Never before was preached more pitilessly the destruction of the enemies, condemned as "torches of hell" and "members of the devil." Never before was more strongly emphasized the saying that the end justifies the means.

As to the question which party was right, Luther quickly formed his judgment, after the peasants refused to lay down arms and determined to make use of the present helplessness of their masters, in order to obtain full franchise and liberty. The Reformer saw that God's order on earth, and even the state, were in danger and that his own works were attacked. In the name of the violated law and in that of the gospel misused by the peasants, he demanded that all the insurgents should be killed like mad dogs. "Therefore whoso is able should hit, strangle and stab, secretly or openly, all the rebels, and remember that nothing is more venomous, harmful, diabolical than rebelling man. Whoso dies on the side of the princes, dies the blessed death of a martyr: whoso dies on the opposite side, goes to hell."

The few sentences which spoke of an agreement, or of a liberation of those who were forced to take part in the insurrection, disappeared in this wild

sermon of "sword and wrath." And this was not a sudden outburst of passion. Luther, who had always despised and thought very little of the peasants, even later on clung to his words and repeated his declaration that insurgents should be strangled most pitilessly, and that the lower classes should be controlled as rigorously as possible. "The donkey wants to be hit, and the rabble ruled by force," he maintained. The Saxon knight Einsiedel who had treated his servants like slaves was greatly vexed, but Luther, Melanchthon and Spalatin strove to rid him of such foolish thoughts.

During the Peasants' War, Melanchthon had composed a pamphlet directed against the Twelve Articles, which spoke of the absolute power of the monarch and the unconditioned duty of the subjects to obey. According to him, the government could impose taxes as heavy as it pleased and not be responsible to anybody. It had the right to confiscate property. In matters regarding the law it could impose penalties as it chose, and should be at perfect liberty to do so. Melanchthon regarded slavery as too mild for "such a wild and undisciplined people as the Germans," and proposed more rigorous laws. The latter wish of his was soon to come true. Luther's Reformation had now broken with most of its own past, and as it despised any idea of combining the gospel with the "carnal" thought of the ordinary man, and every union of

its own fate with that of the revolution, it had to redeem its salvation from the inevitable catastrophe, with an immense loss of sympathies. The lower classes turned away from the great son of his people, whose heart was bleeding because of the religious decline of the nation, yet considered all imperfections and all injustice of the "worldly empire" a well-deserved punishment from heaven.

In order to free himself from the charge of cruelty, Luther referred to the fact that he had requested all the magistrates after the war to pardon both innocent and guilty ones. Despite his burning statements regarding the shameless beasts, wolves, swine, bears and lions among the lords, the struggle of the Reformer against the revolution leaves a highly unpleasant impression.

It was indeed unnecessary to incite the princes and lords to quench the rebellion. Once they had rallied from the first feeling of terror and helplessness, they could easily scatter the undisciplined armies of the insurgents. A decisive turn was brought about by the able leader of the Suabian Confederacy, George Truchsess, who defeated the Württemberg peasants on the 12th of May, between Böblingen and Sindelfingen. The city of Weinsberg and five neighboring villages were burned, and some of the main leaders of the bloody judgment on Palm Sunday were tied to trees and slowly roasted. At the same time, Thomas Münzer with 8,000 men was

routed on the 15th of May by the well-equipped army of Landgrave Philip, Georg of Saxony, Henry of Brunswick, and Albrecht of Mansfeld, near the city of Frankenhausen. In vain did Münzer strive to inspire his men with the headlong, death-defying spirit of the Hussites; as soon as the cavalry drew near, the bands that were used to the storming of churches and castles broke into unrestrainable flight. Thousands were slain; at Frankenhausen "all male persons that were found there were stabbed to death." The prophet himself was seized and, under torture, renounced his tempestuous life as a dreadful error. In order to die as a true and reconciled member of the Church, he received the Holy Communion in one form. Münzer was beheaded; Mühlhausen surrendered to Elector John of Saxony, Duke Georg and the landgrave, and had to tolerate the various attacks of the lords; for the latter knew how to burn and plunder just as well as did the peasants. "Are you still Martinic," asked the bailiff of Scharfenstein of the poor people of Lengefeld; "now we shall teach you, Lutheran knaves," he added, while sacking their church and setting fire to their village.

Like the waves of the rebellion, so now rolled from country to country, with horrible monotony, the flood of princely revenge. That rude generation was not content with the inevitable terror which the war had brought with itself, but rejoiced for

months after the victory in what they called justice. In the fashion of a Crusade, the Catholic Duke Anton of Lorraine undertook an expedition against the Alsatian Lutherans; pilgrimages into the Holy Land were undertaken in honor of the happy outcome of the expedition, and the soul of one of their leaders who was slain by the peasants flew into heaven, according to a contemporary reporter, "among the martyrs and knights who, for the sake of our Lord Jesus Christ, had sacrificed life and possessions."

When the peasants had been surrounded at Zabern, princes and noblemen gathered in the chapel of their camp, which was adorned with holy pictures, in order to render gratitude to the Lord. After reënforcements had been defeated near Lupfstein and the wild soldiers had raged like demons against women and children, the helpless peasants yielded, and on May 17 they were slaughtered by the soldiers, with a brutality beyond description or imagination. The stabbed peasants lay before the gates in such great numbers that one could scarcely ride beyond them. A report said that 18,000 were not buried, but were thrown into the so-called "ditch of heretics," yet the number of those who had been slain was far greater.

One more battle was fought near Scherweiler (May 21), and there thousands of peasants were stretched on the battlefield. All spoke savagely of

Strasburg, declaring that the city ought to be punished for having participated in the revolution.

It was vastly fortunate that none of the larger imperial cities had opened their gates before the peasant armies. Thus the counselors of Nürnberg maintained their independence, despite the upheavals in the city and the proximity of the Franconian revolutionary armies. They skillfully eluded the demands of the Suabian Confederacy which they had reënforced, the propositions of the peasants, and the very suspicious friendship of Margrave Kasimir. Notwithstanding the fact that they once told the confederates, that the "market and the necessity" had forced them to permit the peasants to buy in their city, they bravely resisted them when asked to take part in an expedition against the margrave.

"In defiance, splendor and pride, as if the whole world were theirs, the ambassadors left the council house of Nürnberg. They decided that no house should remain which was better than that of a peasant. Meanwhile the policy which kept and consumed the best powers of the revolution before the mountain castle of Würzburg was severely punished. For the little army which defended the Maria Mountain (*Marienberg*), led by the brave Sebastian of Rotenburg, repulsed many attacks. The victorious Suabian troops thereby gained time to unite with those of the Palatinate and Trier, which were led

by Elector Louis. Numbering more than 10,000, they attacked the peasants of the Oden Forest and the Neckar Valley, near Königshofen on the Tauber, June 2. It was an ominous beginning that, before the armies met, Götz of Berlichingen took to flight. The peasants were repulsed and defeated.

There was still another army near Sulzdorf, including Florian Geyer and his Black Band, but they, too, were routed. "One knight slew more than ten peasants who stood near each other, and no one protected himself." Only an army of several hundred defended themselves valiantly in the ruins of the castle of Ingolstadt. Florian Geyer and several others escaped, but fell shortly afterward before Limburg. When the princes in front of Würzburg ordered that the horns should be blown, citizens and peasants lost their courage and surrendered. The people of Rothenburg followed their example. On his return Elector Louis defeated the rebels, who had devastated the Palatinate to the left of the Rhine, and who in their insolence had forced a countess of Westerburg to cook for and serve them. They were defeated near Pfeddersheim, June 23. After the city surrendered, the peasants attempted to flee, but "in one instance" more than 800 of the helpless victims were slain by the cavalymen.

Toward the end of June, the revolution in South and Middle Germany was almost entirely suppressed. Only in Upper Suabia and the Alpine

regions did the banner of the peasants still wave. They were never successful in open battles. Of course the cavalry of the lords, called "Peasant Death," played a terribly effective part. But even the infantry, of which the peasants had no lack, was superior to that of the rebels. Politically, the peasants were overcome because of their anarchistic and aimless activity. Their leaders, some of whom saw the necessity of a disciplined organization, lacked authority to maintain it and to carry on negotiations independently. Quite true was an account which such Alsatian "leaders and rulers" sent to the council of Strasburg regarding their difficult position, "how uncertain it is whenever one deals with gathered multitudes and bands, and that a shameless talker who prefers ten calamities to one happiness, finds more adherents at the meetings than forty honest people might obtain." The ancient idea of particularism prevented the various bands from uniting.


Territorial dismemberment made difficult a complete victory over the revolutionaries, who in Upper Suabia maintained themselves until the winter of 1525, and in the Alps even until the succeeding summer. The people of Allgäu resisted valiantly until the elector began to destroy their villages. Some leaders of the peasants were guilty of treachery, which probably enabled the princes to overcome them more easily. The people of Klet-



PROGENIES·DIVVM·QVINTVS·SIC·CAROLVS·ILLE
 IMPERII·CAESAR·LUMINA·ET·ORA·TVLIT
 AET · SVAE · XXXI
 ANN · M · D · XXXI

Emperor Charles V. at the Age of Thirty-one.
 (1500-1558.)

Facsimile of an Engraving by Bartel Beham.
 (1496-1540.)



gau and the city of Landshut surrendered in December to the Austrian army. One of its officers is said to have asserted that the city must be taken at any cost, even if it were tied by four fetters to the skies.

Archduke Ferdinand and the Bavarian dukes had not been honest during the Peasants' War, but tried to profit by the distress of their neighbors. Ferdinand gladly accepted the oath of allegiance of the city of Füssen, which was refused help by its lord, the bishop of Augsburg, and the Bavarians sought to obtain the bishopric of Eichstätt, till both the Wittelsbachs and the archduke could hope to secure more tempting prey. The court of Munich planned to secure the archbishopric of Salzburg through secularization, or the election of a Bavarian prince coadjutor. Duke Frederick was willing to negotiate not only with the people of Salzburg, but with those of Tyrol. Eck called these projects "monkey business," but the rivalry between Austria and Bavaria seemed to bring about a mutual war, rather than the liberation of the besieged archbishop. Duke William would have been glad to create new troubles for the archduke in Tyrol.

Finally, in the month of August, the Suabian confederates appeared, and even an able warrior like George Frundsberg thought it advisable to negotiate with them. Meanwhile a part of the peasants of Salzburg attacked one of the most notorious enemies

of the peasants, Sigismund of Dietrichstein, who had defeated, stabbed, flayed and tortured the Styrian rebels, with the aid of Bohemians and cavalrymen. This unspeakable wretch owed his life to the soldiers, while the Bohemians and Hungarians were beheaded because of their frightful atrocities.

It was most repulsive to see these lords, after the danger was over, seek the assistance of the former rebels merely to secure their aims. The movement was successful only in Tyrol, where the archduke had to grant a new constitution at a very stormy country diet. A number of taxes, including the small tithes, were abolished, hunting and fishing were made free, uniform weights and measures were introduced, and severe measures were taken against usury. The ecclesiastical class was also reformed. In civil matters the clergymen had to appeal to a judge, and cities and courts could take possession of void prebends. Yet the young prince did not grant secularization and election of priests by the people. We must not believe that he honestly sympathized with the oppressed peasants; upheavals in southern Tyrol, where they had raged like wild beasts, were suppressed with barbarian severity, while in Styria Count Niclas Salm, according to his own report, gave free license to burn, destroy and rob, "without caring that only few would remain." In vain Gaissmayr, who had escaped into Switzerland in

the summer of 1526, sought to incite a new meeting of the people of Pinzgau, in order to keep up the revolution in the Alps. The peasants of Pinzgau were defeated and the valiant champion of the Protestant republic of peasants, pursued by Frundsberg and routed in the Puster Valley, escaped to Venice, where he plotted against the emperor till he was assassinated. This bold Protestant and former writer, whom his fellow thinkers called the "nobleman from the Etsch," was no doubt one of the most important personages of the German revolutionaries.

Though the lords of the Suabian Confederacy despised the peasants of the archbishop of Salzburg, the sturdy people from the mountains fought bravely, and longer than the others, against the fearful fate which pitilessly and irresistibly destroyed the defeated men, the great masses of the German people. The lords clamored for vengeance, and it would be miserable euphemism to talk of justice and punishment.

In order to comprehend such fiendish atrocities we must think of the traces which the revolution had left as dumb witnesses of what had taken place. In Thuringia alone, 70 monasteries had been destroyed, and 292 castles and 52 monasteries in Franconia. But what did this destruction amount to, when compared with the misery which, as punishment, had been brought upon peasants and citizens?

Very few victors indeed were so willing to listen to the complaints of the peasants and to show leniency toward them as were, for instance, the Margraves Philip and Ernest of Baden, who abolished the small tithes and capital punishment, regulated the taxes and granted certain privileges to hunt. Strasburg, as well as Nürnberg, removed the small tithes and strove to be lenient toward the rebels, despite the accusation of cherishing revolutionary sympathies that was brought against them. It is worth mention that a good many noblemen opposed the princes' desire to inflict vengeance, for instance, the Upper Austrian classes, who regarded the taxes imposed by the government as impossible. Naturally the interests of the landowners had to be considered, as well as the question whither all this ruination and destruction would lead. Margrave Georg wrote to his brother Kasimir: "If all peasants should be stabbed to death, whence shall we get others who could support us?" Yet a prince like Kasimir could not be persuaded. At Kitzingen he ordered fifty-nine citizens to be blinded; no one was permitted to lead them. "They walked about like animals, and many of them died." Heavy taxes were imposed on them, the tortures did not cease, while many who were really guilty were acquitted through bribery or treachery toward their fellows. Sixty citizens were beheaded at Würzburg soon after the princes entered the city, twenty-nine at

Rotenburg, forty-one at Langensalza. An insignificant Suabian nobleman alone beheaded six peasants, and he cut out the tongues of three others. In Suabia 10,000 were put to death, and the number of all the victims of the Peasants' War amounted to fully 100,000. Bethold Aichelin, a soldier of the city of Ulm, became known as the favorite henchman of the elector. "Peasant, knowest thou Aichelin?" asked the princely cavalymen of their prisoners. For months the bishop of Würzburg traveled from place to place, plundering and judging: one of his most pitiless aids in the bloody work was that same count of Henneberg who had once betrayed him and allied himself with the peasants.

Worse than the lot of the executed were the agonies of those imprisoned. Few possessed the steadfastness of that tortured Suabian peasant who preferred to die rather than pay gold for his life. When the unfortunate man lay with torn limbs in the tower, almost insane because of the arctic weather, and asked that he might be granted an ordinary trial, an officer of the abbot of Kempten replied, "If you wish to get out of this tower, you will have to ask for mercy and not for justice; your appeal to the latter will not aid you, and even if the Lord sat on your back, you could not get out of the tower, but only through the grace of my noble lord of Kempten."

It is difficult to estimate the economic losses

that the revolution and a pitiless court brought about. The peasantry, which according to Aushelm had freed themselves from the plows, were once more tied to them. The devastated provinces suffered greatly because of the heavy taxes and penalties, the insolence of the soldiers and greed of the officers and judges. "The damage done was always overestimated," as a Würzburg chronicler wrote, "the old torn rat holes of many were estimated that he and his ancestors had never possessed so much, so that they obtained new beautiful castles and palaces for old ragged houses."

Disregarding the possessions of each, all were equally assessed; thus the tax *per capita* on the people of Hof-Gastein was four florins though they complained that the whole house was hardly worth that much. All contracts made during the revolution were annulled, and many privileges the people had formerly enjoyed were taken from them, so that Mathew of Normann rightly said, "Now each one does as he pleases." Even the Suabian confederates had to threaten the lords that they would refuse to assist them any longer, since they seemed only to incite new revolts. The imperial edicts of 1526 recommended a more lenient treatment of the poor people. In many regions, as in the Black Forest, numerous lords believed it advisable to abolish slavery. On the Upper Rhine the spirit of the revolution seemed to revive, and personages

like the old warrior Hans in der Matten strove to kindle the extinguished fire, thus warning the government to be lenient. The conditions of the peasants grew worse, not in South Germany but in the North, where the people had been slightly affected by the revolution. An insurrection of the peasants in Samland, in the autumn of 1525, was soon suppressed. Aside from this occurrence, there were no rebellions east of the Elbe, although there too the lords were permitted to buy all the taxes and revenues, and only toward the end of the fifteenth century were the unfree Prussians deprived of their hereditary right and their liberty. The Prussian country constitution of 1494 permitted the lord who captured a peasant that had escaped to hang him without trial and confiscate his estates.

In the South the economic and legal conditions were not as bad as in the North. The noblemen of Franconia and Suabia would not, like their northern fellowmen, strive with their peasants and become big landowners, but preferred to remain small lords of the country. The unhappy result of the revolution gave to the greater and smaller lords the opportunity to render the independence of their system harmless through the means of a well developed police system. Those who had taken part in the insurrection were compelled to wear half-beards and veils, in order to be distinguished from the others; inns and church festivals were rigidly con-

trolled, and the carrying of arms and all rebellious speech stirred into activity treachery toward one another. The costume of the peasant was regulated, for the revolutionary was fond of wearing the torn trousers of the warriors and big feather caps.

The scheme that the government should rule as it pleased was furthered by the Peasants' War. Above the ruins of the national monarchy, the princely state climbed its way, suppressed the opposing revolution, and established the police system, lest the evil dreams of the wanton rabble should be brought into new life. Later on, the same princely state became the savior of the much suffering peasantry, though the burden of disgrace and sorrow carried for centuries had left deep traces behind.

All material losses and deprivations of rights and privileges were surpassed by the feeling of hopelessness which overthrew the masses of the oppressed peasantry as it did also morally. Few indeed were able to sing of their own misfortune with the peasant of Speyer, and call out, "Let the devil bless that for me." How could the little man, who for many generations had hoped for a future for the poor and the lower classes, content himself with the belief that all the prophets had lied, and the Christian freedom of the new gospel had nothing in common with the old desires of the people? We should not wonder at the hatred against the existing governmental system, and the doubt which arose

regarding the sovereignty of the Lord, and a moral depravity among the peasants, which greatly stirred the reformers as well as their opponents.

There were many who entered into alliances with the proletariat of the highways and hospitals, frightening the victors through arson and similar evil doings. Such people could easily be overcome; but the spirit of defiant equanimity which had remained after the revolution could not be crushed, despite the attempts of Luther and his young church. "What does the silly parson say of God?" asked the Saxon peasants: "who knows what God is, or whether there is a God?" The blasphemies and beastly irreverence of which we read in the accounts of the supervisors of the churches and others, during the sixteenth century, were indescribable. Luther had never found peace while he was alive, because the "Big Band" displayed a disgraceful ingratitude toward the blessings of the new doctrine, and because the people would rather miss the gospel for a year than suffer loss of property. "We see," wrote Melanchthon to a friend, "how very much the rabble hates us." The year 1525 had opened a huge chasm between the reformers and the lower classes; indifferently and reluctantly the latter observed how, in place of the overthrown hierarchy, a new church was established, dependent upon the governmental power. There were only a few among the educated who spoke in behalf of the ordinary man that had

remained, "bold, rude and wild like a bear," despite his inhuman chastisement.

"Doctor Martinus," wrote Mühlfort, the bailiff of Zwickau, during the war, "is not liked by the ordinary man, the educated and uneducated as well." He spoke of the wicked lords who always referred to the words of the Reformer whenever they slew peasants, and of the coming terrorism. He did not see tyrants in the lords of the country, but in the nobility, whose haughtiness grew worse than ever before.

We can but hint at the immense elevation of the aristocracy of Middle and North Europe during the sixteenth century; the tendency towards princely absolutism was checked on its victorious way, the ancient civilization of the bourgeois was pushed backward, and even the great movement itself benefited feudal interests. Thus German aristocracy, having gone through a dangerous crisis, obtained a far more favorable position than previously, through the result of the agrarian revolution. The struggle against the same enemy strengthened the ties between aristocracy and princes, and it is interesting to observe that the noble landowners, the main cause of the insurrection, protected their subjects against the princely power.

But it was only a momentary advantage for the peasants, if the landowner resisted the princely inter-

vention without which, under normal conditions, the peasant was entirely controlled by the prince. In early times an absolutism of the princes was manifest, which strove to do away with the difficulties caused by the nobility. This idea was to be found in that memorable pamphlet which Palsgrave Frederick gave to his ambassador at the diet of Augsburg, in 1525. There not only abolishment of the small tithes was demanded, but that of slavery. This was also recommended in the duchy of Prussia, in 1541, by a commission of princely officers and city counselors. In 1526 the diet of Speyer was occupied with the causes of the discontent among the peasants, and it was proposed in an official edict that slaves should be permitted to marry from their own choice, and that slavery should be ended. The fundamental idea that each individual government should consider the complaints of its subjects, and settle them in accord with the godly and natural rights, inevitably left everything to the good will and whim of the lords. A long time elapsed before these tendencies secured control over the aristocratic movement,—a time in which all political, legal and economic causes wrought together to degrade the German peasants to a *servilis et misera gens*, as Sebastian Münster put it. While in England slavery was abolished in the fifteenth century, there developed in Germany, chiefly in the North and the East, a systematic enslavement of the

country population, which was attained or surpassed only by Denmark among the Germanic nations.

Whatever solace the Reformation offered to the oppressed was destined to create a spirit of sullen resignation that could only increase the ever-growing feeling of independence among the peasants. All was expressed in one sentence formulated by Brenz: "Suffering befits the Christian, as a king his throne."

Of the same opinion was Sebastian Franck, a man whose writings in no wise corresponded with the views of the new Protestant Church and which were highly honored by the peasantry. Though he regarded slavery as an invention of tyranny, yet he recommended full subjection: "Do thou give; what does it matter thee? It must be suffered. Therewith thou hast an answer to so many a question, which is raised daily everywhere." The last refuge of the reformers was in the idea that the "Nimrodic tyrants, the haughty, the powerful and the rich, are about to fall like a ripe pear." This sort of consolation they obtained from the valiant Eberlin, whose heart really throbbed for the poor. In his exhortations against insurrection and false preachings, he developed the doctrine of all suffering being sent by God, and attacked with humor many a communistic dream.

But was it not contrary to a wise attitude concerning the general "course of the world," if one

preached obedience like Eberlin, and at the same time foretold the coming punishment of the godless, that is, of the anti-Protestant governments? "Tarry in patience; ye soon shall see miracles of the Lord who will fight in your behalf."

No miracles happened; the masses of the nation had to content themselves with enduring and waiting until they became convinced that everything had to be as it was and not otherwise. The German Reformation, however, freed from the dangerous closeness of the social revolution, was dragged into the strife and vicissitudes of the policy of a little state, the fate of which depended upon the course of the great European wars and territorial changes.

Ere we turn to the territorial development of the originally national work, we must consider the conditions of the world in general, and what form they had assumed beyond the German frontier during the gigantic struggle between Spain and France. For this German Reformation more than once was markedly affected by those foreign powers. France, the pope and the Turk had materially helped in the creation of a Protestant Germany.

II

CHARLES V AND PROTESTANTISM

THE STRUGGLE FOR ITALY

AN impressive drama is presented when great historical personalities struggle against each other as the destined representatives of antagonistic ideas. But the real tragedy of historical life begins only at a time when the individual sets out to carry on a war against the impersonal, the incomprehensible spirit of his age, that miserable conflict which, despite all victories, must end with a defeat of the will of the individual. Such a combatant can exercise a destructive or preventive influence upon generations to come, but the blessings of achievements are denied him, for that which he desires to create is and remains only a dream, even though all the means to secure reality should be employed and consumed.

Such a champion was Charles V. For although his rivalry against Francis I sometimes assumed a personal character, and toward the end of his career, after the overthrow of inferior opponents, a man like Moritz of Saxony dared to enter into an alliance

with the powerful victor, yet the real work of the last medieval emperor was an endeavor to attain an impossible aim, and the utmost capacity of his powers was employed against an invincible adversary.

If we call that adversary Protestantism, we must not think alone of the ideas and the adherents of the Protestant faith. Ranke once called the opposition of modern Europe to the endeavors of Charles a "military Protestantism." It was an opposition which comprised the most heterogeneous elements and often displayed an apparently unnatural combination of worldly and religious tendencies. There was still, however, a universal trait in the struggles of the German Reformation and the national states against that ideal of a uniformly governed Christianity which for centuries had ruled all, and had found its most magnificent personification in the international power of popedom and empire.

The impossibility of such a form of government had been proved long before the Augustinian idea of a divine state was displaced by that of a real state, and now the universal monarchy of the Holy Roman Empire was to revive, while the unity of the church of western Europe declined. No one could doubt that the silent Hapsburger, possessing dominions which remind one of the *orbis terrarum* of the Cæsars, should be filled with ancient imperialistic

ideas. The crown of Charlemagne gained special importance on the head of a prince upon whose empire the sun never set, whose word dominated at Madrid and Vienna, at Antwerp and in Mexico, at Naples and Lima. Where could the grandson of Charles the Bold,—the heir of the Burgundic and Hapsburg policy, homeless despite the superabundance of various lands and peoples,—find the quiet center of his calling as a ruler, if not in the idea of a universal empire? Here the numerous tasks of temporal and ecclesiastical authority could come in contact with each other, as was possible only in the case of an international and anti-national state.

No one could speak of a fixed boundary of this colossal monarchic establishment; interests of the emperor were affected everywhere, and he must always advance, and plan to increase his power. Tradition and the nature of his position drew him inseparably to the Catholic Church; he had always acted and felt himself its protector, whether dealing with believers in the Prophet, with pagan Indians, with German heretics, or with the holy see.

Still everybody who claimed independence was forced to protest against the innovation of a half theocratic imperialism. The Hohenstaufen plans to establish a universal monarchy had caused a half unconscious reaction of national feeling, at a time when theoretically none could or would protest

against the idea that only one personality should rule the world. Then the pope assumed the leadership of the imperial elements, to displace a worldly universal monarchy with one of his own. The popes of the sixteenth century no longer thought of this; they intrigued and fought partly as Italian dynasts, and partly as heirs and guardians of a constitution of the Church, the correct adoption of which was again queried because of so powerful a monarch.

Not only the ambitious policy of France, but the efforts of the Ottomans and of the German Lutherans were arrayed against the most faithful son of the Church. In the course of these struggles, which lasted for decades, Italy suffered most severely, and next to her was Germany. Both were prostrated, politically and intellectually, by a long period of deadly sickness. And that the noblest achievement of the German people, the Reformation, could maintain itself despite the tempestuous times, and that it could take firm root, was an inevitable result of the fatal policy of Charles V. He oppressed not only the religious movement but the whole of Europe, so that the general exasperation brought about an alliance which, in its assaults upon the powerful enemy, forgot even the holiest duties. The world had grown weary of the Middle Ages, and their last great champion went down in defeat.

The struggle between Francis I and Charles V, which was a continuation of the ancient rivalry between the French crown and Burgundy against Spain, was preceded by a tedious diplomatic war. Everyone attempted to secure allies for the impending conflict, and the efforts of the two opponents to obtain the aid of the most important neutral powers,—England, the pope and the Swiss Confederacy,—did not lead to decisive events until the summer of 1521.

Finally, the alliance of France with her greatest enemy, Ferrara, brought the momentous crisis. On May 29, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded, according to which the two “highest powers of Christianity” agreed upon a division of Italy, which was completed by the pope’s investment of the emperor with Naples. The pontiff, who declared that he regarded ecclesiastical matters as more important than worldly ones, was promised Parma and Piacenza by Ferrara, besides which, the emperor pledged himself to protect the House of Medici and its position at Florence.

Shortly before this treaty with Rome, the classes sided with their emperor against France and promised to aid him with soldiers. But the Swiss were won over by France; despite the resistance of Zurich, the other cantons entered into an agreement with Emperor Francis May 5, 1521, at Lucerne. But as Leo X had previously obtained an army,

and as imperial and papal money cleared the road for Cardinal von Sitten, who was well acquainted with Swiss conditions, the original successes of France became again uncertain. The people of Berne refused to fight against their fathers, brothers and friends, while the French could only show their indignation toward those "treacherous peasants."

During a prelude of the war, Robert of Maack, not content with the emperor and persuaded by Francis I withdrew. Actual hostilities between France and Spain broke out with the entrance of French troops into Navarra, whose lawful possessor, Duke Henri d'Albret, had received no indemnity from Charles and counted upon the assistance of the king. Upon hearing of the violation of his territory Charles vowed that he would punish the king of France. This was no empty phrase in the mouth of an emperor whose stormy temper was well known to his nearest neighbors. After successes of the imperial arms had been reported from both Navarra and France, the Castilian revolution had been suppressed, and the pope had joined Charles, the young ruler could rejoice in the war which would render him still greater and more famous. He was reported to have said, that either he would soon become a poor emperor or Francis a poor king. After the death of Chievres the most influential voice in behalf of peace was silenced and it was a splendid triumph of the imperial policy

when the greatest enemy of the war, Cardinal Wolsey, declared he could no longer maintain a policy of neutrality. We know of the opposition his peace policy had roused in England; Queen Catharine, the emperor's aunt, attempted to prevent an alliance with France, and the English felt proud after the cardinal had met Charles V at Bruges. The young emperor greeted the first statesman of Europe after he had waited for him an hour and a half before the gates of the city. They kneeled together in the church under one baldachin and upon the same stool. The king of Denmark had to come to the cardinal who, in order to preserve the honor of his lord, could scarcely be induced to walk down into the garden. None the less, the proud man suffered a marked political defeat at the meeting at Bruges and during the following negotiations, although an unhappy turn of the expedition into Holland and the defeat of the imperial troops under the leadership of Henry of Nassau and Sickingen, by Bayard, near the city of Mezieres, caused Charles to conclude an armistice. The unskillful conduct of the war by the French, who did not know how to make use of their successes in Holland, and their refusal to surrender the occupied fortress Fuenterabia, brought to naught the successful continuation of the English mediations.

Wolsey had learned at Bruges that he was dealing with a prince who knew how to conserve his interests

"coolly and carefully." The awakening of the self-consciousness of the young ruler was strikingly expressed in an invitation to the cardinal: "You and I will do more in one day than my ambassadors in one month." He never thought of permitting himself to be led by Wolsey, and when the cardinal began to outline the imperial policy, the emperor's pride was touched; if the cardinal thought to treat him like a prisoner of England he found out his mistake.

Since the betrothment to the little English Maria was one of the principal points of the negotiations, the cardinal remarked that he could get plenty of women without buying them at so high a price. During the conferences at Calais the fantastic side of the imperial policy became manifest. We wonder at Chancellor Gattinara, the tenacious antagonist of the cardinal who demanded the restitution of the Burgundian dynasty, the crown of Spain and the empire,—demands which also comprised the duchy of Burgundy and the territory on the Somme, the ancient kingdom of Arelate, with the Provence, Dauphiny and Lyon, the rest of Southern France to Navarra, and the counties Champagne and Brie. From a legal point of view, the imperial party thought they could demand the entire French kingdom which Pope Boniface VIII had taken from Philip the Handsome, and with which he had invested the Hapsburg King Albert. But Henry VIII

considered a bold policy and the memory of the crown of France which was worn by his ancestors of greater importance than the position of a neutral arbitrator, which Wolsey was aiming at. This office of arbitrator, whose significance gradually decreased, the cardinal gave up after entering into an agreement with the emperor on the 25th of August, at Bruges, against France, which he renewed at Calais November 24, the pope also joining in it.

England was willing to declare war on France and the king proposed to visit the emperor. Wolsey's efforts to delay this visit and the breaking out of hostilities with France were interrupted by the first great victory of the imperial troops in Italy. But Charles's English alliance was none the less false in itself, as Busch remarked, "For the two powers distrusted each other, and the prime minister of the one was the most resolute enemy of the other." In addition to his political misgivings he had a highly personal cause, as we shall soon learn.

The simple rumor of the English alliance was highly valuable for the emperor. At Rome a defeat of France seemed to be certain, as the English ambassador said. For the weakness of the French government in northern Italy was shown by its sudden collapse in 1521, when the Swiss, defying their government, resisted Francis I, and when the papal imperial troops, led by Prospero Colonna and the Marchese of Pescara, appeared before Milan

(November 19). The inhabitants of the city also rebelled against the cruelty of the French governor Lautrec; the French escaped under the protection of a stormy night, and soon Pavia, Piacenza, Parma, and almost all of Milan, threw off the yoke of foreign government.

On December 2, Tournai surrendered to the imperial troops, but the sudden death of the pope seemed to overturn the plans of the emperor. In the midst of the joy because of the victory at Milan, Leo X fell ill; a few days afterward, on the eve of December 1, he passed away. Immediately his small enemies became active anew. Alfonso of Ferrara, still hard oppressed, ordered that a medal be stamped with the inscription *ab ungue leonis*, and he as well as the Roveres, the Baglioni and other dynasts, hastened to reconquer what they had once lost to the Church. Suddenly the emperor was deprived of all material and financial assistance, and the future of the Italian War became dependent upon the dubious outcome of a papal election.

Never had a conclave caused greater excitement to bring about an entirely unexpected result. The most powerful of the cardinals, Wolsey, at first rejected the proposition of the emperor to become a candidate for the chair of St. Peter. But Charles repeated his proposition at the meeting at Bruges, and Wolsey consented; he even undertook to influence the electors by means of the imperial troops.

However, the emperor as well as his ambassador at Rome, the venerable Manuel, well knew that the sympathies of the old ecclesiastical prince were with France. Manuel, who thought that even in hell there was not so much hatred or so many devils as among the cardinals, said nothing of the Englishman in his letters about the conclave, though Wolsey had received seven votes. Since the actual candidate of the emperor, Julius of Medici, had no chance of being elected, Manuel called attention to the cardinal of Tortosa, Charles's teacher, Adrian of Utrecht.

That prelate, wholly unknown at Rome, was chosen after the eleventh scrutiny, on the 9th of January, 1522. The king of France declared that after the election of a Medicean, France would refuse to obey the holy see any longer. He soon appealed to the impartiality of the new pope, who was determined not to become an instrument in the hands of his former pupil. It must have greatly vexed the supreme lord of the Church and an honest man when Manuel, in an almost dictatorial tone, called his attention to the double duty of gratitude toward God and emperor, since the grace of both had regarded him as being worthy of such favor, and since the will of both was in perfect harmony.

Such Byzantine shamelessness could not affect a character like that of Adrian. "I am very glad," he wrote to his emperor, "that I do not owe the election to your requests." The papal politician

aimed at the establishment of peace among the Christian powers, in order to obtain an army to oppose the advancing Ottomans, and he asked the emperor to agree to an armistice, since King Francis was willing to make peace.

Meanwhile, the situation of the emperor was changed through the military events in Italy. While France could control the Swiss Confederates, the German warriors surpassed these dreaded sons of the mountains. Under the leadership of their "father," the Suabian knight Georg of Frundsberg, they crossed the Alpine passes and after uniting themselves with Colonna and Duke Francis at Sforza, were hailed by the joyful people of Milan. The first real battle was fought near the Castle Bicocca April 27. As in almost all such collisions in those times the troops of various nations attacked each other,—French, Swiss, Italians, Spaniards and Germans. Most of all, however, we observe the contrast of the two old rivals, the Germans and the Swiss. The splendid victory of the imperial troops and the capture of Genoa induced the English to declare openly on which side they stood. Toward the end of May Charles V landed at Dover, and while the two sovereigns did not tire embracing each other, an English herald notified Francis I of his lord's declaration of war. In the treaty between Charles and Henry (Windsor, June 19) France appeared as the only opponent of a war against the

Turks, and it was agreed that she should be deprived of all her possessions. They would win over the pope, Venice and the Confederacy; but the leading statesmen never lost their mutual distrust. Wolsey complained of the imperialistic desires of Gattinara, and the imperial party had sufficient cause to discuss the unbounded insolence of the cardinal who still yearned to be the arbitrator of Europe. At the same time, he attempted to induce Venice to join the alliance against France which, as he said, must be destroyed entirely.

Though the subsequent military results of the alliance of Windsor were insignificant (they were confined to the "destruction" of large places in the French northwest), and though Wolsey thought of negotiating with France or to use English troops against Scotland rather than on the continent, the shrewdness of the French government took care that the imperial-English alliance should not be broken, but should be increased to a European league against France.

Francis I had been filled with the glory of the victory at Marignano and was not accustomed to aim at great achievements, or to undertake long toilsome labors; the clever and gay king left the tasks of the government to his mother, Louise of Savoy. Of course he frequently gave expression to his indignation over political events. Thus, during the negotiations with Leo X, he remarked that he

was the first offspring of the Church, and should the pope oppose him, he would be the first devil. To an English envoy he said that he needed nobody's help in order to protect himself, adding that he would never trust any prince whatever; and he vowed to God that King Henry should never regain him if he forsook him now. He once assured the Parliament of Paris that he would take up the fight against the whole of Europe and he feared none of his adversaries.

After hearing bad news, Francis frequently forgot to eat or to sleep. He wore a mask during all the time his soldiers were being defeated in Italy. His mother, skillful in intrigues on behalf of her "lord and Cæsar," made now the most fatal use of her influence by increasing the difficulties which had already existed between the crown of France and her first vassal. Duke Charles of Bourbon, the husband of a grand-daughter of Louis XI, lord chamberlain and *connétable* of France, was the first man next to the king, owing to his large estates and his personality. He, who succeeded in whatever he undertook, always declared that he would not even for a kingdom betray his lord.

His share in the victory at Marignano and the admiration he enjoyed made the duke at first an object of distrust. The manner in which he bore the ingratitude of the court induced Francis I to continue to humiliate him still further. Will any-

body wonder that the vassal ceased to be loyal when, after the death of his wife, her whole inheritance and with it the foundation of his power were taken by the king and his mother? Louise is said to have thought of marrying the much younger duke, but the latter declined the proffer.

In July, 1523, the duke entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Charles V, and later with Henry VIII, according to which he was to marry a sister of the emperor and aid the invasion of France by the allies, through an open rebellion.

Bourbon, who had forgotten that he was not only a vassal but a Frenchman, spoke of the bad government of a sensuous king, of the poverty and destruction of the empire; he also said that he could reckon upon an alliance of at least 2,000 noblemen. While Francis, who had grown aware of his error and promised to mend it, was on his way to the south of France, Bourbon fled across the frontier to Besançon. But the French nobility turned away from the traitor instead of following him.

Bourbon's unsuccessful revolutionary scheme induced Henry VIII to attempt to obtain the French crown, and he determined to carry out his attacks upon France, instead of deserting the league. In Italy, too, the imperial policy seemed to be triumphant. The fact that the Milan citadels were handed over to Sforza induced Venice to join the enemies of France (July 29), and the pope began to yield

his neutrality after discovering that one of the very few on whom he relied, the Cardinal Soderini, had exhorted Francis to undertake an expedition against Italy.

The imprisonment of the intriguer caused the recall of the French ambassador to Rome, and a strong letter was sent to the pope wherein he was reminded of the privileges of France and the fate of Boniface VIII. Poor Adrian was accustomed to such letters. The young emperor at once wrote to his ambassador to Rome that if he permitted himself to be influenced by indignation in his actions against Adrian, the pope would soon become an ordinary priest of St. Peter. It was a tragic fate that this old man, filled with the most holy zeal, should have to pay for the sins of his predecessor. Leo X had contracted debts of more than a million ducats, and Adrian hesitated to defy France, "because," as he wrote, "French gold would cease on the same day, on which my court lives."

He had seen all his ideals come to naught; Rhodes was occupied by the Turks; Lutheran heresy maintained itself in Germany, and on August 3 the pope was forced to join the imperial alliance. A few days previous the Venetians—the "arch-Frenchmen" as they were called at the imperial court—had also joined the league. On September 14 Adrian passed away, persecuted by a depraved race which even crowded the doors of his physician.

Vana sine viribus ira, sighed the pope in the last hour before his death. "Here rests," says an inscription on his tomb, "Adrian VI, whom no greater calamity befell during all his life except the attainment of the highest power."

It was mainly the fault of the emperor that the attack upon France resulted in failure, despite the favorable political situation. While the English army in northern France justly complained of the "inactivity of the Burgundians" and accomplished almost nothing, and while in the East the warriors of Bourbon, who talked already of the capture of Paris, quickly deserted their leader, the emperor delayed his expedition from Spain into southern France, until the English ambassadors reported that he could neither help himself nor his friends, and would make peace to order his own affairs.

The reoccupation of Fuenterrabia remained the only important event of the late Spanish winter expedition. That slowness which characterized all decisions and movements of the emperor was noticeable even at that time; it was a result of the various tasks, of an incredible uncertainty as to means of communication, and chiefly of a chronic lack of money which greatly hampered the immense necessities of a warlike policy and a luxurious household.

But all these causes did not suffice to explain Charles's hesitation during the war of 1523 and 1524, especially after he had learned how to obtain

money by inflicting punishment upon Spanish rebels. In vain did those who understood conditions exhort to mildness; in vain did Duke Alba seek to influence the emperor. Here, for the first time, the young ruler displayed the spirit of stubbornness of which he was always accused. Despite an amnesty, execution and confiscation did not cease for years and nothing characterized the attitude of the future misanthrope better than his pitiless consideration, by means of which he acquiesced in deserved punishment, in order to make that punishment more severe. As early as 1525, a pious monk entreated him to celebrate the victory of Pavia by pardoning the exiled rebels, and to permit no longer their wives and children to die in misery. But more hideous than the cruelty of the royal judge was the base treachery shown by Charles against the revolutionaries of Mallorca.

The politician made use of such means without the least hesitation. Thus he believed he could again deceive Wolsey after the death of Adrian, by writing to his ambassador at Rome,—who had been ordered to work in behalf of Julius of Medici,—to aid the Englishman; but he kept the letter at Barcelona until he learned of the election of the Medicean. Charles was determined to obtain the tiara for himself or a man of his choice, “even if all in the conclave should perish.” The Romans demanded a native pope. We learn that Cardinal

Farnese tried to obtain the aid of the emperor by offering him an immense sum of money. Yet it was an awful deception when Charles's envoy regarded the Medicean, who was elected November 19, 1523, as an instrument of his lord.

Clement VII, who was called the most unhappy of all popes, had achieved as an imperial partisan the highest dignity of Christendom, yet later on he made a serious attempt to change entirely, in accord with that new position. The aims of his policy were those of Adrian,—peace among the Christian powers, European war against the Turks, and destruction of all heretics. In Clement, however, we once more observe the Italian prince with his territorial and dynastic interests. He was far more decent and more priestly in his private life than Leo X; he gave alms instead of aiding musicians and jesters, but none of the great ideas of Adrian appeared in him. While he secretly aided the imperial army in northern Italy financially, he declared that he would be pope and not a servant, and that he would maintain the independence of Italy, both against France and against the emperor.

The envoys of the emperor described Clement, soon after the election, as a genuine Italian and not dependent upon his environment. Several months later, the Spanish court thought his holiness should have become cardinal rather than pope. Of course it seemed peculiar to the Italian princes and people

that the interests of a foreign ruler should be their own interests. The pope believed it possible to maintain a friendly alliance with the emperor in North and Middle Italy, and Chancellor Gattinara would have loved to see the French "barbarians" driven out of Italy, and through the establishment of an independent duchy of Milan, all Italian states tied to the emperor as their natural lord. Besides Spanish and German troops they were chiefly Italians who, under the leadership of Prospero Colonna and after his death under that of the new imperial governor Bourbon, put to flight a superior army of the king of France, in the winter of 1523-24.

The people of Milan had not forgotten the brutality of the French and were anxious to join the hated besiegers. On their retreat the French lost their leader Admiral Bonnivet, the "knight without fear and blame." Bourbon, who soon resumed his favorite project of conquering France, took the oath of allegiance before Henry VIII, in order to obtain English subsidies; he hoped to be the Lord of Paris before November 1. Yet lack of money and the opposition of Pescara delayed the invasion into southern France till July. Although the cities in Provence opened their gates without resistance, the whole enterprise came to naught before the powerfully fortified Marseilles, whose citizens themselves had helped destroy the suburbs and, with

tears in their eyes, had brought their dead and their saints from the sacked churches behind the protecting walls. The women of all classes, in terror of the wild Bourbon and his soldiers, took part in the digging of the trenches, and within three days the *tranchées des dames* were erected. In vain did Bourbon harangue his men while Pescara told his Spaniards that if they wished to sup in the nether world they should storm the stronghold.

Meanwhile all hope of an insurrection against Francis I had vanished. His subjects did not face a hated king and were not an exhausted and discontented people, but possessed a firmly connected, national state, where despite bad government the days of distress seemed to afford new resources. Italian spectators truthfully asserted that the French would never give up their king in behalf of the emperor or Henry VIII. Notwithstanding all the evil experiences of the last few years, the reckless squandering at the court, and the depraved commerce with judicial offices, Francis I could gather a well-equipped army in the autumn of 1524 which, led by himself, crossed the Alps, not to mention the imperial troops who had left Marseilles.

Shortly before, Bourbon had written to the emperor assuring him that he would be the greatest of men who had ever lived, and would establish the whole of Christianity. The French entered Milan on October 26. Francis I who after a long time

had again mounted his charger, in order to devote "a little trouble," in behalf of the safety of France, besieged Pavia. The commandant, Antonio de Leyva, knew how to encourage his soldiers and citizens, as the people of Marseilles had once been supported; at Pavia, too, noble ladies helped dig trenches and displayed great valor.

The Hapsburgs faced a grave crisis. The French at Milan; in Germany the imminent revolution; England, instead of assisting, about to desert her ally; Venice, Ferrara, and the pope on the side of France; Duke Sforza highly distrustful; Charles's brother-in-law, Christian of Denmark, driven out of the country; his brother Ferdinand desirous of obtaining Milan; his brother-in-law, Louis of Hungary, threatened by a rebellion of the magnates and a Turkish invasion;—it was a tremendous test though which the courage and wisdom of the twenty-five-year-old emperor should pass victorious.

He possessed the patience to wait and endure like his ancestor Frederick III; the time would come—he wrote to his ambassador to Rome—when he would be able to inflict vengeance upon false friend and enemy. Until then it was necessary to be friendly with and place confidence in those who least deserved it. In truth, there could be no better school for intrigue than the diplomatic relations to the Italian powers, above all to the holy see. Wolsey denied with all his boldness his negotiations with

the mother of Francis I, and sought to excuse the withdrawal of English subsidies. No wonder, therefore, if the emperor was often lost in this labyrinth of deceptions and more than once lamented that he no longer had the strong leadership of his Chieftains. For Gattinara, though indispensable on account of his singular skill, could not really control the young prince, whose increasing independence and desire to work frequently yielded to the pressure of bodily fatigue.

The sovereign often suffered from fever, and his attempts to overcome it by riding or hunting aggravated his weakness. Perhaps his inactivity during the French war had something to do with his ill health. His furious passion found expression when he learned of the treaty between the pope and France. He complained that Clement VII had become pope with his assistance, and that while a cardinal the pope had caused his war against France. To his courtiers he said he would go to Italy and punish those who had vexed him, "especially that fool of a pope; today or tomorrow Martin Luther might probably become a valuable man."

Nothing was more important for the fate of the German Reformation than this struggle between the emperor and pope. It was as Adrian had said: "From the rest or unrest of Italy depends the rest or unrest of the whole world." During the struggle between France and Spain the Italianized papacy

could not but pay careful attention to the vicissitudes of a struggle upon the outcome of which its existence depended.

And where should it find an independent existence? Pope Clement VII could not be made responsible for such distress, no matter how repellent the political immorality of the pope might have been. Yet no other pontiff had been influenced so wofully by the contrast between the tasks of a governor of Christ and an Italian prince as Clement VII, and in this respect, German Protestantism must "regard him with grateful memory as one of its greatest benefactors and furtherers."

The year 1525 seemed to bring about a decision in behalf of the emperor. While King Francis was forced, because of the valiant resistance of Pavia, to change the siege into a blockade, warriors gathered by Bourbon crossed the Alps under the leadership of Marx Littich of Enis and the aged Frundsberg, whose son was in the besieged city. Thus was formed an army of about 20,000 men on foot, and several thousand horsemen. Its main strength consisted of German soldiers and Spanish bowmen who obeyed blindly their adored leader Pescara. It was he who had to keep the troops together despite the utter lack of money. He first appealed to his Spaniards; they were willing to sell even their horses, cloaks and shirts, in order to obtain money or food. The Germans formed the

most difficult problem. Francis I was still the superior in point of numbers of soldiers, and was far better equipped with ammunition and cavalrymen. The imperial leaders were willing to bring about a decision because of the increasing distress of the defenders of Pavia and the lack of money. Their soldiers, the abbot of Najera wrote, were in an excellent mood, "as if every one of them was sure of capturing or at least wounding the king."

On February 21, General Charles of Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, wrote to the ambassador at Rome that within three or four days he would be victorious or dead. The latter contingency was almost prophetic, for on the 24th of February the battle of Pavia was fought. At midnight the imperial troops stormed the fortified park near which the royal headquarters were established. After daybreak the two armies met within the park. Francis was deceived by the original effect of the fire of his soldiers and his advancing *hommes d'armes*, when his Swiss fighters succumbed to the terrific onslaught of the Spaniards.

Meanwhile Leyva left the city and the defeat of the French was turned into wild, unrestrainable panic. The king, who fought amid his horsemen, suddenly observed the headlong flight of the Swiss. He preferred to die with the flower of his cavalry, and it was only accidental that he did not fall like many others of his companions, for the Spanish

spared none. Francis I. summoned Lannoy and handed his sword to him. "Of all things," he wrote to his mother, "my honor and my life are left."

Tremendous was the impression of this victory upon the whole of Europe. Besides the joy of the imperial party, there was observed a general feeling of depression, as if "the emperor were the only ruler chosen by Fate," Ranke put it. The superstition regarding a world monarchy roused either hope or fear in the mind of great and small.

Charles V seemed modest after hearing of his victory,—a disposition which was in great contrast with his age, as well as with his intention to make all possible use of his success. Instead of displaying delight and exultation he withdrew to his chamber and threw himself before a picture of the Virgin. Instead of splendid festivals, he arranged processions. But was there anyone in Europe who, after this, could deny God's grace and the holy duty of a war against the Turks? Peace among Christians as he wished to establish it was brought about through the collapse of France, the enslavement of Italy, and the destruction of German heresy. Only after this according to the statement of Najera, he could establish laws for both Turks and Christians as he pleased.

The first difficulty he encountered was England. Wolsey had offended the imperial ambassador at London, which fact was explainable only by the in-

tion of England to effect a break with the emperor. Although Charles treated this disgrace with unexampled forbearance, Wolsey continued to test his patience by means of propositions which would appear silly, had he not intended to free his lord from the emperor.

England demanded nothing less than the dethronement of the Valois dynasty, and the French crown for Henry VIII. Henry would accompany the emperor on his Roman journey to obtain the imperial crown, and the entire French-English inheritance would go to the emperor, on account of the little Maria, so that the latter would become actual lord and possessor of all the Christians. The nine-year-old princess had to send a ring to her royal bridegroom, as a "token of her love which was increased through jealousy," whereas the king was negotiating regarding a Portuguese marriage.

Wolsey did everything he could to bring about a break between Charles and Henry; he is said to have stated that the emperor was a liar, his aunt Maria a prostitute, his brother Ferdinand a child and Bourbon a traitor. As early as the summer of 1525, the power of the cardinal increased. While the timid pope brought about an offensive-defensive alliance between the emperor and Henry VIII, Italy, France and England intended to proceed against the victor of Pavia. England on August 30 made peace with France, according to which the British

Isles received more than one million and a half crowns, and the omnipotent minister the astounding profit of 130,000 crowns.

Let us, in order to concede the political merits of Wolsey, remember that he had secured what he was striving for. England under Wolsey's leadership, for the first time in history, had saved Europe from the rule of one monarch,—from a universal monarchy, as it was called in those days. It is a question also as to whether the young emperor met with difficulties—besides the enmity of a Wolsey—because the king of France was in his power.

Instead of continuing the war the victor undervalued his advantages. Soon after the first great decision we clearly observe Charles's dynastic attitude and his inability to esteem national powers. When the emperor demanded the duchy of Burgundy, and the French portions of the county of Artois, and the independence of the possessions of Bourbon, which were increased by Provence, he acted like a genuine Burgundian prince and at the same time as an international emperor to whom a nation was nothing but a geographical term. Queen Louise proudly replied that she would never cede one foot of French soil, and that the whole empire agreed with her. France splendidly proved by her undaunted and patriotic position that her territories were one state, and her inhabitants one nation, as Mignet states.

Thus the queen was enabled to undertake political, military and financial reforms without meeting with opposition and disobedience. King Francis had publicly declared he would prefer to spend his days as a prisoner, rather than to harm his country. Of course this meek mood did not last after he was brought to Spain upon his own request and learned that his adversary, instead of negotiating with him, was determined to make use of the misfortunes of the defeated king.

The joyous and honorable receptions in Spain (at Barcelona he was received by 22 noble ladies) were followed by months of anxious and fruitless expectation. The emperor refused to meet Francis, and only the serious illness of the prisoner induced him to hasten to Madrid, where the dying man greeted him. Charles tried to console "his good friend and brother," making use of the biblical saying, in a half frivolous manner, "the Lord hath given, the Lord hath taken away." The sister of the king, the amiable Margaret of Alençon, did not succeed in freeing the prisoner; the celebrated "Minerva of France," to whom Erasmus had sent a consolatory letter, found the emperor "very cold," and later she bitterly complained of having dealt with the greatest hypocrites, "with people whose sense of honor was as little as little can be." Resignation and despair, as found in the poems of the captured king, induced the latter to obtain freedom

at any price, even at the cost of his honor. He had declared in Italy that he would disregard all treaties concluded during his captivity. Gattinara, the most zealous representative of an anti-French policy, was convinced that no treaty would bind the king after his liberation. None the less, peace was concluded at Madrid January 13, 1526, according to which "the King of France had been made the subject of the emperor," as Baumgarten stated. Burgundy was to be ceded, all French claims in Italy and the Netherlands given up, Bourbon reinstalled, and the entire French fleet controlled by the emperor. Francis I was betrothed to Charles's sister, the dowager queen of Portugal, and promised to return into captivity unless the treaty should be fulfilled within six weeks after his liberation.

When they parted Charles asked his "brother" whether there were any difficulties. Francis replied: "I shall fulfill everything and I know that none in my empire will prevent me from doing so. If anything else will occur, you should regard me as a low villain."

With great distress Charles permitted his dreamed-of gains after the battle of Pavia to come to naught. "Whoever wants to obtain too much cannot keep it," says an Italian proverb. The emperor was sorely vexed over the perjury of the French king, which was not like an honest noble-

man and brave knight, but like a merchant, he said to the envoy of Venice.

But would the emperor in similar circumstances have kept his word? We have reason to believe he would not, if we recall the treacherous activity of Charles's first general in Italy, in 1525, of which the emperor was fully aware. "One sees from the experience of our time," says Machiavelli, "that those princes had accomplished great things caring only little about fidelity and faith, and knowing how to deceive their fellowmen cunningly. Yet finally they were overcome by those whom they had believed loyal." The creed that only he who is the most cunning profits most, the great Florentine could very well observe from the political practice of his age. Charles V had dearly paid for the peace of Madrid, while at the same time his super-prudent Italian adversaries were caught in their own snares.

If an attempt of an Italian war of liberation under the leadership of the pope miserably failed, the deeper cause lay in that boundless individualism which characterized the entire civilization of the Renaissance, and which profoundly vitiated the political life of Italy. Even if the liberation had succeeded, the Italian rulers of the sixteenth century never would have possessed that degree of unity which saved the German empire from utter destruction.

There was still in existence an old though loose union of the numerous politically independent dynasties, and, despite all disasters, the wonderful construction of the Holy Empire every now and then roused a responsive emotion among the princely and republican powers, which kept on experimenting with it. Although the name of a common, beauteous Fatherland filled many a man with pride and joy, Italy lacked a common national past, she had no political traditions, and her most talented sons knew and exercised only the sovereign rights of the individual, in the strangest contrast with their revered Roman ancestors. Yet the individual was prevented from attaining his highest aim by the fact that the majority of Italian statesmen had grown accustomed to cunning and deceit, which led inevitably to a policy of cowardice, trickery and overreaching others. "These acute calculators, to whom none could compare," Baumgarten remarked, "saw so clearly that they recognized every possibility as well as every difficulty. They also knew each other so well that every one of them feared the worst from his neighbor."

Thus, at a juncture when France and England were willing to make common cause with Italy, and the Peasants' War in the Alpine countries made it impossible for Ferdinand to participate, we find there was anxious intriguing in place of bold activity; and, instead of an appeal to the national

indignation, there was cautious speculation with the important man whom they attempted to lead astray lest they should have to fight against him.

A great moment was at hand,—that much everybody knew. "It was," said Giberti, the confidant of the pope, "a question as to whether Italy should be saved or enslaved for ever." Nothing could be more favorable for an insurrection than the haughtiness of the imperial generals and the lack of discipline among their unpaid and scattered troops, who imitated on a small scale the extortions of their leaders.

Nareja advised the emperor to continue the expedition rather than to let the people be suppressed any longer. Discord among the imperial leaders and Charles's ingratitude to Pescara, the real victor of Pavia, caused that peculiar attempt of Morone, chancellor of Milan, to bribe the general, with the consent of the pope. Morone, a skilled diplomatist and keen judge of human nature, whom his prince praised as "the man of all hours," forgot that he himself had once called the great military leader a model of infidelity and wickedness, and thought to rouse the Italian within Pescara who, though born at Naples, was descended from the noblest Spanish blood on his father's and his mother's side.

Pescara, who had fought at Ravenna and later on at Pavia, and who controlled the hearts of his Spanish soldiers as did no other general, was de-



**Duke George of Saxony. (Duke from 1500 to 1539.)
From an Engraving by George Pencz. (1500-1550.)**

terminated to remain loyal to the emperor. We do not know whether or not his loyalty was changed by the hope of obtaining the kingdom of Naples. The hero whose life had hitherto been blameless, who was highly adored by his wife Vittoria Colonna, the first lady of Italy, dishonored the last years of his life—he died in December, 1525—through the skillfully played rôle of a spy. He promised as a soldier, general and nobleman, to do anything for his persuader, and as “a malcontent and an Italian,” he joined the alliance of the pope against the emperor, while he reported everything to the latter, not without burning shame in his inmost soul; “for,” he said, “I cannot help feeling that I am breaking my word.”

The treachery which he carried on for months was completed by luring Morone, who had begun to be suspicious, to the city of Pavia, and by ordering his arrest. After recommending the prisoner to the mercy of the empire, he passed away. One year afterward the brilliant but unscrupulous Morone was in the service of the emperor.

The pope, whose cowardice during this critical period was revolting, vacillated for a long time from one party to the other, suspicious toward all and suspected by all. While the Venetians were ready to protect themselves even if forced to “conjure up the devils from their abodes,” every delay was a gain for Clement. He cringingly informed the em-

peror of the possibility of his deserting him, only to declare later on that he would be willing to surrender with the other Italian princes.

On account of the hesitation of Francis I and the inactivity of Wolsey, Italy missed a most valuable opportunity, and as late as May 22, 1526, an alliance was formed by France, the pope, Venice, Florence and Milan without England, yet under her protectorate. This "holiest" League of Cognac, which would force the emperor to evacuate Upper Italy and return the sons of Francis I to their father, determined to expel the emperor from Naples. Francis claimed only Asti and Genoa, but Clement offered him Milan in addition. Upon the whole, the entire course of the Italian made the impression that he had no serious belief in its cause or its power, despite the stirring appeals for the freedom of the Fatherland and the Spanish tyranny; else they would have succeeded in overcoming the ten or twelve thousand hostile soldiers, who had lost their able leader and who could obtain neither help nor money from the emperor, in the midst of a people filled with hatred. But the timidity of the Venetian Supreme General Francesco of Urbino, who feared to cross the Adda or the Oglio, "as though they were the Indus or the Ganges," spoiled everything which might have turned out well through the papal leaders. He once spent three days in marching a distance that any one else would have covered in

three hours. It is, therefore, easy to understand the contempt of the barbarous but warlike imperial soldiers for such enemies.

While these brave troops held the banner of their emperor aloft in honor, the newly-wed monarch was leading a life of luxurious leisure in Spain, whose splendor and comfort shut out the distant battle cries. Charles must be regarded as a favorite of fortune, for hardly ever has another monarch left everything to fate, while surrounded by the most dreadful war which befell one-half of the world. He understood how to win his people to his side, so that they ventured all in his behalf without obtaining any help or gratitude from him in return. As with the Spanish, the German revolution was suppressed without his assistance. Others had sacrificed their lives at Pavia and won victory for him, and it was not upon his orders that the captured king was brought to Spain. The Italian league now unsheathed the sword in Germany, heresy began to spread, and the victorious armies of the sultan advanced toward the desolate fields of Hungary.

Charles celebrated his wedding with the pretty Portuguese princess Isabella March 3, 1526, and the wealth of Spain and India was consumed before his eyes, through a series of festivals, instead of being sent to the starving armies in Italy. And as he had not rewarded the services of Pescara, he now

greatly offended one of his ablest generals, Antonio de Leyva, by accusing him of bribery.

We hardly understand the emperor's lack of money when we remember the Spanish incomes of that year. The Cortes of Castilia paid during the years 1523, 1524 and 1525, extraordinary taxes (*servicios*)—from 300,000 to 400,000 ducats for each year,—while confiscation of property amounted to about two millions, and the dowry of Isabella equaled another million. In addition to all this was the so-called *cruzada* (crusade tax), which Charles had let for 800,000 ducats; then there were 80,000 ducats from the Moors of Granada, aside from the rich gifts of the clergymen and the transoceanic revenues which, since the conquest of Mexico, annually increased from 100,000 to 200,000 ducats. As early as 1527 and 1528, the Cortes Family of Castilia announced that their subjects were totally exhausted.

Although we must credit Charles's government for its wise institutions in behalf of commerce and industry, and even agriculture, and although the number of Spanish merchant vessels reached several hundred, and Seville alone employed more than a thousand looms in the preparation of silks, still the wars which were carried on for decades, and the incessant furnishing of the colonies with working facilities, were very unfavorable for the economic conditions of Spain. Wealthy Seville was, despite

its monopoly of Indian commerce, "thinly populated and almost entirely controlled by women."

Recently the attempt has been made to prove that Charles V had aimed without any purpose at the suppression of the freedom of the various classes. But if he intended to live in accord with the existing laws, his policy was in harmony with the "practical" absolutism of the sixteenth century which, according to Koser, was distinguished from the "fundamental" absolutism of the later centuries through sparing certain constitutional humiliations. How the unhappy outcome of the revolution had changed the state theory of the Castilian Cortes, we learn from the comparison of those classes of 1518 who had regarded the king as an officer of the people with the meeting of 1523, at which the citizens who hailed Charles as the creator of a Golden Age and as the living law adopted the doctrine that "laws and customs are controlled by kings, who can ordain and abolish them as they please." After that time the offices in the cities gradually filled with members of the lower nobility. The *caballeros* (knights or cavaliers) and *hijodalgos* (noblemen) complained that their equals had to be confined to some prisons with the common people; and they demanded that every Spaniard should be allowed to carry a dagger with him.

Charles V won favor by assuring the Spaniards, especially the Castilians, how he loved these em-

pires, "on account of their great Grandeza and their nobility," more than all other of his possessions; how his entire policy was in behalf of the glory and weal of Spain, and how it was Spain's holy duty, on the other hand, to help preserve "God our Lord and Christian religion."

At this time Charles, the Hapsburger and native Dutchman, had become part and parcel of the Spaniards, so that henceforward he appeared to be of their lineage and creed. As for the Spaniard, it was a new source of pride that he could adore in his king, according to Charles's own statement, "God's governor over all Christendom."

But the majority of the Spaniards felt less pleased after open hostilities broke out between the two "governors of God," in 1525. Baumgarten justly emphasized that the accusation of having neglected Luther and the Turks was true of the pope as well as the emperor who never ceased parading his hatred of the heretics and the Turks. Clement VII had sent some money to Hungary, yet both Christian rulers were far remote from the danger of their interests and those of western Europe, and did not wish to sacrifice their ambitious plans, or lay aside their petty struggles.

The pope emphatically demanded the return of Reggio and Rubiena, of which the duke of Ferrara had once deprived the papal dominions, while the emperor dared protect that detested enemy of the

Medici. Mutual threats became louder as time went on, and the Spanish envoy to Rome, the duke of Sessa, exhorted the pope to consider Germany and Hungary and the incessant efforts to induce the emperor, as the chosen prince, to diminish the papal dominions and start anew reforms of the Church. To the ambassador's question as to whether the rumors of war were to be believed, the pope replied that the sounding of trumpets would announce the beginning of war. While Charles attempted to induce the pope to yield to the emperor's extraordinary envoy, Hugo de Moncada, the always irresolute Medicean furthered a break with the emperor in behalf of the liberation of Italy, "the common Fatherland of all nations," as he pompously announced. He sneered at the late propositions of Moncada, whereupon the passionate Sessa, soon after his interview with the pope, set a jester upon his horse, who ridiculed and made light of the Romans. Of course the warlike spirit of the pope, who had sent a sharp note to the emperor when he had been misled by his wicked counselors, soon vanished, especially after danger arose in his own country. The fiery and ambitious Cardinal Pompeo Colonna, who had called upon the Roman people to battle for freedom under Julius II, had declared war upon Clement VII, and as in previous centuries, the Colonna and other native noblemen marched against anti-imperial Rome, in full accord with

the Ghibelline past. Moncada was ordered by the emperor to assist those gentlemen secretly.

A feigned treaty was concluded with the pope, who actually permitted himself to be deceived and dismissed his army, with the exception of only several hundred men. Thus, on September 20, they were able to surprise their almost helpless enemy and Rome, whose population remained inactive, saw barbarous plundering as a prelude to its imminent fate. The holy implements of the Church of St. Peter were not spared. Clement escaped and declared he would die as a pope, but his action did not harmonize with his words when he resolutely defended himself like every other soldier. In the evening he negotiated with Moncada who, amid hypocritical excuses, returned to him the stolen tiara, with the exhortation to make peace with the emperor, "whose victorious arms God himself could not resist with impunity."

Although the unhappy tidings of the destruction of the Hungarian army near Mohács coincided with this grave lesson, the pope secretly renounced the treaty into which he had been forced to enter, and punished the treachery of the Colonna, despite his promised amnesty, by devastating their territory. "It is better to die than continue to live in such disgrace," called out the passionate supreme shepherd of the Church, who did not cease to think of victory and revenge.

We shall hardly take it amiss that the pope replied to that letter by a destruction characteristic of the Roman policy ever since the first days of the imperial election. While Charles was not willing to believe the statement that Clement had freed the king of France from his Madrid oath, he sustained the grave accusation of Pescara, who regarded the pope as the leader of the anti-imperial conspiracy, and who was told by Roman authorities that he could renounce his loyalty toward the emperor without any detriment to his honor. With an irony which reminds one of Hutten, the emperor considered it unthinkable that Christ's governor on earth would be willing to shed one drop of blood for the sake of worldly possessions. But the result sounded in the ears of the Roman soldiers like the thunder of the judgment: if the pope, instead of making peace, acted like the head of a party and not like a father, as a burglar and not as a shepherd of the people, the emperor appealed to the verdict of a general council. Regarding the calling of a council which he had promised to the Germans, he made the cardinal responsible in one of his later letters; otherwise he "would employ every means possible" by authority of his imperial dignity.

The question was raised at the imperial court in the summer as to whether peace and assistance for the empire should be obtained by a lenient treatment of the heretics. Charles therefore wrote to his

brother Ferdinand to ratify his plan; he was far from being willing to negotiate with the Lutherans. But there was no need of it. The obvious fact that the emperor was hostile to the pope sufficed to induce the German warriors who gathered about the banner of Frundsberg to consider this Italian expedition of especial importance. Here for the first time the policy of Charles V and the nation met.

The memory of the day of Pavia roused a nobler emotion in the hearts of the wild warriors. As late as the seventeenth century the German poets sang of the pious warriors who "had to walk in blood to their knees," and with sneering at the old Swiss rivals—"methinks we have repaid them at Pavia in the zoo"—there were mingled the patriotic thought of taking vengeance for French disgrace, and the hatred against the treacherous ones who fought in behalf of Francis I:

"Stab to, stab to, ye pious men,
These are the genuine French."

Fully in accord with such thought lived their famous leader, the plain Suabian knight who, according to the words of a contemporary, "had made the whole globe fear Germany." It was rumored that the king of France would have regarded the winning over of this man as equivalent to that of the whole Roman Empire. Frundsberg, in whose "knightly heart and mind" the holy gospel

was firmly established, undertook his last expedition with all the antipathy of the German toward the anti-imperial clergy. He is said to have declared that he would hang the pope if he came to Rome. After he had pawned his own estates and the jewelry of his wife, besides the trinkets he had obtained from Ferdinand, he was able to gather an army of about 11,000 men in the Etsch valley, 4,000 of whom served without pay. Over pathless roads they crossed the Alps; the aged general was greatly assisted by his men with long javelins in crossing the most dangerous places. Toward the end of December he notified the duke of Bourbon of his arrival at Piacenza, "across high mountains and deep rivers, surrounded by enemies, in famine and distress and poverty; what shall we do?"

It was one of the most peculiar of expeditions which led the imperial troops to the front of the gates of the Eternal City, after months of inactivity. While the duke of Urbino pressed the cause of the allies with great unwillingness and tardiness, partly in favor of Venice and partly because of personal enmity against the Medici, the pope negotiated with Lannoy. On the other hand, a long time elapsed until Bourbon could unite his badly paid soldiers with those of the German Frundsberg. The advance of the undisciplined troops was decided by the assistance of the duke of Ferrara, yet neither his money, nor his supply of food and ammunition,

prevented the onrush of the Spaniards in March, 1527, and later on that of the Germans. Bourbon managed to escape from his camp, where the raging Spaniards hunted for him, and which the Germans plundered.

Fruntsberg could do nothing; "Money! money!" shouted the insurgents, and turned their spears against the leader whose strength could no longer resist such shameful humiliation. He became ill and returned to his Fatherland to breathe his last. But the army pushed onward, taking the leaders with it and disregarding the imperial papal armistice, through snowstorm and rainshower, plundering and burning. The Spaniards, who marched toward Rome, carried supplies for eight days, in case they should be stopped. Cavalry and infantry numbered about 20,000 men, one-half being Germans. Since they demanded 300,000 ducats as the price of their withdrawal, the pope disregarded his treaty with Lannoy in order to join the league once more.

It all seemed like destiny; the dismal mood at Rome was expressed by the words of a wild fanatic who climbed naked up a statue of the Apostle Paul, and called in a loud voice, regarding the pope: "Woe upon thee, Sodomite bastard! because of thy sins Rome shall perish! repent and be converted!" The city expected aid from Urbino, who followed the imperial troops, and the Romans themselves hoped to resist better than before. On May 4,

one day before the arrival of the enemy, the pope proclaimed a holy war against the Lutherans and the Marannes. The following evening Bourbon held his war council in the little church of the monastery of St. Onofrio. His army had doubled through Italian reënforcements. These troops, famished and wild for money, had left their artillery and pressed onward with the utmost speed. At last the longed for prey lay before them.

Hutten would have rejoiced, had he lived, to witness these horrible May days of the year 1517; there was hardly any good German, whether Lutheran or Catholic, who would not with Luther have considered modern Rome "the devil's nest." And while many a warrior might recall the ancient prophecies regarding the punishment of the corrupt capital of Christendom, the Spaniards were convinced that Rome was the personification of wickedness and not the mistress of Christianity. At dawn, May 6, they joyfully began their attacks upon the effeminate priests and priestly slaves. The fire of the defenders, which lost its effect because of a dense fog, seemed to bring about a decision when Bourbon was wounded while encouraging his men. But the warriors and Spaniards, defying death, renewed their assaults until evening when the entire city, with the exception of the Angels' Castle, was in the power of these hordes who, bereft of their leaders, no longer knew any mercy.

Since the days of terror of 1084, when the Normans invaded the Eternal City, it had not known such atrocities. For days and weeks cruelty and luxury, greed and voluptuousness ruled within its gates. Not only eyewitnesses, but historians of our time cannot express their absolute disgust with the description of that satanic revelry. It was the name of Rome and its immense size which made the misery of this reign of unrestrained license so hellish. Numerous cities of lesser importance were compelled to suffer similar affliction in those days of hired armies, but their woful doom was surpassed by the violation of holy Roma, of the graves of the Apostles, and of the Vatican.

In the midst of the most hideous scenes of torture and indescribable orgies, we recall the great struggles of the time when the warriors, disguised as cardinals, proclaimed Luther pope in front of the Angels' Castle. With disgust a Spanish historian tells us of the disgraceful trade in consecrated hosts and relics and the dreadful maltreatment of clergymen,—proof of the great decline of all ecclesiastical authority. The old enemy of Luther from the time of Augsburg, Cardinal Cajetan, was dragged along the streets by the warriors as if he were a mutilated rabid dog. One of his colleagues was carried on a bier through the city by wretches who attempted to lay their burden into an open grave, in order to obtain an immense ransom.

The victors were unjustly accused of destroying a number of works of art, but in this respect they were, according to Gregorovius, better than those Vandals who demolished the Heidelberg Castle and the cathedral at Speyer.

The destruction and ruin were so utter that the Spanish historian wrote to Göttinger that Rome would not recover within five hundred years, and that the atrocities were of such a nature "that neither time nor memory nor paper nor ink sufficed to describe them." Clement VII resisted for one more month, but on June 5, deserted by all, he capitulated and became a prisoner of the emperor.

According to Sebastian Schärtlin, one of their leaders, the invading warriors found him in a small room, together with twelve cardinals; "great misery prevailed among them, they wept much; and all of us became rich." Many a common soldier suddenly became the owner of from 20,000 to 40,000 ducats. The Spaniards sneered at the miserable Romans who had been deprived of all their possessions, as being their fathers for whom they would pray, since they had obtained more favors from them than from their own parents.

It is characteristic to hear an Italian voice regarding the blame of the Romans themselves for their unspeakable fate. The Florentine Vettori always wondered at the fainthearted resistance of

the male population, who amounted to at least 30,000 that were able to bear arms. But they had proved "that proud, greedy, selfish, voluptuous and treacherous people could not resist for a long time; God often punishes those who possess those vices by means of their own enemies and for worse criminals. And nobody can deny that the inhabitants of Rome and above all the native Romans possessed all the aforementioned vices and many others besides."

This belief of a divine judgment, of a well-deserved punishment was common not only among the Germans, who were not at all surprised by the fulfillment of the current prophecies, but even among the Italians and Spaniards who were loyal to their emperor and in favor of reforms.

Two men greatly differing from each other, the pious cardinal Cajetan and the skeptic libertine Guicciardini, fully agreed in their contempt of that disgraceful, shameless, Roman reign; yet while the former saw only divine justice in the woe of the pillage, the ingenuous Florentine admitted, with all the candor of a man of the Renaissance, that he had rendered service to the pope for his own profit and not because of conviction; "otherwise I should have loved Martin Luther like myself."

Of course, in order not to cut loose from the traditional laws of Christianity, he did not forget to add, "he would like to see this band of contemptible

people controlled so that they should have to live either without vices or without power."

Similar opinions regarding a reform of the Church, which above all should do away with the worldly power of the papacy, were also met among many highly distinguished Spaniards. As early as the summer of 1526, Charles's envoy to the republic of Genoa, Lope de Soria, advised the emperor to punish severely the pope, who appeared to have forgotten his duty, as a task which would please the Lord and prove a warning lesson for all future popes. The same diplomat, because of his thorough knowledge of the Italian conditions, regarded the popes as the only source of discord among the Christians, and advised the emperor, after the conquest of Rome, to reform the Church by confining the pope to his ecclesiastical duties, as being the sovereign lord on earth. And Bartolommeo Gattinara, the chancellor's nephew, who negotiated with the imprisoned pope, wrote from Rome, on May 24: "We expect speedily arrangements of your Majesty regarding the government of Rome, and as to whether there should remain any sort of apostolic see in this city or not."

Divine judgment and reformation were always mentioned in the letters of the Spaniards who stayed in Italy. One of them, who shed tears while looking at the captured pope, declared that all misery would be brought to an end by the coming reform

of the Church, which was totally controlled by the emperor and the Spanish prelates.

One cannot say that those voices were not heard at the imperial court. Charles himself demanded that his letters to and from the pope, wherein he attacked the pontiff in a truly Lutheran fashion according to a Venetian envoy, should be published. Many pamphlets, though not official, yet the work of partisans of the emperor, went still farther. They are said to have been composed by Alphonso Valdés, a secretary of Gattinara, and his brother Juan. They were filled with Erasmic ideas, especially since the emperor and the high Spanish clergy gave aid to Erasmus, whom the monks accused of heresy. One of the pamphlets ended with the hope of obtaining an imperial reformation; in future all would declare that Jesus Christ had founded the Church, and that Charles V had restored it. Still everything that was said against the pope, celibacy, and the superstitious veneration of idols and relics, and against conversion by force, had nothing in common with the viewpoints of the emperor.

Charles, in his earlier years, seemed to have used the terms "reformation of the Church" and "general council" for political purposes. At any rate, he did not approach the greatest decision of his life with that religious sincerity which we should have expected from a disciple like Adrian. His de-

meanor before the catastrophe was quite ambiguous. Despite the armistice which had been concluded by Lannoy, Charles, who was against that treaty, approved of and aided the advance of Bourbon. After he learned of the fall of Rome, he would not even interrupt the festivities in honor of the christening of his first son; and soon took part in a tournament.

All the same, it was brought to his knowledge that he had to reckon with the feelings of a nation which was more Catholic than the pope. The ecclesiastical and civil nobles expressed their indignation about the Roman events so openly "that many believed more had been said than was needed," and the Franciscan general Quiñones dared even to tell the emperor that he could no longer bear that name if he did not fulfill his duties toward the pope, but would be called Luther's military colonel. All people of prominence lamented the events, said the Venetian envoy to Valladolid, and only a few Dutchmen and certain "bankrupts" rejoiced.

The fact that Gattinara began to be disliked by the court, from which he absented himself for about six months, greatly influenced the policy of his lord, whose innate vacillation needed strengthening, and which could not be thus aided by all the energy of statesmen of the second and third ranks. Charles V would have decided otherwise if he had himself witnessed the events, and if he had not been in

Spanish seclusion where he learned what had happened abroad only after weeks or months. Leyva, therefore, quite justly wrote to him from Milan, that within the time which the imperial commands needed to reach their destined place all could be lost, and that the emperor should not rely too much upon his propitious star, for "God doeth not miracles every day."

The systematic postponement of this and other important questions deprived Charles once more, and not for the last time, of the fruits of victory. Although he officially talked of divine judgment, of reformation of the Church, and of a council which his brother Ferdinand especially recommended, and although he was willing to liberate the pope only because of his ecclesiastical office, he finally decided to reestablish civil authority.

The postponement brought about a change in the conditions of the imperial army and the world itself, greatly to the detriment of the emperor. The ferocious garrison of Rome, driven away for a time because of famine and pestilence, soon returned to the wretched city, into "their Rome," as they said. It was feared that the warriors would be incited by Cardinal Colonna to assassinate the pope. None the less, one of the Spanish leaders refused to bring the "body of the Lord" to Naples, as he had been commanded to do. More than once the hostages of the pope were dragged to the

tumultuous war councils, and repeatedly the miserable beings faced death.

At last, on the 31st of October, a treaty was agreed upon, and signed November 26, according to which the pope was freed and retained the papal dominions, but had to promise strict neutrality and to indemnify the imperial troops. Clement did not wait until he was released, but fled to Orvieto during the night preceding the one set for his liberation, being aided by a few imperial Italians, including Morone.

The imperial mediators well knew that the pope would break his promises and return to the league. "All of us should be surprised if he did the opposite," wrote Perez. Meanwhile, the haggling and mutinous army at Rome was utterly disorganized and no longer a power ready to strike, although a few months before it was equal to any military task.

It would have been unpardonable had the French made no use of the opportunity which the fatal tardiness of the emperor offered. Francis I, too, showed equanimity toward Italian affairs for a long time. After his return from Spain he was influenced more than ever by his love for Anne de Pisseleu (the later duchess of Etampes), to whom he dedicated many poetic epistles composed in the camp and the prison, and whom he had solemnly promised that he would never flee before the enemy.

Francis' negotiations with England were resumed after the capture of Rome. A meeting of cardinals at Avignon, proposed by Wolsey, in order to establish a sort of independent ecclesiastical government, and to protest against eventual concessions of the pope, was not effected, but when Wolsey renounced his king's claims to the French crown, and when peace was established between the two empires (at Amiens, August 18, 1527), French troops under the leadership of Lantrec were stationed in Upper Italy. Not only Pavia but a number of Lombardic cities, including the important town of Genoa, the "Porte of Italy," opened their gates before them. While Leyva, deserted by the emperor and the main army, was writing to Spain that for four months he had received no reply to his important letters, and that his little army was greatly suffering from hunger, Lantrec advanced towards Naples. Alphonso of Ferrara and Federico of Mantua deserted the emperor, the latter promising secretly that he would remain loyal to the sovereign.

Now, for the last time, Wolsey enjoyed the hallucination of dominating the scales of the great war. With royal pomp, and treated like a grand ruler by Francis I, he appeared in France; at his reception the cannons roared so that his mule, as he related, grew melancholy. Even the royal privilege of pardoning criminals was presented to him by Francis. At the same time, Charles attempted to win

over his greatest enemy, and yet how could the imperial personage seriously expect to gain Wolsey by means of several thousand ducats, or the hope of obtaining the holy see? None the less, Wolsey's obliquity must needs lead to his destruction.

The center of all interests for Henry VIII was not his relation to France or to the emperor, but the desire to obtain a divorce from his Spanish wife and to marry Anne Boleyn. The Spanish ambassador to England clearly understood the cunning policy of Wolsey's English adversaries, who thought of destroying the long detested minister. Charles V was, as lord of Holland, far more important to the Englishmen than the king of France, and the attempt of Wolsey to remove the English commerce to Calais from Antwerp increased the number of his antagonists, as well as the futile expenditures and stopping of communication concerning the French treaty. "He is playing a dangerous game," said the French envoy, "for I believe him to be the only Englishman who wants war with Flanders."

Decline of the national textile industry, bad harvests, high cost of wheat and meat, the dreadful epidemic of the so-called "English Sweat," and finally, the increasing number of unemployed workers and demoralized soldiers,—all this united to bring about an ominous disposition among the lower classes; the famished people declared they

would hand over the cardinal to the sea in a leaky boat.

The violation of the economic interests of England incited the masses against him, while the impossibility of winning authority from Rome for a divorce for the king soon alienated his lord and protector. England had no time to interfere with the struggle between the French and the imperial arms. Yet it was due to luck rather than merit that Charles V came out victorious from the grave crisis of 1528. Since the close of April Naples had been besieged from land and sea by Lautrec and the fleet of Genoa. Viceroy Moncada was killed during a battle with Genoa, and Lannoy served for a short while as his successor. Prince Philibert of Orange who, after Bourbon's fall, had desired something like a supreme generalship, met with more obedience on the side of his soldiers than in the time of the desolate Roman campaign; even the warriors were willing to content themselves with bread and water, for it should not be said that Germans had surrendered such a city from lack of wine. But their cause was miserable and the hopes of the emperor were at a lower ebb than at any other time in the course of his never-ending conflicts.

The dethronement of Charles by the deeply offended pope was already discussed at the English court, and Wolsey took an oath before the French envoy that he would attempt with all his power to

bring about such a dethronement. A festival was celebrated by Wolsey in honor of the liberation of the pope from the power of those wicked men who were worse than the Turks. True, the name of the emperor was not uttered, but it was hinted that all disaster came from the indomitable avarice of one man who intended to subjugate the whole world. Furthermore, the Venetians incited the Porte to attack the Austrian lands, as Maximilian had previously incited the Turks against Venice.

One comprehends why Ferdinand, now king of Hungary, renounced his claims upon the duchy of Milan, and why he ratified the peace with France, fully aware of the Eastern peril, instead of going to Italy upon the request of his brother. Duke Henry of Brunswick, in the spring of 1528, marched against northern Italy with a German army, but this "flower of Germany," including many nobles, had like its predecessors only the one purpose of securing money. When about to slay its ducal leader a Spaniard declared that it was "the most hideous band of heretics which had ever entered into Italy."

Thus it was not the military achievements of his soldiers to which Charles owed a sudden change in the state of affairs. Once a disease raged virulently in the French camp at Naples, and at another time the French committed a grave political error. King Francis neglected to reward the naval hero of Venice, Andrea Doria, whose fleet won a victory

over the emperor. A half personal, half political resentment led this commander to desert a monarch who had not sufficiently recognized his services, and he refused to return Savona to his native city. In the beginning of July his nephew gave up the blockade of Naples, and in September Andrea appeared before Genoa with the banner of the emperor. Soon afterward Clement VII, who had wisely delayed his alliance with the league, was taken to Rome protected by imperial troops. In vain did the noble Contarini, the ambassador of Venice, entreat him to remember the freedom of Italy and his high office. "Let your holiness not believe that the weal of the Church of Christ depends upon that small worldly state; before its acquisition there was a Church, and the very best one, too; the Church is the union of all Christians, whereas that state is nothing else than that of all other Italian princes." Clement replied that whoever in this world maintained the right course, would be treated like a beast. He did not forget that the Venetians would not return Ravenna and Cervia to him, and that Francis I had wedded his sister-in-law Renée to the son of the duke of Ferrara. In the face of such treatment he would have yielded even to the devil, as one of his relatives wrote, to say nothing of the emperor, and no longer permit himself to be fooled and vexed. The chasm between the secularized see and the really

pious sons of the Church becomes quite obvious when we recall that frivolous word of the bishop of Bayeux, besides that statement of Contarini. "Destroyed as pope, saved as Medici," thus Brosch summed up his judgment regarding the humiliated but not bettered supreme lord of the Church, whose thoughts thenceforward belonged to his own family and its future.

Not only at the papal court, but everywhere, people desired peace. As in England, the high cost of living caused disorder to break out; it was the same in France. Holland grew exhausted, and the resistance of the prelates and the cities to the never-ending taxation had led to ominous conflicts with the government. Governess Margaret adopted severe measures; for instance, she confiscated the temporality of the Brabant prelates, and changed the constitution of Brussels; it was believed that she intended to drown all rebellious clergymen, but she was quite glad when England offered an armistice and signed it, together with France, in June, 1528, without the consent of the emperor. At this time took place that peculiar commerce with honor between Charles and Francis, whose "humorous rather than tragic outcome" was expected by all, notwithstanding the serious mien of the emperor. In the summer of 1527 Charles had told a French envoy that his lord had acted unknighly, wickedly and cowardly toward him, and he would rather

settle the matter by means of a duel. Francis replied that the emperor was a base liar and demanded the duel. But as nothing took place, Charles was not ashamed to maltreat the children of his adversary, who stayed in Spain as hostages.

Despite personal enmity the princely women finally succeeded in fulfilling their "natural calling," as Francis's mother said, and in bringing about the desired peace. The emperor had shortly before appealed to his bride, Eleanor of Portugal, who already bore the title of a queen of France, and she was willing to mediate with her brother. A reconciliation, however, was brought about chiefly by the aunt of the emperor, and deserved its name,— "Peace of the Ladies." Margaret, who had been taught by her father Maximilian to take part in all political affairs, negotiated with the French court and was joyfully received by the mother of Francis I. Still before these two mediators met at Cambrai, after overcoming great difficulties, the pope established good will with the emperor contrary to the expectations of everyone, and not without being accused by a representative of Charles of "being greedy and exceedingly mean."

One wonders at the pope, who suffered such treatment at the hands of the haughty Spanish. They had much that they could offer and consoled him with regard to the council, which the emperor himself did not like, as being a source of "innova-

tions and perils." Clement, on his part, would have preferred to make a few "less scandalous" concessions to the Lutherans. On July 29, peace was signed at Barcelona, according to which the alienated portions of the papal dominions were to be restored, and the Medici reëstablished at Florence, while as to Milan, both pope and emperor should rule it if Sforza's guilt should be proven.

Immediately before, Leyva's victory at Landriano had defeated the last French army. These successes were surpassed by the diplomatic victory which Margaret won at Cambrai. As early as June Francis had told the Italian envoy that he would sacrifice even his own life and the freedom of his children in behalf of his allies. Instead of this, France sacrificed her Italian allies, at the peace of Cambrai, whereupon the emperor renounced his claims on Burgundy. Ransom for the French princes, amounting to two million gold thalers, should create the financial foundation of the power of the imperial lord of Europe; shortly before he had almost despaired because of needing several hundred thousand ducats for his Italian journey.

After he had left his Spanish seclusion to arrange the future of Germany and Italy, Charles came not, as nine years before, to enter upon the great struggle of his life, but now fully assured of his success. He himself had changed; he had grown to be a

man and his own prime minister; "he will be governed no longer," said a German spectator. His confidants well knew the burning desire of the secluded monarch "to show the whole world, what a big heart he possessed, which his servants already knew."

He was favored by fortune while in Spain, and it now clung to the victor as he was about to follow his own convictions, defying all warning advices, and to settle with the pope and Luther. Against the expectation of all, the terrible peril of the Turkish invasion had passed; soon after Suleiman had given up the siege of Vienna, the English statesman, who hitherto had been able to hold Hapsburg imperialism in check, fell.

The personality of Charles V gains glory when compared with monarchs like Francis I and Henry VIII, who were forever forgetting their duties. But the recklessness of the French king, and his deplorable concubine system, appear almost harmless when compared with the indomitable selfishness of the Tudor who during his whole life never pursued any purposes except his personal ones.

Boundless vanity was the basic trait of his character; during his youth he displayed it with silly childishness, such as calling upon a Venetian servant to admire the beauty of his leg. The intellectual and moral depravity of that colossal egotist was never more clearly shown than in his separation

from the pope, which led to the destruction of his most faithful counselor.

We recall the saying regarding small causes and great effects when we note the important political and ecclesiastical danger that grew out of a love affair of Henry VIII. For dynastic necessity was not the reason that a separation from his Spanish wife was made the principal aim of the English government, but the power of a violent passion. The coquettish Anne Boleyn, with her beautiful dark eyes and her wavy black hair, possessed sufficient self-control to resist her stormy suitor. She would not become his concubine like her older sister.

In vain did Wolsey advise the king to give up his intentions regarding a divorce. From June, 1527, Henry actually lived separated from his wife; a few months later, Anne Boleyn told the cardinal, who had returned from France, that he must come where the king stayed. None the less, Wolsey strove to enter into an agreement with the perilous woman, and Henry made the cowardly attempt to obtain a divorce or a license for bigamy at Rome.

The latter disgraceful demand Wolsey knew how to avoid, but even a divorce was not obtainable from Clement VII, who would not take upon him the grave political responsibility of such a step, although the cardinal called his attention to the firm will of the king and the disregard of the papal authority by many people. The decision was

brought about on the Italian battle fields,—with the failure of the French before Naples. England lost every hope that the pope would yield when he delayed the matter through his legate Campeggi, and removed the whole trial to Rome (July, 1529). Thus the position of Wolsey was endangered, and as he said himself, he needed a “terrible alchemy,” to maintain himself against his opponents.

Anne Boleyn was aided by the old enemies of the English aristocracy, and with the thorough failure of the anti-imperial policy the minister lost the last real claim upon the king's protection. In October, 1529, he was indicted and deprived of the seals; as “Your Majesty's much humiliated chaplain, creature and brother” the once mighty man appealed to his master, “calling aloud and shouting for forgiveness and mercy.”

None the less, after he was pardoned he did not give up his hope of regaining his old position with the aid of France and the emperor. But his relation to the foreign ambassadors did not continue secret. He was imprisoned on November 4, 1530, and died in the Abbey of Leicester when about to be brought into the tower. “If I had,” he said to the lieutenant of the tower, “served God as zealously as my king, He would not have forsaken me in my old age.”

To the very last moment Wolsey was occupied with the fate of his prince; he ordered that he should

be warned against the anti-governmental spirit of the Lutheran heresy. Death freed the great statesman from the iron of the henchman who, several years afterward, would sever the neck of his pretty and cunning arch enemy.

The world did not as yet know the true character of Henry VIII, whom Wolsey had understood so well when he lay at the feet of his lord for hours without changing the dreadful stubbornness. Now the foretold desertion of England from the papal see followed its course, while the foreign policy of the kingdom was carried on to the advantage of Charles V. The latter and Francis I spoke of Henry as an unreasoning fool. Yet, Brewer justly said, the magnificent trait which a personality like Wolsey had brought into the English commonwealth remained alive, and raised even a man like Henry VIII above his own native insignificance.

When Charles V landed at Genoa (August 12, 1529), the war in Italy was not over, and the Turkish peril made necessary the conclusion of peace. Milan, Ferrara and Florence resisted bravely, while Clement mediated in the name of the first two, without giving up his claim upon Venice.

Many in the city of lagoons believed that the pope should be called an archheretic, rather than the head of Christianity. Yet, in his own behalf, he considered desirable the continuation of the mighty

republic and of an Italian duchy in Milan. The stopping of the emperor and the pope at Bologna (they resided in the same building) led to a settlement of the Italian affairs which was in favor of the papal-Medicean interests, rather than in that of the emperor.

During his intimate conversation with the cunning Florentine the emperor always consulted his notes lest he should overlook anything. The widely spread opinion that he was inactive or sleepy had to be changed. "One can say," remarked a Venetian, "that he had suddenly and quite unexpectedly risen; and become alive, alert and valiant." He no longer permitted himself to be deceived by the winning words of Francis I, who promised him "seas and mountains;" he derived from the words only a warning "that this gentleman king did not give up his claims upon Italy." Because of his own political efforts, Charles had brought about peace with his Italian adversaries and entered into a defensive alliance (December 23, 1529) which comprised,—besides the emperor, the pope and the king of Hungary,—Venice, Milan, Savoy, Montferrat, Mantua, Genoa, Siena and Lucca. On New Year's, 1530, peace was announced, and the most peculiar imperial coronation which the world has ever seen took place.

It seemed that the Holy Roman Empire was transferred from Germans upon Roman nations, as

once it had been from Germans upon Germans; for, instead of German electors and princes, the monarch was surrounded by Spanish and Italian nobles. The coronation took place on the 29th of February, the day of his birth and of the battle of Pavia, at the cathedral of Bologna. He took an oath to preserve the possessions, honors and privileges, of the pope and the Roman Church, as protector and defender. Yet Clement VII sighed so deeply during the ceremony that one could clearly discern the falling and rising of his heavy purple cloak. Brosch quite justly compared this last coronation of a Roman emperor with that of Napoleon by a humiliated pope. First, there stood before the world and the old hierarchic-theocratic powers an emperor and a pope, harmonizing with each other, when the new protector of the Church went northward once more to harness the defiant Germans. In reality the pope feared a council, which the emperor demanded, as much as the Lutherans feared imminent imperial measures.

The victor left Italy when that country looked like a horrible example of broken resistance bleeding from a thousand wounds. The inhabitants of Florence, who in 1527 drove out for the last time the House of Medici, and declared Christ their king, renewed in vain the religious-political traditions of Savonarola, and decided with antique courage, shrinking from no sacrifice, to risk for the main-

tenance of their liberty "the ruin of their country, the loss of property and even life."

Thrown upon their own resources, they were beaten, after a long siege by troops which the emperor had placed at the disposal of the revengeful pope. On the 12th of August, 1530, the unfortunate city capitulated, and was obliged to abandon its proud republican past for the rule of a bastard from the Medici family who was favored by the emperor. The commander-in-chief, Malatesta Baglioni, had turned traitor, but what showed still more shockingly the low state of morality prevailing in Italy at that time was the sudden discouragement which overcame one of her greatest and noblest sons, Michelangelo Buonarotti, in the midst of his preparations for defense, and caused him to flee from his helpless home city. The fall of Florence completed the work of destruction begun three years before by the looting of Rome. The flower of Italian Renaissance was broken and Michaelangelo's celebrated "Night" which, in its sleep of stone, felt neither the misery nor the disgrace of the period, could be regarded as a suitable symbol of a woful future, not only for the city of Florence, but for the whole of Italy. Spanish rule was made more stringent at Naples by bloody executions. The duke of Milan was ill and the return of his state to the emperor was only a question of time. Alessandro de Medici, the new commander of Florence,

was selected as the future husband of Charles's illegitimate daughter. At Bologna ambassadors of Italian princes and republics were quarreling over precedence on the occasion of a coronation, the celebration of which meant for all of them the ratification of foreign rule,—that “stinking rule of the barbarians,” as Machiavelli once wrote.

The higher culture, weakened by political corruption and moral decadence, succumbed to the rougher manners of the Spaniards, who were more accustomed to matters of state on a larger scale, and to a firm discipline. Brosch said: “The present belongs to the victor, the future, even if far away, to the vanquished.”

An inscription in the pope's palace at Bologna, immortalizing the meeting of the two heads, shows the emperor leaving for Germany to “crush the rebels' ungodly intentions,” and to end the Turkish war. Besides thinking of the general council the emperor had an idea about leading a great Christian undertaking against the Ottoman people, which had been the dream of his grandfather, Maximilian. Before this could be done, more urgent cases required attention. The emperor had to look after two important matters which he had neglected for years. In the first place, Luther's heresy, through its favorable connection with the princely powers of the empire, had gained a firmer political foothold and consequently had become more dangerous for

the combinations of an ever alert statesmanship. Then an inheritance of land had come to the emperor's brother, which could only be kept together in connection with the empire and its military power. The emperor's programme was to have either an amicable or a forcible settlement with Luther's followers, and to acquire the Roman crown for the ruler of the new international union of states, of which the future Austria was the result. At that time he did not know the powers which had developed in Germany during his long absence. Luther's followers had changed to Protestants.

III

ORIGIN OF GERMAN PROTESTANTISM AND OF THE AUSTRIAN STATES

LUTHER'S Reformation had long before reached a point where its separation from the political powers of the nation became absolutely necessary. The clumsy machinery of the empire's representatives had not yet led to a decision, but the stirring events of the knightly, and particularly the agrarian, revolution reminded one vividly that it was necessary to find a protecting roof for the gospel, which should operate in the world and have its effect upon the world. The state's immense importance was shown by the fact that without it even the naturally free human enterprise had no safe foundation.

There were few men of action whose inmost thoughts kept them as far from public affairs as Luther, and who supported with such warmth the perfect independence of the individual in religious matters. Perhaps he soon became puzzled in the realization of his ideals because, in spite of his fine notion about the reorganization of social life, he had the highest respect for the state and its workings, but lacked sufficient knowledge. Thus he was

swept into the steadily advancing movement which, since the fifteenth century, had striven to bring the Church's supremacy into the power of the territorial state, with other attributes of sovereignty. Doellinger said: "Luther was able to found a religion but not a church." Nevertheless he appeared in the later decades of his life as the compelled founder of churches and ecclesiastical master of the largest part of Germany. He was no longer the national hero of earlier years, and it may be easily understood that the struggle with work which was not in keeping with his genial disposition made him discouraged and embittered. It is all the more creditable to him that he still showed his accustomed "friendliness and charm," and in the family life became a leader of the nation. Poor as the Church reared by him under such difficulties may appear, when compared with the solid and imposing creation of Calvin, the example of this man, great and good at heart, served for his dear Germans as a rich and invaluable model.

In his domestic relations he did not wholly absorb the noble principles that many generations after him strove to develop. Luther's marriage revealed that healthy sturdiness befitting the best Germans of his period, and his good wife Kaethe von Bora, who, according to his own words, "served him like a domestic," had hardly anything in common with such Italian flowers of womanhood as Isabella

Gonzaga or Vittoria Colonna. The fact that the expelled monk married the runaway nun, on the 13th of June, 1525, was important. The world expected that the declared opponent of monkish ideals would take this step, and undoubtedly if it had not been taken would have pointed to that fact as triumphantly as it condemned the "antichristian union" with great moral indignation and mischievous joy. Even the sensitive Melancthon, who had not been consulted, could not resist the temptation of accusing his great friend, in a confidential letter of being fond of women and conceited, while he referred to the marriage as foolishness.

Luther took the correct view when he explained that he had now made himself sufficiently contemptible to "make angels laugh and all devils cry." The repeated foul calumnies were overbalanced by Luther's real life as head of a family, when he was seen playing among his children, teaching the real German art of ennobling and enjoying life in modest circumstances and, while not despising the material joys of existence, unable to accumulate money or to refuse assistance to those asking for it.* His inter-

* What was believed to be the betrothal ring of Martin Luther was loaned to the New York Historical Society and placed on exhibition there in the early part of 1916. It is the property of Mrs. Hildegard Pinkert, wife of Dr. Maximilian Pinkert, pastor of the German branch of St. Bartholomew's Church. She was formerly the Baroness von Georgi and a descendant of a branch of the Anhalt-Bernburg family, the ducal family of which Luther's bride was a member.

The ring is of gold and set with a ruby. All the

course with his "Master Kaethe," with friends and table companions, revealed his inexhaustible treasures of wit and humor. The overzealous effort of many admirers to publish every remark made by the great man was more to his disadvantage than to his credit, until investigations in modern times, from original notes, proved how unreliable were the reports of vulgar interpolations in after dinner speeches. There was some coarseness, as was customary during that period, but his remarks were never frivolous and, considering his powerful nature, nobody can read the Reformer's celebrated letter to his "little son Haensichen" without loving the writer. Johannes Kessler wrote: "His earnest is mixed to such an extent with joy and friendliness that one feels a desire to live with him; it seems as though God wished to prove his delightful and joyous gospel not only by his teaching but also by his manner." The man who fought furiously in his literary battles could not imagine a greater suffering than that his son Haenschen "might think hard of him." Rather too mild than too strict in his family life, he was inclined to enjoy everything the

symbols of the Passion are shown in the gold work. The inscription reads: "D. Martino Luthero—Catharina V. Bora, 13 Juni, 1525." It must be admitted, however, that the authenticity of this ring is not clearly established. What is believed to be the original was bought by the late J. Pierpont Morgan and presented to the German Government. At the jubilee at Leipzig, in 1825, there were many reproductions of this ring, and it is not impossible that the one described was among the number.

moment offered during those hours of relaxation,—the children as the finest “little play birds,” a look through the window, a walk or a ride, dogs and birds, which “he also would like to see in the beyond,” shooting at a target, playing ninepins, music, and not least, a good drink, which God would not blame him for. His unconstrained enjoyment of the “creature life” did not betray any monkish fear of the world, nor did it resemble the half-poetical and half-mystical dreaming which caused Francesco di Assisi to greet “Brother Sun,” “Sister Air” and “Brethren Birds” affectionately. The great man’s amiable, homelike, modest manner of living might best be explained by the words of Friedrich Vischer who, in characterizing the German Reformation, spoke of the “healthy plainness of German nature.”

This national trait had a different effect on church politics than on the family life. It must not be thought that the Reformer’s original ideas were lacking in a great and free trait. Quite to the contrary; Luther was too much of an idealist to consider from the beginning a practical organization of his gospel, and his ideal of a church was much too lofty to permit of realization. He started with the principles of general priesthood and a full liberty of conscience, which naturally led to the principle of community. He did not have the inten-

tion, or a firm plan, of founding a new church; in his teaching he pointed back to the origin of Christianity and only desired to remove later disfigurements. For a while he contemplated separating real Christians into a kind of Lord's Supper community, without trying to organize such a "congregation of saints." He said: "*Ecclesia* shall mean the holy Christian people, not only in the days of the apostles but to the end of the world." In some sporadic cases, self-government of church congregations which, according to a pamphlet issued by Luther in 1523, should have right and might to "judge all teachings and install as well as dismiss teachers," was tried by the Wittenberg people during the Reformer's absence and caused tumults. In 1523, at Leisnig on the Mulde, and in 1524 at Magdeburg, similar establishments sprang up, of which E. L. Richter explained the basic principle as "a complete mixing of ecclesiastical and municipal affairs into a Christian community." The church receipts, kept in a "common box," were to pay at the same time for assistance to the poor and for instruction; the management was to be in the hands of elected commissioners under the control of all the members.

Luther, as shown by his letter of 1523 to the commissioners at Prague, did not particularly care whether the entire congregation or the authorities as its representatives exercised such rights. Strictly

speaking, the identification of the church congregation with the municipality did not agree with Luther's ideal. He also explained in 1523 that God's kingdom should be separated on principle from the worldly kingdom, because the last named had "laws which did not extend further than over the body and property and all that is external on earth."

When not only the experiments at Leisnig and Magdeburg proved unsatisfactory, but the peasants' revolution made the free selection of preachers its first condition, Luther gradually forgot his leanings toward liberty, although willing to grant the peasants at least the conditional privilege of election. Partly aversion against the revolution and partly other experiences made him recognize the state, as then constituted, as the only helper in need.

In all German conflicts of that period the state's authority was finally victorious. Thus the Peasants' War strengthened the territorial supremacy, while the empire, as such, had no more success in dealing with the peasants than it had in its troubles with the knights and the Church movement. The empire was unable to reach a decision and furthermore, was mostly represented by ecclesiastical princes and leaders. Fortunately the emperor was still absent, but he was the arch enemy of reformation; German democracy, rejected even by Luther, was completely destroyed. The Reformer could

only turn to the powers which alone were able to grant temporary protection to his work,—God's cause,—in addition to good will. He did not think of armed defense of the gospel—which he considered only much later and then reluctantly—but of the absolute necessity of straightening out church conditions, at first only in the princely or municipal territories which were favorable to his doctrine.

While hope of reforming the entire Church and of extending the great struggle to the evangelical faction continued for a long time, it became necessary in some minor but urgent cases in the nearest surroundings to arrive at decisions which, as precedents, would be of importance in the future. Nothing could explain this pressing need more clearly than the small war which Luther waged against the founders of the All Saints' Church, which he called the All Devils' Church. The tolerance which he at first displayed toward the "weak" was not of long duration. In 1523, the Lord's Supper disappeared from the parish church, and when the dignitaries, backed by the elector's order, continued to practice the "horror of the still mass," the indignant Reformer threatened and used force.

In this connection it is interesting to note his change from the principles of liberty of conscience and church independence to force of conscience and state's assistance. It was in 1523 also that Luther rejected as sharply as possible the canonists' appeal



Götz of Berlichingen, (of the Iron Hand).
In the Camp of the Rebellious Peasants. (1480-1562.)



to the elector, by writing: "What do we care for him? He only has to give orders in worldly affairs, but if he goes further than that we will say: 'Gracious Sir, attend to your own business; God must be obeyed more than men.'"

Toward the end of 1524, however, Luther asked the state's interference against blasphemy, claiming that God had supplied authorities with the sword for that purpose. It was useless for Frederick the Sage to remind him of his own remark that the Word could fight for itself. Luther, in the pulpit, made such use of the Word's power that the "few remaining popish hogs of the foundation, with whom neither the city nor the university desired to have anything to do" were obliged to yield. There still remained the old terrible view that the state must eradicate the so-called idolatry. In a letter intended for the dying elector, Spalatin called attention to the particular mention of this duty in the Mosaic law, like the papal Church of the Middle Ages. One of the noblest basic ideas of the Reformation was vanquished by the hierarchical principle, the employment of which toward the followers of the new doctrine was indignantly rejected.

There was still another mighty motive for appealing to the state, namely, the burning question of secularization. It was to be determined who was to dispose of the church properties collected in large amounts, owing to the continuing victory of the

gospel. Referring to an impressive legend of the Middle Ages, it might be said that "poison was poured" into the young evangelical church, just as it had been poured into the old Christianity by its connection with the Roman state, power and property.

Modern historians have pointed out the previous underestimation of a circumstance which undoubtedly contributed toward the spreading and strengthening of the German Reformation. The shameless way of financing indulged in by the hierarchy was the most objectionable point, while the abolition of many oppressive measures strongly recommended the new doctrine of justification; consequently many governments may have been very favorably impressed by the prospects of secularization. It was not a new idea; but, owing to the ecclesiastical and political movements of the preceding few years, it had come closer to realization than ever before. Besides the revolutionists, who in 1525 declared by proclamation their radical efforts fully to secularize the German territories and care for the young nobility by forming an army, there were good Catholic princes, like those of Austria and Bavaria, who during the Peasants' War showed a desire for secularization. In 1527, its possibility in the church state was explained by the emperor. While Luther's writings of the same tendency were received with pleasure at the English

court in 1529, governess Margaretha proposed to the emperor that the pope, owing to the distress prevailing in Turkey, ought to sell all church property, particularly since there were German princes among Luther's followers who would gladly buy.

That which was hinted at everywhere was accomplished by the evangelical authorities, with the pleasant knowledge of serving religious and state interests at the same time. Besides handling the property and foundations, they had to undertake in addition a good deal of work for the benefit of the community, which previously the Church had attempted to do. Without the state's intervention the rich booty would have been scattered, and even then some of the noble property owners managed to defraud the government. The nobility's position toward secularization showed itself very peculiarly in Pomerania, where the noblemen at first assisted in introducing the Reformation and a few years later opposed the innovation because their share in the property to be absorbed impressed them as too small. Luther remarked that, in this respect, even papistical young noblemen were good Lutherans. Distress resulted, as is best shown by Luther's letter, written in 1526 to the elector Johann of Saxony, reading as follows: "Please do your duty in keeping order when ecclesiastical jurisdiction ceases and all

convents and foundations are absorbed, because nobody else can or shall do it."

The Reformer's embarrassment was noticeable also in 1528, when he wrote, in his preface to the book of Saxon visitation, that at first there had been an intention of reëstablishing the bishop's authority; but, since not one of his associates had such a privilege or received positive directions to use it, he appealed to the worldly authorities appointed by God, in order to be safe, although it was not the duty of those authorities to do such work. There was also a reminder of Emperor Constantine and the Council of Nice. It will be noticed that Luther reluctantly discontinued his old separation of ecclesiastical from temporal affairs; contrary to the elector's wish, he included in his book a preliminary optional permission of laymen's communion as practiced in the old churches, justifying this view, which was not in accord with his own practice, by saying: "Nobody should be forced into belief nor from his disbelief by order or power."

Luther has frequently been praised as the state's liberator from ecclesiastical rule, and his firm conviction that temporal power, even if incomplete, was not only sanctioned by human law but by God's order, facilitated his transfer of the highest church authority to the prince. While he called evangelical sovereigns make-shift bishops, it is clear from many of his remarks that nobody suffered more than he

through the new state of dependence into which German religious and church life was falling, through force of circumstances and the Reformer's impolitic nature. He always regarded his sovereigns with the respect of a good subject, but complained bitterly of their noble and common counselors, whom he called the restless and greedy "Scharrhansen" of the court; and he disliked the haughty, unlovely jurists. Melanchthon said: "Our conclusions are simply platonic laws unless protected by the court." While Luther observed a respectful attitude toward the state, Melanchthon was blindly servile, calling princes gods, and demanding that subjects should regard monarchs as just and wise, not indulge in any criticism, and obey all their orders as they obeyed those of God. He only anticipated later days when old German lack of sovereign authority had changed, under the united efforts of state and church, to abject submission.

To sum up, it may be said that the increased authority, which in the course of German reformation was conferred upon the state, was simply a continuation of efforts previously made, since Luther was rather conservative in his work.

Even during the fifteenth century, by papal consent, many German principalities, such as Brandenburg, Cleve, Saxony and others, had extended the sovereign's authority over church matters. Instruction and care of the poor were at that time, particu-

larly in German cities, partly placed under state authority. At Nürnberg, in 1522, the statute of alms showed a connection between the new and older endeavors inasmuch as, besides the long recognized socialistic principles of a regular department of charity, and the remnants of the old way of church care for salvation of the benefactors, there were plain traces of the evangelical viewpoint. After accomplishing the Reformation and the state's supremacy over the Church, it became necessary to put some of the previously ecclesiastical properties and foundations to a different use. In Nürnberg only about one-tenth of the wealth taken from the Church was used in the interest of the clergy, while a considerable amount of the so-called alms served purely worldly purposes.

There came a great reaction; while previously money was lavished on the Church, the contrary now seemed to be the case, and many of the poor evangelical parsons had barely enough to live. Nevertheless, the concentration of authority was a progressive step and, in spite of all confusion during the period of transition, those at the helm, conscious of their increased privileges and duties, did their best to straighten matters out.

A great benefit appeared in the complete abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and its constant quarrels with temporal authorities. The young evangelical state was very strict, much more so than the

Church of the late Middle Ages, in maintaining an active supervision over morals, which attempt at times was more inconvenient than successful, though the endeavor seems to have been quite serious.

The evangelical authorities had conflicts also with their ecclesiastics. In 1528, the Nürnberg city government felt obliged to prevent the over-zealous preachers from, according to the words of Lazarus Spengler, "revolutionizing, under the cover of God's word and Christian liberty, all customs of the country and urban usages which are not contrary to God's word." The fight against such inferiors, even if at times it seemed overbearing, was far less dangerous than the quarrels in which the anointed of the Lord believed in their higher dignity and power, and had the backing of an organization predominating throughout the world.

Treitschke, on one occasion, compared Luther and Machiavelli as fight companions; both desired to separate the state from the Church. While the great Italian showed, in his doctrine concerning the state, that he was a pupil of the heathen antique teachings, in addition to his own vast experience, the German theologian referred to his master Augustinus by protesting against the hierarchical degradation of the state to a purely human or even devilish invention.

Luther prided himself on having written more gloriously and usefully about the worldly or civil

authorities and their work than "any teacher since the days of the apostles, unless it be Saint Augustine." Hundeshagen claimed that Luther regarded the state as an educational institution, all the more so since the Church's decay left a great gap and threatened to cause the most terrible moral and social confusion.

The desire to prevent temporary disorder and disintegration influenced the Reformer's creations of interior church life. There again was shown the contrast between his ideal and reality's requirements. While fighting against the sale of a church, in which the thought of divine service naturally awakened recollections of bells, incense, bright lights, raiment of silk and gold braid, pictures, organ music and other symbolic luxuries, he stood originally for full liberty and indifference to all outside matters, such as time, place, persons and forms. He said: "The faithful can make each day a holiday and proclaim God's word, be it in the forest, in the water or anywhere." However, this loftiness above all forms and rules could not be practically carried out in view of the enormous number of "weak ones." Thus Luther, always conscious of making merely temporary arrangements, and without claiming to have established lasting or unchangeable rules, shaped the divine service in consideration of his budding Christians, principally on the pedagogic order, when, under the decidedly evan-

gical successor of Frederick the Sage, "the pope was entirely eradicated."

The rooting out process was accomplished with an astonishing degree of caution. As late as 1541, Luther maintained that laymen and foreigners not understanding his sermon would necessarily gather from his divine service the impression that "they were in a truly popish church and that there was no difference or very little between this service and their own."

The Sunday mass of the Lutherans, celebrated in the German language, was introduced at Wittenberg in the autumn of 1525; by omitting the central pivot,—the sacrifice,—this mass was changed to a mere cover for the focus of the service, which was the sermon. Luther's proclaimed intention was to promote the education of "the young and the simple-minded," but he had no desire of making such work an established fact, because to him all regulation was only "an external thing which, good as it may be, might easily degenerate into abuse," in which case it should be quickly replaced by something else. A favorite idea of the powerful devotionalist was, in his great distress, to "throw God's baggage out of the house and rub his ears with all kinds of promises," but that could not be carried out. Luther desired that "any crowd might keep mass in this manner so that a joint fervent cry from the heart of all the people would rise to God." The

place of such joint prayer was taken, to a certain extent, by the singing of the entire congregation. This was developed by the Reformer, who had distinct ability in regard to poetry and music. The singing was the most characteristic expression of the new church service, and its democratic origin still resounds in the mighty strains of popular hymns. After 1523, Luther created, mostly on the basis of psalms and old church hymns, a treasure of church songs which, as concerns language and melody, may be called folksongs in the noblest sense of the word. Paul Speratus and others assisted him, the former's first evangelical "little book of songs" appearing in 1524, and including a number collected by Luther at Wittenberg.

These gave the Reformation a new and very effective means of influencing the mind. Perhaps these songs accomplished more in disseminating the teachings than the sermons did. They were easily accepted and at first were repeated from mouth to mouth. Even in church songs Luther did not forget his pedagogic aim, which was served particularly by his large and small catechism issued in 1529. The former, called "German Catechism," was intended to instruct the "young folks and raw peasants"; consequently it was meant for the clergy, while the smaller one called on every head of a family, children and servants, to learn by heart, if necessary by compulsion, the principal chapters, the Ten Com-

mandments, etc. Those who did not wish to learn were to be "sent to the pope and his officials or even to the devil himself."

The task of issuing a condensed and nevertheless generally comprehensible explanation of fundamental Christianity was never solved more happily than in this small catechism, of which the author confessed himself to be "the child and pupil." It was his habit, by literal recitation of the commandments, the belief, biblical passages, etc., to "warm" his heart for prayer, "just like the children do."

The Reformer tried to organize public education through state, church and school; above all, he recognized the immense importance of instruction for children. In 1524 he issued a pamphlet about establishing and maintaining Christian schools, which he recommended warmly to the mayors and counselors of all German cities. He was as firmly convinced of the fact that citizens, first of all, must create a solid basis for modern German education, as he was of the new school system's humanistic character. Among those who despised education were some of the new belief, but in all cases he championed the languages as "the scabbard in which rests the spirit's knife" (the gospel). The most magnificent result of his appeals to city authorities was the gymnasium opened at Nürnberg in 1526, with a dedicatory oration by Melanchthon. Among its first teachers were men like Joachim Camerarius

and Eobanus Hessus. German Humanism began to receive some "schooling"; its period of strife and genial independence was forever ended, but it could still be used as a valuable element in the system of instruction instituted or further developed by the Reformation.

The real hero of this new phase of Humanism, in contrast to the previous "poets" and wandering apostles, was Melanchthon, the German preceptor, who declared that science was more necessary than business, and agriculture even more than the sun's rays. Under the more modest form of honorable professors and schoolmasters, Humanists continued their old fight against barbarism, sometimes using strange means. For instance, Valentin Trotzendorff formed the plan of giving his pupils in the Silesian city of Goldberg a republican constitution, and even forced his servants to talk Latin.

The evident improvement of the school system under evangelical influence caused the otherwise pessimistic Luther, in 1530, to call his elector's attention to the fact that the tender youth was now so well trained in the catechism and Scriptures "that it does me good in my heart to see how a little boy and girl pray, believe and speak about God and Christ more than did formerly and do even now all foundations, convents and schools."

Matters, however, concerning divine service and ministering to the soul were much worse in the

country, where the rough and selfish nobility, instead of the urban authorities, presided over church and clergy. There, too, in strong contrast to the religiously inclined and receptive citizens, the embittered and savage peasants regarded the Lutheran Reformation only as an ally of their oppressors.

Besides these drawbacks the reports of Saxon visitations showed the difficulty experienced in finding enough suitable parsons. There was such a lack that even a joiner, who did not know the Ten Commandments, applied for such a position. At another place a weaver did the preaching for a compensation of two florins per annum. In 1537, a list of those to be ordained at Wittenberg showed, besides theologians and cantors, not only city secretaries, compositors and printers, but bookbinders, shoemakers, tailors and other artisans. Under such circumstances the evangelical clergy at first appeared only as representing the masses or, as Luther put it, "the mouth of all of us," to preach and distribute the sacrament as an "offshoot of the general priesthood," because, for practical reasons, such privileges and duties could not be exercised by all the people at the same time.

Luther renounced such formalities as ordination of bishops and the so-called apostolic succession of clergymen; even the formal ordination by laying on of hands came into use only gradually. However, the view that the regularly ordained preacher

was entitled to some authority and God's order, encouraged the development of new priestly desire. According to Gottschick, the difference between the clergyman who alone was active and the purely passive part played by the other believers, caused,—not with Luther but among his successors,—a “reestablishment of appreciation of Catholic institutions.”

An immense amount of work was done by Luther as church organizer, without neglect of his ordinary professional duties and his never completed literary work. The man to whose word the rulers and the educated people of one half of Germany listened respectfully, did not consider it below his dignity to visit sick people, or to console condemned men prior to their last walk; more than once he was seen among his Wittenberg fellow citizens in the midst of the pest's horrors, and his joyful fearlessness put to shame Calvin's actions under similar circumstances.

All this was done by Luther in spite of his declining health, domestic cares and, above all, a return of his terrible troubles. Speaking of his condition, he said: “Outside battles, inside terrors.” Just as he had formerly done in the convent, he again writhed in agony like a “poor worm”; he complained that the devil clung to him with mighty cords and tried to drag him into the abyss. Again he doubted God's mercy, although he fought with fullest energy against this worst of all temptations.

Once he said: "If Christ comes and asks you like Moses did: what did you do? kill him; if, however, he talks to you like God, 'et salvator tuus' (and your Savior), stretch both ears and listen."

The Reformer suffered even more than at the beginning of his career through the powerful destruction and passing away of the old things which surrounded him. Freytag said: "The concealed pain and even regret of all great historical characters about their own work has been felt by few men so deeply as by Luther." He frequently pointed back to former days as the better period, and claimed that everything was ten times worse than under the papacy. With the pessimism of approaching age he said: "On the whole, citizens and peasants, men and women, children and servants, princes, officials and subjects, all belong to the devil." Still all this increasing burden of his life could not break his capacity for work nor destroy his courage, although he once said: "After my death my heart will be found very small, as if starved by great anxious thoughts."

In regard to work and vexations, he was not so lonely as formerly. A large number of friends and assistants, like a general staff selected from the most capable among his followers, surrounded the leader, who felt more and more the desire to have his word regarded as a command. Melanchthon, who experienced and soothed many quarrels in his inter-

course with Luther, said once that the love of superiors for their inferiors was greater than vice versa.

Luther, who recognized and was pleased to find in Melanchthon and others what was denied to him, towered so far above his friends that, in his candid warmheartedness, he met them unconstrainedly, while Melanchthon could not help feeling, in the presence of his powerful friend, that he was the weaker of the two and frequently, contrary to his will, submitted to the Reformer's domination.

More sincerely devoted to Luther were less prominent persons, such as Nikolaus von Amsdorf, or the enthusiastic Justus Jonas, who afterward protested against hearing Luther's name mentioned among those of prominent preachers because, as he said, "That was an entirely different man." Amsdorf represented the strictest tendency of the new gospel: he lived voluntarily in celibacy and, after Luther's death, was regarded by the faithful ones as the real Elisha of the removed Elias.

Speaking of his friend, Luther said: "My spirit is taking a rest in my dear Amsdorf." The last named surpassed Luther in his irreconcilableness in the theological combat, and agreed with Bugenhagen when, in 1522, that warrior undertook to defend the gospel with the sword, contrary to Luther's view. Particularly intimate with Luther

was the practical and independent Doctor Pomeranus (Bugenhagen), whom Luther called "a real bishop,"—a truly North German individual, whose grim humor seconded the great friend at the large table in Wittenberg and who, in hours of distress succeeded, as Luther's confessor, in relieving his desperate state of mind. It was due to his great ability as an organizer and manager that the city parson of Wittenberg became the founder and ruler of the evangelical church in a large part of northern Germany. He also, by translating it into the nether-Saxon tongue, made the Lutheran Bible more comprehensible to his countrymen. Bugenhagen's activity extended as far as Denmark; very characteristic, not only of the man but of the new and high position of such a simple theologian, was his jovial correspondence with King Christian III, who would have liked very much to have the Pomeranian and "bacon eater" settle permanently in his kingdom.

Justus Jonas had similar intimate dealings with the princes of Anhalt. Spalatin, the old mediator between Luther and Frederick the Sage, also belonged to this circle of friends. After 1525 he was superintendent of Altenburg and somewhat removed from court life, but he was consulted in every important transaction, because of his ability and business experience. He was the constant traveling companion of Johann Friedrich and was frequently compelled to interrupt his much desired rest until,

like Luther but earlier, in 1545, exhausted by sickness and work, he closed his eyes and passed away.

Among the younger lights that came in close contact with the leader was the highly educated and refined Caspar Cruciger from Leipzig who, in 1524, at the age of twenty years, was appointed rector of Magdeburg and, when only twenty-four, professor and preacher at Wittenberg. He was one of Luther's most faithful literary assistants. There was also the active Veit Dietrich from Nürnberg who, having lived for years in intimacy with Luther, left in 1535 after a dispute, to make better use of his superfluous energy as a preacher in his native city, while fighting against Catholic influences.

A somewhat uncertain, although gifted, person was Luther's countryman, Johann Agrikola from Eisleben. "Master Grickel," as Luther called him, caused a serious disturbance in the circle of Wittenberg reformers by violently attacking Melanchthon, in 1527, as disloyal to the evangelical doctrine. His zeal against every sermon on the law led him to a sharp personal collision with Luther in 1537, which brought the young hot-head into court and caused him to flee from Wittenberg.

On the whole, however, it may be said that those theologians who formed the intimate surroundings and were fighting companions of the great German Reformer did not deny their principles in the face of their opponents. The papists were no longer

the only foes to be considered; besides the evangelical radicalism, there occurred a very disastrous split between the North and South German reformers, about the year 1525.

At that time there were a good many South German princes among Luther's followers who showed more or less openly their preference for the gospel. The most important of them was Margrave Kasimir of Brandenburg who, however, was only a clever, unreliable fighter for an increase of his own princely power. Assisted by the House of Hapsburg, he worked his way upward and did not entirely disdain the plan of using the revolution for his own benefit. From his able-bodied subjects he formed a militia in black and white uniform, and made use of the reformatory idea to pose as the "authority ordered by God." This enabled him to get a firmer hold on his priests and to weaken the abominated power of the bishops.

But the Margrave's brother Georg, who was on the point of retiring from his peculiar position at the Hungarian court to his new property at Jägersdorf in Silesia, was sincerely evangelical. Neither of these gentlemen possessed any special influence, and the same was true of the decidedly Lutheran Palsgrave Ludwig von Veldenz and Margrave Philip von Baden, who were favorable to reform. The actions of some North German princes,—above all the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hes-

se,—became important for the further development of reformation.

The landgrave, born in 1504, excelled all his German fellow princes in political ability and youthful enthusiasm, and made Luther's cause his own. In later years he related how, at first, when an eager papist, he expelled the predicants, and how his conscience hurt him after eating on a fast day a brace of ducks which he had shot. It was not a selfish motive which made him desert the old Church, but a sincere effort to form his own judgment upon the momentous religious question roused by Melancthon, whom he met accidentally and through reading pamphlets. Neither his mother's protests nor the indignation of his father-in-law, Georg of Saxony, whom he tried to convert, could make him desist. In the spring of 1525 he declared to Johann, who was at that time duke of Saxony, and to the duke's son, that "he would rather lose his life, land and people than deviate from God's word."

Philip, in spite of his youth, had considerable experience, and had drawn his sword more than once. His powerful and graceful appearance contrasted favorably with the clumsiness of most German gentlemen, as did his brilliant eyes with the habitual sleepiness of the others. Prior to the death of Frederick the Sage, he came to an understanding with the elector's successors.

In vain Joachim of Brandenburg and particularly

Georg of Saxony hoped, after their joint sad experience with the Peasants' War, which they believed to be due to heresy, to bring their Lutheran allies back to the right path. After the summer of 1525 these attempts led to the formation of alliances between Lutheran princes that opposed the anti-Lutheran princes, who were also allied. Throughout two full decades Germany felt the pressure of an approaching religious war, until finally the emperor saw that the hour for action had come.

Preparations for alliances were noticeable in 1524 when, after the meeting of princes at Nürnberg there was a convention of Catholic princes at Regensburg, where the first example was set. On the other hand, the South German cities came to an understanding among themselves and, in case of need, they did the same with the evangelical Rhenish counts. At the same time, Count Albrecht von Mansfeld took advantage of the open secret that the electorate of Saxony (*Kursachsen*) threatened to win, first of all, Duke Johann to the idea of forming an alliance of evangelical princes.

This question became a burning one in July, 1525, when Georg of Saxony, who was considered the soul of the Catholic party, held a meeting at Dessau with the electoral brothers Joachim and Albrecht, besides Eric and Henry of Brunswick, under the pretense of checking the hardly subdued revolution, but consulted over the extermination of the

"damned Lutheran sect." About the same time, Duke Henry started for Spain to secure the emperor's assistance and to arrange for a meeting of representatives of all Mainz suffragans, besides obtaining imperial mandates of execution against the Lutheran authorities. The peace of Madrid, the emperor's expressed intention of coming to the empire, and the more and more suspicious attitude of Duke Georg indicated what Count Albrecht von Mansfeld had previously announced, that nobody should think God would arrange this matter because He desired to act rather through men as his tools. The aging Johann of Saxony was a very peaceable and rather impolitic gentleman; only the utmost need could drive him to violent defense; to one of his friends, a prince, he said: "I am not hurting anybody; only I believe more in God than in human beings and they do not like that."

At the very beginning Landgrave Philip took the bold step of proposing a connection, not only with princes of the same mind, but also with Lutheran cities, in spite of the ill feeling which had recently increased between the princely and the republican elements of the empire.

It was the basic idea of the alliance of Schmalkalden which was afterward formed. The landgrave expressed the opinion that, besides the gospel, the resistance against the threatening hereditary imperial house of Hapsburg would open the way to

an understanding between the princes and, particularly, with the larger cities. At first his and Saxony's efforts met everywhere with fear and reserve, even at Nürnberg, although the assistance of that city had been considered certain. Nevertheless a great success was seen in the fact that the careful and conscientious Wettiner clung to his bolder associates. During February and March, 1526, an alliance was prepared at Gotha, and concluded in May at Torgau, according to which both princes promised each other the fullest assistance against any and all attacks. At that time they stood alone, but at a meeting in Magdeburg on the 12th of June they were joined by quite a number of North German gentlemen,—Ernest of Lüneburg, Philip of Grubenhagen, Henry of Mecklenburg, Wolfgang of Anhalt, Albrecht of Mansfeld and, besides them, the archbishop's pugnacious opponent, the city of Magdeburg. The alliance was facilitated by the fact that there was shown the imperial instruction to Henry of Brunswick to bring about a preliminary coalition between all anti-Lutheran princes and counts.

The evangelical people likewise applied to the Bohemian nobility for assistance, thus showing their determination to increase their own insignificant powers in every possible way. The German order land (*Deutschordensland*), which was changed on the 10th of April, 1525, to a hereditary duchy under

Polish supremacy, did not belong thereafter to the empire. The Hapsburg policy was friendly to Jagellon and consequently unfavorable to the order, which completely abandoned by the empire, was now threatened by the Poles with a new war that could only end in the order's expulsion from a territory in which it had not yet become Polish. In this terrible distress the Grand Master Margrave Albrecht decided to confess allegiance to Poland and to introduce secularization. This was all the easier for him since, in his heart, he favored the new doctrine and felt sure of the consent of his bishops of Samland and Pomerania.

During the preceding few years Albrecht's external consideration for the pope led him into some ugly double dealing. At one time he wrote almost simultaneously to Adrian VI, denouncing the effect of the "Lutheran poison" in his order, and to Luther, requesting advice for reformation of the order. Now the declaration of allegiance at Cracow offered the new duke the possibility of a half independent existence for the East Prussian territories, and at the same time the first example of secularization on a large scale.

The step taken by the grand master, who could furnish only one hundred riders, did not mean a direct strengthening to the alliance of the evangelical Germans, but his marriage to the daughter of King Frederick of Denmark did so; not only Denmark,

but King Gustavus of Sweden declared his willingness to join. The horizon of the allies was quickly enlarged; that which a century later was to save German Protestantism made itself felt at that time by means of various combinations.

The surest ally of the evangelical people was their hatred of the House of Hapsburg; it caused discord among the Catholics in the empire while, outside of it, many different kinds of power against the superior force of the emperor were put in motion. Strange as it may seem, for a while the evangelical people had hope of winning to their cause the elector of Trier, "who had swallowed a Frenchman."

Particularly effective was the contrast of Austrian politics and the House of Wittelsbach, especially with the Bavarian line, which seemed to have thought deliberately of raising Duke Wilhelm to the dignity of a Roman king. The Wittelsbach people had cousins in the Palatinate, who soon wished to make common cause with the emperor and even Trier, although after October, 1525, they were allied with Landgrave Philip, who deemed it advisable to accept a pension from Charles and Ferdinand. This did not finish by any means the intrigues against a new royal Hapsburg election in the kingdom. While Charles V had to give up the idea of going to Germany, in view of the pressing demands of his tremendous European politics, his brother looked longingly toward Hungary, where

the collapse of Christian rule was confidently expected. It must be remembered that in the hereditary countries the revolution had not yet been fully suppressed. Under such conditions another effort was made to settle the religious question by an imperial congress.

This body, which perhaps did not fully deserve its reputation, spent a useless day at Augsburg, because there was no quorum, and it was adjourned to Speyer for the first of May, 1526. For awhile Ferdinand vacillated between convening and postponing the congress, but he finally opened it on the 25th of June. The fact that not one of the princely leaders of the Catholics was present may be partly explained by the contempt for the lack of success achieved by congress on previous occasions.

There was not much difference this time. The followers of the old Church continued in the majority, the privilege of cities was questioned and the imperial proposition, as before, was directed toward carrying the edict of Worms through to a general council. An impression was made, however, by the personal appearance of the declared leaders of the evangelical party,—Elector Johann and Landgrave Philip,—and of their preachers, whose sermons on the only true belief attracted large crowds. Their opponents saw a strong challenge in the fact that they no longer observed the law about fasting. The cities, in which most of the followers of Ref-

ormation lived, did not at first fully support their princely co-religionists. Only a short time before, during the Peasants' War, a number of cities, including the capital of Mühlhausen, had been violently treated by princely forces, particularly by Saxons and Hessians.

At the congress, however, the feeling of religious solidarity crushed previous differences. The lead was taken by the cities which, in a written complaint, asked free supremacy for civil authorities over "ceremonies," abuses, and all questions of church rule up to the jurisdiction of the council of Nürnberg. They even considered making a protest in case the majority of congress did not yield, and changed their previous opposition to the proposal made by Philip of Hesse in such a way that the matter was laid over until some future time. At the suggestion of the cities, a committee of eight members were elected to draft, first of all, proposals in regard to church questions. Among the worldly representatives were three decidedly evangelical people and one friend of reform who was still affiliated with the old Church.

The great importance of the occasion, the open fight between emperor and pope, evidently influenced the feeling at Speyer and it was not strange that the committee believed in the possibility of a compromise which would grant the laymen's chalice and the marriage of priests while, on the other hand, retain-

ing the seven sacraments, the fasting, many church festivals, and the *Vulgata* as the official text of the Bible.

The favorable position of the evangelical people improved when, at the election of the general committee, in which the cities were granted a few representatives, most of the votes of the civil prince's curia were cast in favor of the landgrave. A citizen of Nürnberg reported that there were "many pious Christians" among the counselors of these princes, and Spalatin summed up his views by saying that "never before at a congress did people speak so freely, bravely and boldly against and about the pope, bishops and other clergymen as they did here."

At this point, Archduke Ferdinand published an imperial instruction which he had kept secret so far. The document was dated the 23rd of March and declared that the emperor would go to Italy for an understanding with the pope about the general council, and he demanded that in the interval, or up to the time of his arrival in the empire, nothing should be done or treated against the Christian belief or the customs of the Church, but that the mandates of Worms and Nürnberg should be considered. The archduke's intention was to prevent any further steps regarding religion and to enforce from congress a speedy consent to the assistance to be granted Turkey. Indignation was almost

general, some people even thought of fraud, but he carried his point partly, at least.

The edict of Worms was not fully recognized; the cities still declared its execution quite impossible and explained that at the time of writing the instruction the emperor and pope were still in accord, while now the pope's warriors were in the field against the emperor. In the meantime, the elector's counselor found a way out of the difficulty, which was accepted. This was that everybody, in regard to belief, should conduct himself in such a manner as he considered just toward God, the emperor and the empire. The archbishop of Trier had supplied the first suggestion by intimating that everybody was free to obey the emperor or not. By a strange coincidence negotiations were pending just then at Granada over the question whether the fines mentioned in the edict of Worms could not be lightened, so as to enable Ferdinand to intervene personally in Italy.

There was no intention of using Luther as a trump card against the pope, although the emperor once, in anger, alluded to such a possibility, and Charles first consulted his brother about the concession mentioned in the clause. This imperial letter, dated the 27th of July, contrary to previously expressed belief had no effect on Ferdinand's decisions, and he evidently did not receive it until congress closed. The members agreed to send messengers to

the emperor requesting that a general or national council could soon be called. When congress ended, on the 27th of August, they adhered to the elector's proposal that, until the council was called in regard to the edict of Worms, they would "live, act and behave toward God and the emperor as conscience dictates."

There was no ambiguity about this compromise; Ranke regarded it as "the legal basis for the formation of German country churches." This, however, was not the correct view, because the responsibility toward the emperor did not appear to be less than that toward God, and the members of congress could hardly have any doubt about the intentions of Charles V, unless a pamphlet of 1526 contained the fiction that the pious, mild, God-fearing emperor could not possibly have ordered anything contrary to God's word and the common weal. The records of the prorogation of congress plainly showed the emperor's will, as per his instruction that no innovation or change should be made in matters of religion. It agreed neither with the words nor with the sense of the resolutions adopted at Speyer when immediately afterward the landgrave, and later other evangelical members of congress, tried to construe them as a privilege for founding evangelical country churches. Immediately after passing the resolutions, several members made remarks which showed no evidence of such a view.

Right does not count much in great revolutions. The German Reformation, so to speak, carried its right within itself; and that a legal existence within the empire was finally attained was not due to lawful proceedings but to the power and fortune of Protestant arms, to which the strict representatives of the law had to bow. Here, as in many other cases, German particularism finally triumphed over the empire, which everywhere and always showed its inability to deal with great reformatory problems.

In this manner the congress of 1526 only deferred the decision and thereby encouraged the separate states to exercise again their privilege of decision, to which they had long been accustomed, although the wording of their resolutions contradicted such proceedings. Again valuable years were gained for the extension and strengthening of the German Reformation, which had found at the same time a worldly hero and champion in the person of the landgrave.

The struggle for foreign rule was waged in Italy, and through this Germany was placed in a position to save at least a part of her national aspirations from utter annihilation; a political reorganization was accomplished in the East through which a very ancient dispute was settled for centuries to follow.

The year 1527 saw the birth of the Austrian monarchy; that often planned and temporarily realized intermediary realm, which the seriously

menaced safety of West Europe seemed to have peremptorily demanded for a long time, assumed life under the Hapsburg scepter. Here, as elsewhere, the farseeing policy of Maximilian was destined to triumph after his death. The old Austria of the Babenbergers and the great colonization east of the river Elbe advanced German culture and rule, from the twelfth until into the fourteenth century, beyond the river Oder and along the Baltic coast up to Livonia. These Germanic conquests had been relieved in the later Middle Ages by the tremendous progress of the Slav nations, and it had been partly destroyed. The national reaction against the intruding German element, and especially against the prosperous citizens, was strongest in Bohemia, for the Hussitic revolution not only affected the ecclesiastical authority, but equally changed the privileged position which the German element had created for itself, chiefly under the protection of a purely Czech dynasty, the Prschemyslides.

In Poland and Hungary there were desperate struggles against the German merchants and tradespeople. As in Bohemia, social and political passions and desires combined with the national hatred against the foreigners. For with a truly annihilating energy the nobility made its way in these eastern empires, over the ruins of a monarchical institution and the freedom of the people, to a full possession and administration of the state authority. It is well

known that even from the Hussitic movement, after a short preliminary rule of democratic factions, the Bohemian aristocracy emerged as victor. King Georg Podiebrad, himself raised from among them, had to wage the hardest fights of his government with these defiant Greeks, and to his two successors the relation was expressed by the phrase: "You are our king, we are your masters."

Like Vladislav's standing order of 1500 in Bohemia, so in Poland the famous constitution of 1496 indicated a certain climax in this development; the democratic nobility of the Polish Szlachta, which prohibited all acquisition and possession of real estate by the citizens, and took from the peasants the right to emigrate, sequestrated also nearly all ecclesiastical dignities. In Hungary the lower nobility knew how to secure a preponderating share beside the magnates in the tumultuous diet and in parliament, and the agrarian revolution of 1514 offered the welcome pretext for the introduction of the most rigorous serfdom.

Apart from the fatal consequences which the inner life of the three empires had to bear, the course of their foreign policy was much influenced by these tendencies. Here, however, the old and continually recurring idea of the greater international state administration was opposed to the home rule of the national factions. Already, in the fourteenth century, King Louis the Great had united Hungary and

Poland for a short time under his rule. Subsequently, Bohemia and Hungary had been joined, under Sigismund of Luxemburg, while at the same time the Hussitic revolution roused the feeling of kinship in the Czechs and Poles, and created the inception of a political union.

The Polish state felt quite particularly the need of establishing better boundaries for itself, and, above all, of gaining a foothold on the Baltic Sea by the conquest of the territory of the Teutonic order and by a union with Lithuania, thereby preventing the full autonomy of its dangerous eastern neighbor. But the Polish plans of aggrandizement did not stop at this; Bohemia, Hungary, and the lower Danube provinces, seemed to lie in the realm of the attainable, especially as the national monarchy with Czechs and Magyars was only of short duration. Georg Podiebrad had turned his glances more to the German and western European affairs and his greater son-in-law, Matthaeus Corvinus, who vainly tried to wrest the Bohemian crown from him, likewise neglected Hungary's natural tasks at the lower Danube, in order to use his power for the foundation of that empire as it has been established later by the Hapsburgers.

His failure to establish a connection with the Black Sea, shortly afterward proved unsuccessful also (1497) to the Polish king Johann Albrecht, whose undisciplined aristocratic army gave a clear

proof of how little the self-glorifying aristocracy were suitable for hard military service. Yet the near future seemed to demand such work more than ever. Rapidly following one another, the two great East European powers had been expanding, though their later rivalry had not yet assumed form. The old Byzantium had become the center of the Osmanlic military monarchy, and in the grand duchy of Moscow, liberated from the yoke of the Tartars, originated a sort of substitute for the fallen East Roman empire. Here, as well as there, was a deeply rooted aversion for the religion and culture of West Europe. Hungary was for the Turks, and Poland for the orthodox Russians, the next great aim of attack.

Emperor Maximilian maintained the traditions of his dynasty when he concluded the family connections with the Jagiellons. The heiress of the Piasts had been engaged to Wilhelm of Austria before she saw herself compelled to yield her hand to the Lithuanian Vladislav Jagiello. Austria, Bohemia and Hungary held for a few decades (1437-57) a personal union under King Albrecht II and his son Ladislaus, who died young. At the subsequent settlements of the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns the Hapsburgers did not forget to appear with their claims, based upon a hereditary fraternization of 1364 with the Luxemburgers, whereas the principalities of both kingdoms were

in a position to insist repeatedly upon the right of free election. An agreement between Emperor Frederick and King Matthias, in 1463, which granted to the emperor or to his son the succession in Hungary in case Matthias should not leave a legitimate son, was after the death of the great king (1490) only another reason for the Hungarians to repudiate the alleged right of Maximilian to their crown.

In those days the choice fell upon the Jagellon Vladislav, who had been king of Bohemia since 1471. This model of princely weakness, who rarely spoke except to say "yes" to everything, was obliged to see the Hungarian diet of 1505, with its emphatic declaration that the present decay of the empire resulted from the government of foreign kings, make the resolution never to elect a foreigner again, but only an Hungarian after the death of Vladislav, or that of a later king without a male heir.

The principals had no consideration for the fact that the Pressburg peace of 1491 had renewed that order of succession in favor of Maximilian and his descendants. It needed the true Hapsburg tenacity, as Maximilian possessed it with all his restlessness, to secure to his dynasty, in spite of this, the prospect of the acquisition of the two crowns, or at least the semblance of a closely allied dynasty, through the double marriage arranged for in 1507. The

marriage was contracted on the part of the very juvenile couple fourteen years later. In May, 1521, Ferdinand led Vladislav's daughter Anna to the altar, while her brother, King Louis II of Hungary (born 1506), celebrated his wedding with the Infanta Maria in January, 1522.

More speedily than expected, the fulfillment of their boldest wishes came to the Hapsburgers. The weak Jagellonian kingdom, still deteriorating through the fact that Louis was yet a minor at the death of his father (1516), did not gain any new strength from the last of its representatives.

While in Bohemia the quarrels among the principals were intensified by the revival of the religious differences touched by the German Reformation, the anarchistic conditions in Hungary were drifting into a catastrophe. The young king yearned above everything to enjoy his life; his intellectual and energetic consort was not afraid to challenge the exasperation of the Magyars by surrounding herself with Germans, and openly showed her sympathy with the German heresy. For since 1522 one could listen in Hungary—especially in Transylvania—to the preaching of the gospel by the Saxonians, and also in Oedenburg and Upper Hungary. At court, Margrave Georg, the former tutor of the king and the imperial ambassador, spoke in favor of the new teaching and Queen Maria appointed as her preacher the fervent Austrian Cordatus, who afterward so

frequently visited Luther's home. All the more indignantly rose the native nobility, to whose great majority the word of the nuncio could be applied, declaring that they would reject anything which the Germans rejected.

The first man of this "patriotic" aristocracy was the Voivode of Transylvania, Johann Zápolya, who had made a name for himself through the cruel suppression of the revolution of 1514, and for a time had hoped for the hand of Princess Anna. His aim was the Hungarian crown, and his tools were the excitable Hungarian nobility. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the sentiment of these circles, who were continually playing with revolution, was the fact that even Polish ambassadors called their own conditions happy in comparison with the Hungarian ones. They believed that the evil would be eradicated only by a revolution, or an attack from foreign countries.

However, the peril was not removed, but showed itself in its whole ugliness when the long expected advance of the Turkish army really was made against Hungary. If, in the official utterances of the papacy and the great Christian states, the Turkish danger and the need for defense played such important parts, they were not empty phrases, even if the writers may sometimes have exaggerated. After the war policy of Selim I, without which a pure military despotism could not exist, he had

turned to the Orient, wrenched a piece from Persia, and with the destruction of the Mameluke rule (1517) had at the same time conquered the country for the grand seignior of Stamboul, and had begun a series of European campaigns with the accession to the throne of Suleiman II (1520). Already, in 1521, the Hungarians, who had laid violent hands upon an ambassador of Turkey, were made to feel the vengeful anger of the youthful sultan; their most important border fortresses—Schabatz and Belgrade—fell into the hands of the Turks.

The following year saw the heroic defense of the powerful fortress Rhodos by the Knight Hospitallers: after twenty assaults and fearful losses, the persevering Osmans reached their goal and on December 21, 1522, the grand master surrendered, and subsequently emigrated with his knights by way of Crete to Italy. Later (1530) the order established its headquarters in Malta.

It could not escape the Porte that the religious and political disruption of the Occident offered the most favorable opportunity for a policy of aggression. In Constantinople the pashas talked of the new antipope, Martin Luther, who like them would not tolerate any images in the churches. Even before the battle of Pavia, connections with the Turks were formed by France, though with the greatest secrecy. One of the Croatian Greeks, Christoph Frangepan, at the instigation of Francis I, was to invade Styria

and Carinthia by the side of the pasha of Bosniá. After the capture of the king his mother appealed to the sultan, and Francis, who was then in Spain, joined in this request for assistance, whereupon Suleiman sent him a consoling letter with the assurance: "Day and night our horse is saddled and our sword is girded."

In the spring of 1526, he determined to subjugate Hungary; the possession of Ofen, it was said in his council of war, was indispensable for the safety of the Osmanlic empire. "When the Turk is coming," the nuncio wrote to Rome, "His holiness may regard Hungary as lost." The young king led between 20,000 and 30,000 men against the tremendous, perhaps tenfold superior force of the enemy; Zápolya, who was credited with the wish to see his native country humiliated, was standing aside with his troops when, on the 29th of August, in the swampy plain of Mohacs, the little Hungarian army, without waiting for reënforcement was crushed after a foolhardy attack, by the superior numbers and the 300 guns of the opponent. Two archbishops, five bishops, a great number of magnates, and thousands of fighters were stretched on the battlefield. In front of the sultan's tent 2,000 heads of Christians were piled up as trophies. King Louis himself met his death in the waters of a swollen brook, while fleeing. Far and wide in all directions, the Turkish "runners and burners" carried horrors

before them; Suleiman celebrated the little Bairam festival in Ofen, but returned home again without having made sure of the country. It was like one of those terrible robbing expeditions which many centuries ago made the name of the pagan Hungarians first known in Germany and Italy.

A heated rivalry and fight for the two released crowns began at once. The matter was simple enough in Hungary, where only two contestants were possible,—Ferdinand and Zapolya. But Bohemia, by virtue of her geographical position, had always roused the ambitious desires of various great and little neighbors. Moreover, besides King Sigismund of Poland, this time a number of German applicants were named,—Joachim of Brandenburg, Johann of Saxony and his son Johann Friedrich, Duke Georg and the Dukes Wilhelm and Louis of Bavaria. The new Prussian duke Albrecht whom Friedrich of Liegnitz, a friend of the Reformation, recommended to apply for the kingdom, endeavored to prevent Ferdinand's election and to assist his sovereign lord of tenure, the king of Poland, in obtaining the crown. The only dangerous rivals of the archduke Ferdinand were the Wittelsbachers, whose agent computed his "saffron bill" of bribery of the Bohemian voters as far above 200,000 guilders, and who kept in touch likewise with the ambassador of the proposed king of France.

They resolutely opposed in those days the foundation of a Hapsburg world power in and beside the empire. At the same time, they had their eyes upon the Roman and the Bohemian crowns. "Never," says Ranke, "was there a more dangerous undertaking for the development of the power of the Austrian dynasty." It was, however, essentially due to the superior skill of its ambassadors that the election of the 23d of October, 1526, to the consternation of the Bavarians went to the archduke. With full justification Baumgarten points to the fatal error of Francis I who, as in the quarrel over the Roman crown, had again neglected the vigorous support of a German rival of the Hapsburgers, on account of a personal candidacy. "In Prague was," according to Alfons Huber's judgment in those days, "not only the fate of Austria decided but also that of all Europe." •

Not through religious concessions, as one formerly assumed, had Ferdinand won the Bohemians. In spite of the early ties of some Utraquists and the always oppressed Bohemian brethren with the "Saxonian Huss," there was no question of a rapid victory of the Reformation in that country. On the contrary, as in recent years a great approach had again taken place between Catholics and Utraquists. Luther had to see an ambitious clergyman, Gallus Cahera, who had personally applied to him, and for a time in Prague promoted evangelism, give himself

as utraquistic administrator and a tool for the reactionary movement.

Thus also the articles which the principals laid before their chosen king demanded equal justice for Catholics and Utraquists, whereas the marriage of priests, violation of Lent, and blaspheming of the saints were forbidden. Ferdinand, who showed great firmness at the attempt of the principals to force upon him a far reaching election capitulary, promised full validity to the compacts and, if possible, the papal confirmation; the same had been pledged by Vladislav and Louis. He also acknowledged that he had been elected by the free will of the principals, but he opposed himself with success against a number of articles which involved an essential decrease of the royal power. His enemies hoped that this stubbornness would yet cost him the crown.

On February 24, 1527, the solemn coronation took place in Prague. In the adjoining countries,—Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia,—which were not called upon to participate in the election, the acknowledgment of Ferdinand rested clearly on the basis of the hereditary right of his consort, which had been rejected by the Bohemians. This right the archduke had also claimed in Hungary, but nothing could be achieved there against the stress of the national passion, with which the lower nobility especially were inspired, either by this rather dubious

claim or the former agreements concerning the succession. A Polish observer received the impression that one was even inclined to an alliance with the Turks through sheer hatred of the Germans.

On November 10, 1526, Johann Zápolya was proclaimed king in Stuhlweissenburg and crowned the following day. "Even the Gods," remarked the Pole, "could not have induced the Magyars to the election of a foreign prince." One planned his marriage with the dowager queen Maria, but this brave Hapsburg lady, on the contrary, did everything to procure the crown for her brother. She succeeded in the typical Hapsburg way, more through promises than by actual deeds, to gather a party and bring together a very small diet in Pressburg, which elected Ferdinand on December 17th as king. For, firmly as the archduke clung to his right to the crown, his delegates were prudent enough in the decisive moment to place the election of the nation in the foreground.

The ambition of a dynasty to whom nothing seemed too high or too remote, was no less personified in Charles V than in his younger brother. What had he not aspired to in recent years? Besides the Roman royal election for which he temporarily gained the consent of the emperor after 1525, the acquisition of the duchy of Milan occupied him, and while his Hungarian brother-in-law was still alive he gained a foothold in Croatia, where the principals

accepted him as protector. Then he looked ahead to a kingdom of Bosnia. Bohemia was now a certainty to him, however, and in order to become really king of Hungary he was obliged to draw the sword under the most unfavorable circumstances, at a moment when France, the pope, Venice, Poland and the Bavarian dukes appeared as rivals by the side of his opponent Zápolya. It was the incomprehensible indolence of the latter who, instead of exploiting the advantages of his position, gave the opponent time for war preparations, that made it possible for Ferdinand at the head of a small but effective army, to take him by surprise in the summer of 1527, and drive him back into Transylvania. A diet called in Ofen acknowledged the Hapsburger as the rightful king, and the coronation took place on November 3 in Stuhlweissenburg.

The great change which had occurred with the formerly almost powerless governor of a far distant emperor exerted an immediate influence in two respects. First, the fact that his brother's interest had been so thoroughly diverted from the decisive struggle in Italy, and that Ferdinand had become to him an ardent advocate of peace, must have been very inopportune to the emperor himself. Second, the bearer of two royal crowns, whose territory now stretched almost uninterruptedly from Upper Alsatia to the Hungarian low plains, and from the Adria to the river Oder, held a totally different re-

lation to the principals of the empire than before. It is true that his rulership in Hungary still rested upon rather weak foundations, and in the empire the opposition of the Wittelsbachers was increased through the luck of their rival rather than weakened by discouragement. But this foundation of a new Hapsburg great state remained an event which tended to increase the turbulent excitement of the two German religious parties. Not the Turkish, but the religious war seemed to be imminent.

The independent regulation of the religious question manifested itself very differently as it was allotted to the various principals, in the long absence of the emperor and the powerlessness of the imperial authorities with those of the old creed and the confessors of the new doctrine. Real tolerance did not exist on either side, but it cannot be denied that the ecclesiastical revolutionaries dealt as a rule far more moderately with the Catholics than the latter did with them. It must be said, for instance, that the religious mandates of the duke of Prussia (July, 1525) threatened every departure from the pure preaching of the gospel with severe punishment; it is said in Prussia, where the duke referred to his office of execution as imposed upon him by God, that it had come in reality to a few executions of "superstitious people." On the whole, the evan-

gelistic state acted with a forbearance which the old Church had never known.

There was in those days no possibility of the two hostile parties living peacefully together in the same territory. One could hardly go any further in the matter of consideration than Landgrave Philip who, at the Homberg synod (October, 1526), gave those of the old creed another opportunity to defend publicly their opinion. There could not be any question that the result of such a "free" religious discussion was uniformly in favor of the majority of the believers.

The landgrave perhaps had been impressed more strongly than any of his companions by the original ideals of the religious movement. The church order which Francis Lambert, a sanguine southern Frenchman, worked out according to the Homberg synod sought to do justice to Luther's peculiar idea of the segregation of a real community of saints. This was to be done by a sort of plebiscite embracing all the men, women and children consenting to the new order, which was to be founded on the basis of a Presbyterian constitution, by which only a certain part in the democratically organized church régime would be conceded to the sovereign and the nobility. As a matter of fact, however, this bold scheme was never carried out, and Philip allowed himself very soon to be guided into the more comfortable path of royal dignity, and to be the head

of the Protestant Church, chiefly through Luther's criticism of "such a heap of laws with such mighty words." These worldly bishops were content to forbid stubborn adherents of the old Church to exercise their cult, and in an extremity compel them to emigrate. For instance, in Nürnberg the Dominican monastery was dissolved in 1543, while that of the "barefeet" held out until 1562, when the last monk died. Naturally they were called upon to participate in the general civic duties and burdens. In Hesse the resigning monks and nuns were paid in settlement partly with cash, and partly by written promises of usufructs for life.

It was a hard change for the priests from the possession of the most extensive rights and prerogatives to a mere existence offered them with a sort of charitable contempt. However, it was by no means the real religious revolution as it had claimed, for instance, in Hussitic Bohemia. If one reads the terrible and destructive accusations which were poured out in the writings of Luther and other Reformers against the "red harlot" and her servants, one can only wonder that the evangelistic princes and towns did not resort to more forcible means at the reorganization of the Church, and recognize a kind of redemptive obligation.

The picture which confronts us on the side of the Catholic authorities is altogether different. Their programme was a very simple one; eradication of

this new heresy, as Georg of Saxony urged in an assembly of princes called in Esslingen (December, 1526), on account of the Turks. If the finish of the Peasants' War had given to many a lord of the old creed cause for an exemplary punishment of Lutheran preachers, the ecclesiastical reaction experienced a rise after the Speyer diet which, in a certain measure, kept pace with the simultaneous advance of the evangelists, only that the Catholics were always ready with the axe and the pyre.

Georg of Saxony, who contented himself with deportation, remained although seriously angered by his personal feud with Luther, the most lenient of them all. The mandate which Ferdinand issued in August, 1527, during his Hungarian campaign, punished with deportation a disparaging criticism of the prayers for the poor souls, and in the case of graver misdemeanors he threatened with fire, sword and water.

The strict carrying out of this bloody mandate, however, was rendered highly difficult by the increasing sympathy among the Austrian nobility for the new teachings. Already, in 1524, a Vienna citizen, Kaspar Tauber, had been beheaded as an evangelist, but we only hear in the years after that mandate of Anabaptist, not of Lutheran martyrs. On the other hand, in Bavaria the matter was seriously considered.

The year 1527 saw the burning of Carpentarius

in Munich, and in Schaerding of the favorite clergyman Leonhard Kaeser, who had returned home from Wittenberg to visit his dying father. The executions increased in a gruesome manner; for instance, in Landsberg nine persons were condemned to the flames, and in Munich twenty-nine people were done to death by water. The famous Bavarian historian and tutor of princes, Aventin, lay in jail for some time under the suspicion of heresy. In Meersburg the preacher Johann Heuglin died on the pyre (1527). Town council and inquisition at Cologne kept the magister Adolf Clarenbach in unlawful custody until, in September, 1529, he was led to the pyre, together with student Peter Flysteden, who had spit at the elevation of the Host in the cathedral.

The joyful stoicism with which these victims of fanaticism went to their death reminds us of the period of ancient Christendom and its pagan persecutors. Their companions strove to preserve the last speeches of the tortured martyrs as a precious legacy and surrounded the end of Kaeser with miracles. The spirit of persecution began to touch even the highest circles. Prince-elect Joachim of Brandenburg fixed the year 1527 for his consort, who was an adherent of the new creed, to become converted, and reflected seriously whether he should kill her or give her imprisonment for life, until the tormented woman made an end of the threats and

indignities of the passionate man by her flight to her uncle, the prince-elect of Saxony.

In those days of trial Luther, for whom "inner upheavals" coincided with outward struggles, sang his greatest song, the sublime hymn of the Reformation. Firmly imbedded was his steadfast belief in the omnipotence of the divine Word, and in the worthlessness of all earthly defense, but through its mighty rhythms rang the blaring of trumpets and clashing of swords of the Huguenots, the Swedes of Gustavus Adolphus, and the Roundheads of Cromwell. Luther composed this battle song of Protestantism while he believed he could feel the proximity of the day of reckoning. In 1527 he wrote his preface to a new edition of Lichtenberg's prophecies, but not without giving expression to his contempt for astrology. A few years later he described, in his interpretation of Daniel, the rising power of Charles V and the splendor of the gospel as the last flickering up of a light about to be extinguished. On the 1st of November, 1527, however, he consoled himself, in a letter to Amsdorf, with the certainty that amid all the raging of Satan, "the divine Word saves the souls, even if the former devours the bodies."

Thus he wrote on the tenth anniversary of the "annihilation of the indulgence traffic, to the memory we have pledged our drink in this hour." All that he had experienced personally in the hard

struggle with the "prince of this world," he couched in the noble and victorious words of his song. The strophe "and if the world was full of devils" reminds us of his entrance in Worms, while the sublime courage of those martyrs is reëchoed in the finishing verse:

"Nehmen sie den Leib,
Gut, Ehr, Kind und Weib,
Lass fahren dahin,
Sie habens kein Gewinn,
Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben."

That Luther, notwithstanding this, was not willing to let the mischief of the enemies go unpunished, was shown by the fight which he undertook in 1527 against a disgraceful violation of the law on the part of the prince-elect of Brandenburg. Joachim had taken to himself as his mistress the wife of a certain Wolf Hornung, and had not only driven the abused husband out of the country with the utmost brutality, but forcibly prevented the fallen woman from returning to her husband. This princely champion of the old Church was not ashamed to put the climax upon his wantonness by frivolous jests. It only exasperated him the more when Luther, as an advocate of the maltreated woman, urged him not to get angry, "when I grab into the lining of the electoral hat so that the hair is flying about."

Prince-elect Joachim taking with him his mistress

in man's clothes, in May, 1527, met the two other heads of the Catholic party, King Ferdinand and Duke Georg, in Breslau. The question in the first place was regarding the Bohemian tenures of Brandenburg and Saxony, but immediately afterward, warnings reached the evangelists, especially those of electoral Saxony and Hesse, concerning hostile intentions about which an understanding had been reached in Breslau.

On the strength of this already existing suspicion the administrator of the chancery of Duke Georg, Otto von Pack, founded his fiction of a great Catholic aggressive alliance which he tried to make the excited landgrave believe, and also attempted to confirm it, as an experienced forger, by the presentation of a seemingly genuine copy of the alleged mislaid original. The assertion of the ultramontane side that Philip was the intellectual originator of this forgery has been proved absolutely wrong by the statements of H. Schwarz.

However, the reproach of gullibility does not apply to the landgrave alone, but to the otherwise cautious Prince-elect Johann, who at once closed a new alliance, in Weimar (March, 1528), with the avowed intention of forestalling the attack of the Catholics.

Calm reflection would have brought the conclusion that a union of King Ferdinand, the Bavarian dukes, Prince-elect Joachim, Duke Georg,

the archbishops of Mainz and Salzburg, and the bishops of Würzburg and Bamberg was an impossibility. But the utterances of Catholic reaction, as they have been the order of the day in recent times, coupled with those warnings, made the unnatural alliance of Ferdinand with his deadly enemies, the Wittelsbachers, look quite feasible. According to the forged document, Zápolya of Hungary and then Prince-elect Joachim and the landgrave were to be driven out of their territories, and Magdeburg was to be brought back to obedience.

This courageous town had been declared under ban since the autumn of 1527, the execution of which was intrusted to the Prince-elect Joachim and Duke Georg. There can hardly be a doubt that Philip seized with pleasure the opportunity to strike. He was by no means a man of passive resistance and, apart from religious zeal, was filled with the aversion of the empire princes against the monarchical endeavors of the Hapsburgers, the "hereditary emperorship." Since 1526 he had occupied himself with the idea of a repatriation of Ulrich of Württemberg, the outlaw of Hohentwiel having found a safe place of refuge at the Hessian court.

From the first the question was only to forestall the opponent's offensive; "That's how matters stand now," wrote Philip, "that one could carry out with the help of God what would be impossible without it." He outlined his alliance schemes upon the

grandest scale. Not only the evangelical principalities, but Zápolya, France, Denmark and Poland were to be called upon to help. Hessian delegates went to the Voivode and to King Francis, who had previously urged the landgrave to attack Ferdinand, under the supposition that the former was plotting for the Roman crown. We see how the young prince plunged without hesitation into the great European entanglement, as it seemed in the spring of 1528, to take the most threatening turn for the emperor. He raised, besides a levy of his subjects, an enlisted army of about 4,000 horsemen and 14,000 foot soldiers who, however, did not cross the Hessian border; it never came to an invasion of Würzburg territory, as has been commonly assumed.

For the first time the will of a princely politician collided with the resistance of an element whose intervention in a question of war and peace was produced by the new, indissoluble union of religious and state interests, and which gave clear proof that one was still far removed from a serious separation of the ecclesiastical and the worldly. Prince-elect Johann, momentarily infected by the fire of his juvenile companion, sobered down quickly and decided to live simply, in accordance with the advice of his theologians, so far as a matter of conscience was concerned, for such he considered was the keynote of the whole affair.

There were no less than eight opinions of Luther

and Melanchthon. At first Luther advocated with all determination the right of self-defense against such "murder princes" and "rotten parsons," but he made it a condition that before using force there should be a last discussion with the opponent. Gradually, however, under Melanchthon's influence as it seemed, the theologian's advices became more peaceful and considerate for the opponents, while the landgrave endeavored in vain to refute an argument which was an absolutely decisive one for the Prince-elect Johann. There was hardly anything left for the landgrave to do, but to compel the neighboring ecclesiastical princes, (whom to begin with he could threaten by agreements), to make at least a payment of the war expenses. Mainz and Würzburg each promised to pay 40,000, and Bamberg 20,000 florins, besides which Mainz renounced the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Saxony and Hesse.

Thus this campaign ended without a stroke of the sword, in spite of which it was to become typical of the future of German Protestantism in more than one respect. The fatal contrast between the landgrave and Ernestinians, the alliance with the foreign opponents of Hapsburg, the obvious idea first to finish the rotten ecclesiastical states, the repatriation of Ulrich of Württemberg, already held in the background,—all this repeated itself in the history of the Schmalkalden Federation, whose

chief founder had also been Landgrave Philip. At first he may have regretted his rashness when the unjustly accused Catholic princes, with the greatest indignation demanded the proof for this grave accusation, and when this was not given insisted upon the naming and punishment of the deceiver. According to the letter of the law, Philip might have refused to deliver his wretched informant to Duke Georg, or to subject him to the painful question; but, as one was not accustomed in those days to make much ado over such scoundrels, the far reaching consideration of the landgrave for the miscreant could only strengthen the bad impression of the whole matter in the empire.

Pack, dismissed from the Hessian court, was not apprehended in the Netherlands for some time, but he was beheaded in 1537 at the instigation of Duke Georg. How much the fear of the revolution remained in the minds of the German authorities showed itself in every political excitement of those years. In the same way, the undertaking of the landgrave must have had the greatest attraction for the old enemies of the clergy, the poor people. He said in his instruction that every member of the nobility and of the common people was favorably inclined toward him.

The lesson which the principalities of the old creed, and especially the ecclesiastical principalities, had received through the Pack affair, bore its fruit

when, after a few futile plannings of a diet, an assembly in Speyer was called for February 21, 1529. The delegation to the emperor which was proposed in 1526 was never sent; for Charles V refused to listen to such a communication of wishes and resolutions of the empire, and declared writing to be the only admissible way (May 20, 1527). There were new proofs in Speyer of the absolutism with which Charles was ready to maintain his imperial position in the empire, but the numerous Catholic principals were not offended by the arbitrary procedure of the ruler, since it was directed against the evangelists.

The latter seemed indeed to be defeated by the united will of the head of the empire and the majority of the diet. They felt at once bound and betrayed. In relation to electoral Saxony and Hesse, even the customary forms of courtesy were no more observed by the other princes. Wrote the Strasburger, Jakob Sturm, "Christ is again in the hands of Caiaphas and Pilate." The affable neutrality of the Palatinate people upon which one had hitherto relied was ended. The brother of the prince-elect, Palsgrave Frederick, had been induced again by dubious promises, especially by the hope of the hand of the dowager queen of Hungary, to forget previous ingratitude and to play anew his old part of a faithful shield-bearer to the Hapsburgers. Besides King Ferdinand and the pals-

grave, there appeared as imperial commissioners Wilhelm of Bavaria, Erec of Brunswick, Bishop Bernhard of Trient, and the ambassador and vice-chancellor of the emperor, Balthasar Merkel, postulant of Hildesheim and coadjutor of Constance, commonly known as the prior of Waldkirch. The Constance vicar general Dr. Johannes Faber, also belonged as court preacher of Ferdinand, and proved a "heretic henchman" to the most influential personages. Formerly a friend of Erasmus, Melancthon and Zwingli, he had forgotten his old fight against the indulgence nuisance when, in his Speyer sermons, he declared the Lutherans to be worse than the Turks, and the teaching of the Church to be more reliable than the Bible itself.

So the proposition of March 15 proceeded with extreme harshness against the ecclesiastical innovations of recent years. The emperor forbade until the coming council every outrage against ecclesiastical and civil authority, as well as every seduction to a wrong faith, under penalty of the ban. He nullified, by virtue of his imperial authority, the article of the preceding Speyer final decree, because it had been interpreted arbitrarily, so that "great mischief and misunderstanding" had resulted, and he ordered the principals to place in the new final decree the provisions referred to. This was the language of an autocratic ruler, and the German empire principalities which had once forced upon

this same sovereign their co-government of their states saw themselves reduced to a mere machine for the registration of the imperial will.

Now, as a matter of fact, a committee was chosen for the deliberation of this proposition, but among the eighteen members were ten staunch Catholics, five of whom could perhaps be won to the side of a mediation, and only three evangelists,—Prince-elect Johann, and the two municipal representatives. How could these few votes have any weight, especially since the prince-elect lacked the qualities of a masterful personality? On the other hand, the opposing party could dispose of such warlike and eloquent spokesmen as the cardinal of Salzburg, Leonhard von Eck, and Johannes Faber, while of the mediators, like the prince-elect of the Palatinate, who "did not know any more Saxonians," little could be expected.

However, it did not come to an unconditional accepting of the imperial command, but the verdict of the committee majority, which mitigated the proposition to the extent that it was resolved to postpone the total abolition of the innovations until the meeting of the council, was in spite of the concession not acceptable to the evangelists, if they were unwilling to relinquish their hardly secured ecclesiastical independence. For, apart from the unconditional prohibition of Anabaptistic teachings and those of Zwingli, the old Church mass was to be

tolerated in evangelistic territories, and every encroachment of a principality upon the authorities or upon the possessions and interest of another, was to be followed at once by a declaration of the ban. Here it was possible that an application of the episcopal jurisdiction over territories which had been estranged from it could be renewed, whereas the toleration the Catholic cult imposed upon the evangelists was not upheld by an admission of evangelistic preaching. On the contrary, the principals who had until then observed the Worms edict, must continue to do so, and the evangelists on their part were to avoid any further innovations.

These were resolutions the carrying out of which would have tied completely the hands of the latter, and opened all doors to the Catholic reaction.

The deeply religious, but apprehensive prince-elect of Saxony came near being a victim of the skillful attempt of the opponents who strove to make use of the unfortunate dogmatic split among the evangelists, by separating the strictly Lutheran elements from the South German towns, which were more inclined to adhere to Zwingli. Melancthon, who accompanied the prince-elect, and who thought it advisable at this moment to dedicate his commentary upon Daniel to King Ferdinand, remarked that an immediate withdrawal from the Strasburgers would have been highly advantageous. But Landgrave Philip, who was at that time already possessed

by his idea of a union between Luther and Zwingli, kept the seriously threatened evangelists together. His whole demeanor breathed confident boldness; with 200 men in armor and amid the blaring of trumpets he rode into Speyer. As they did three years before, he and the prince-elect vexed the Catholics by eating meat on fast days, and by the sermons of their theologians which were largely attended.

However, it was of deciding importance that Philip had never lost sight of his old project of an alliance with those towns which were related to him in creed, and in spite of the mistrust of the towns against the princes, he had the drafting of an agreement laid before the representatives of Nürnberg, Augsburg, Strasburg, and Ulm, which a modern historian has directly described as "the first document of the Schmalkalden Federation." It did not come to a ratification in those days, but in 1528 there were Nürnberg troops and guns in the camp of the landgrave. In the summer of the same year, in an assembly at Esslingen, the towns belonging to the Suabian Federation debated over the necessity of a closer alliance, after their delegate, the burgo-master of Memmingen, had been expelled from the assembly of the confederacy at Ulm on account of the evangelistic attitude of his town.

Afterward in the Speyer assembly the Strasburger Jakob Sturm and the Nürnberger Tetzl

were the unflinching defenders of the final decree of 1526. Still, in March, the Nürnberg town council had their jurists and theologians make out expert opinions which advocated unreservedly a protest of the evangelistic principalities against every majority resolution which was not acceptable because of religious reasons. The jurists remarked that the gospel and the pope were two antagonistic masters and a mediation between them was an impossibility. That the opposing party in full realization of their crushing majority would not go beyond the mitigation referred to in the imperial proposition could be foreseen, for, wrote the Strasburger, "we are overwhelmed by the clergy, and therefore we adhere to them." Besides this the Catholics succeeded on April 12th in splitting the solidarity of the towns which had up to that date been maintained in face of the religious difference, whereupon the princes made an explicit statement on the same day in which they explained why they could not sanction the drafting of the committee. When, without any further consideration for this complaining writ, the imperial commissioners accepted the resolution of the diet majority as a valid final decree, and then left during a separate deliberation of the princes, the latter presented the previously arranged protest to the still assembled principals. They included a small number of princes besides electoral Saxony and Hesse, Margrave Georg, Prince Wolfgang of

Anhalt, and an attorney of Duke Ernest and Francis of Brunswick-Lüneburg. After that as many of the towns as were willing to follow the princes upon so dangerous a path protested; the appeal, signed by all protesting members, showed fourteen of such communities, of very unequal importance;—Strasbourg, Nürnberg, Ulm, Constance, Lindau, Memmingen, Kempten, Nördlingen, Heilbronn, Reutlingen, Isny, St. Gall, Weissenburg and Windsheim.

The original protest had been provided on April 20, with a very exhaustive argumentation. The evangelists planted themselves upon the legal contention that a final decree of a diet passed by a unanimous vote could be altered only by a unanimous resolution and not by a mere majority. But, after all, everything hinged upon the vote of conscience, since they were matters which concerned the honor of God and the salvation of every individual, "in which we are by God's command and for the sake of our conscience bound and obliged to regard him our Lord and God as the highest King and Lord of all Lords." In addition to this, the Catholic imputation of a one-sided and not mutual toleration, as well as the procedure of the diet against the incorrect teaching of the Holy Communion, was rejected. They wished to adhere to the article of 1526 until the meeting of a general Christian or national council.

In vain Henry of Brunswick and Philip of

Baden afterward sought to mediate on the basis of mutual tolerance; the evangelistic principals were still prepared to offer their hands, while the Catholics did not think of yielding anything further. Thus it remained at the separation which no council could mend, a segregation of a Catholic and a Protestant Germany. As Luther had withdrawn in Worms from the general Church, for the sake of his conscience, so now the evangelistic state, threatened in its birth, availed itself of the ancient means of defense, against unbearable restraint and pressure of the killing letter of the law.

The far reaching dogma that one had to obey God more than man was the keynote which continually recurred in the protest itself, as in other utterances of the protesting evangelists. "If we fear the emperor's ban," said the Nürnberg theologians, "we should be more afraid of the ban of God" therefore, "we will joyfully venture it upon His sacred Word, and if everything should rain down upon us the enemies of His divine Word could think of." God, wrote the burgomaster of Memmingen, was stronger than the world; him they wished to choose as their highest captain.

It made a wretched impression when, in contrast with this heroic spirit, Melanchthon was heard whining over the danger of the protest; he felt as if "extinguished," and was "half demented" with fear. With Luther, of course, it was not fear,

but deep distrust of the landgrave and the Zwingli towns, that made him an uncompromising opponent of an evangelistic alliance. He believed no one had cause for fear from the papists. A "secret understanding" had been reached in Speyer on April 22, between electoral Saxony, Hesse, Strasburg, Ulm and Nürnberg. One wanted to defend oneself against every attack for the sake of the divine Word, regardless whether it came from the Suabian Federation, the supreme court or the empire régime. The thoughts of the landgrave reached far ahead of this narrow circle of allies; he hoped yet to triumph over all theological differences, and to elevate the evangelism to a great power.

In the meantime, the young creation of Hapsburgian statecraft was once more menaced by the long feared Turkish invasion. While the sultan advanced into Hungary, the intrigues of the Bavarian Wittelsbachers to procure the Roman crown desired by Ferdinand for Duke Wilhelm, were rampant at the same time with the princes-elect. They kept up their relations to the Hungarian anti-king Zápolya, and Duke Louis meditated gaining the hand of a Polish princess. It deserves to be mentioned as a symptom of the ferment still rife in Germany that, in the circles of the South German Anabaptists, the older conception of the Turk as the "Messiah" of the poor and oppressed, the appointed punisher of the corrupted authorities, assumed new

life again. The fate of the world seemed to be dependent upon the armed forces of Suleiman.

Zápolya was represented to the Porte by an excellent diplomat, the Polish lord Hieronymus Laski, who had an easy task from the first, in spite of his efforts to be recognized as a royal ally and not as a vassal owing tribute. Turkish haughtiness did not abandon the claim that Hungary, according to the right of conquest, belonged to the sultan, although the latter had not made any preparations to seize it. The attempts of Ferdinand to urge his rights in Stamboul were as futile as the proposal of the emperor to the shah of Persia of a combined attack upon the Osmanli power. On the other hand, Francis I had not broken off his relations with the Porte, and concluded an agreement with Zápolya in the year 1528 which promised his son Henry of Orléans the eventual succession in Hungary.

The Venetians acted directly as agents of the Turks by keeping the government of Suleiman informed of the vicissitudes of the Italian war, their countryman,—the renegade Gritti,—being the influential confidant of the grand vizier. The contempt with which the Turks spoke of their Christian friends and foes, and the naïveté with which Suleiman, “the shadow of God over both worlds,” as he described himself, claimed rulership over the whole of the earth as his right, are surprising. However,

at the base, it was only a strong, orientally colored repetition of the same theocratic idea of world governorship which was the keynote of medieval imperialism, and of the endeavors of its last representative, Charles V. Thus, in the spring of 1529, the "real emperor" rose in order to advance through the almost defenseless Hungary into the heart of the Austrian monarchy.

On the battlefield of Mohács, Zápolya paid homage to him; the weakly defended Ofen surrendered to the grand vizier Ibrahim. The impressive advance guard of the Turkish army,—the "runners and burners,"—were sighted by Vienna September 21 and the whole town was soon surrounded by hundreds of thousands of the sultan's forces, whereas Vienna, a "far-stretching, unsafe and unfortified spot" at the best, according to the report of the Austrian commanders, was not sufficiently provided with food, and the garrison numbered only 20,000 men.

Palsgrave Philip, a brother of the prince-elect, Count Niklas von Salm, and other experienced captains, conducted the defense, whose heroism was of the highest character, for they had not only to fight a tremendous superiority in numbers, but the finest regiments of the Osmanli army. They were called Sipahi and Janichars, recruited from Christian boys and trained in half-monastic discipline as Moslem fighters for the faith. The invincible infantry,

whose iron discipline was justly admired by the contemporaries of the continuously drunk and rebellious foot soldiers, had the hook rifle as their chief weapon, and as an ornament an aigrette upon their high, white felt caps. But a number of repulsed assaults taught them what a warlike power reposed in the despised "dust-covered infidels." They ceased laughing when they saw the ease with which a prisoner moved about in his seemingly clumsy armor. The defenders were superior in guns, and they knew how to escape the Turkish mines.

Gradually the autumn climate of the North made itself felt. In the words of a Turkish historian, Germany "is the residence of the Shah of the winter, and the Fatherland of the frost of the cold; the minds of the war champions of Islam got dimmed."

With rich rewards to his leaders and Janichars, congratulated by them like a victor, Suleiman commenced his retreat, after he had given up the siege on the 25th of October. Neither the tasteless phrases of Turkish boastings, nor the atrocities of the retreating army, could hide from the world the defeat of the "Magnificent" and hitherto victorious ruler.

Besides the glorious resistance of the Austrian metropolis, the increasing peace sentiment in Christian Europe had a sobering effect upon the sultan, whose aggression was not to be despised by the

contending powers in the West. The empire had only a small part in the defense of Vienna; its field marshal, Palsgrave Frederick, came too late to enter the beleaguered city.

However, the sentiment in Germany had greatly changed in consequence of such threatened danger. Luther himself, who had not supported the widely spread mistrust of the ecclesiastical crusade projects without cause, in a writing published in 1529, advocated the unconditional obligation of the Christians to follow the call of the emperor against the Turkish robbers and disturbers; the emperor's banner, he declared, was not a bad piece of silk, but God's command; protection to the pious and punishment for the wicked, was written upon it. A plethora of lamenting, admonishing and finally jubilant songs disclosed the sympathy with which the nation had in those days accompanied the grave menace and unexpected rescue of her southeastern Mark from the "Turkish Dog." We are reminded of the prophecies of an emperor Charles, who was to overcome the infidels and cross the ocean to Jerusalem.

The protesting principals did not exclude themselves from rendering assistance, although they had denied their help. Johann Friedrich of Saxony was to be placed at the head of the men levied by his father.

Luther had dedicated his writing to the land-

grave; he never tired of reproaching him with the aggressiveness of the princes against the emperor,—“the princes’ revolt,”—and his relation to the peasant revolution. The Wittenbergers were on the right track when they protested against the doings of the young prince as uncanny and revolutionary. His high soaring plans, which meant nothing less than a reorganization of the empire and Europe, were totally different from the good-hearted loyalty of a Luther, and the doctrinal anxiety of a Melancthon. It certainly touches our national feeling painfully when we read that the most gifted among the Protestant princes of those days adopted ways which must be characterized as hostile to the empire, and talked with regret of the retreat of the Turks from Vienna, and with hope of a new Turkish invasion. But was the régime of Charles V or the religious system of suppression of the Catholic principals in any way really national? Was it not more anti-national, and repulsive to the new spirit dwelling in the masses of the people? For a few centuries the tremendous anachronism of the Holy Roman Empire had led an inglorious existence, to give more than sufficient proof of the fact that it was no longer able to regenerate itself from its own resources, nor even shorten its agony of death. In view of such conditions revolutionary thoughts were no crime, and it would surely have been an invigoration of the national life if the

union of the Swiss and German Reformation, aspired for by Philip,—the “one will” from the sea to the Alps,—could have been called into life. But the grand political idea which the Reformation period had produced was not to attain its maturity.

IV

ULRICH ZWINGLI AND LANDGRAVE PHILIP

IN the history of great movements the will as well as the achievement demands a place. We should draw a most faulty picture of the fermenting period if we confined our attention to that which has emerged victoriously from all the storm and stress in the struggle for existence. Among the most attractive episodes of the Reformation must be counted the confederacy of the republican hero Zwingli and the only Protestant empire prince whose eye was able to penetrate, here and there, the enshrouding fog of old and new prejudices.

Parallel with the German Reformation, under its powerful influence and yet with the full preservation of its own character, the liberation from the rule of the old Church had been accomplished in a few Swiss cantons. The figure of its great champion suffered a long time from the continually recurring comparison with Luther or Calvin, instead of an appreciation of this independent nature according to its own particular merit. But the disparity in the development of the Wittenberger and

the Zurich reformer must not elude our attention if we wish to appreciate the highly personal contrast. As Staehelin said, "From the small congregation reformed by Zwingli has developed a great community whose branches are ramified over distant countries, yes over whole parts of the earth."

We have seen the harmonious nature of Zwingli, saved from all deeper storms of passion, ripen into a happy childhood and youth. Born in the Toggenburg Alps village of Wildhaus (January 1, 1484), he was a peasant's son in a different sense from Luther, whose father had changed into a small citizen. With all their simplicity of circumstances, the family commanded a certain respect. The father was a bailiff in his community, an uncle was a deacon, and two other relatives were abbots in neighboring monasteries.

Without being compelled to go through the sad experiences of a poor pupil, Ulrich, destined for a clergyman, lived only for his studies. The glory of the ancient wrought with full power upon the gifted youth, who attended the University of Vienna during its humanistic prosperity under Celtis, and acted in Basel as teacher of Latin. This buoyant and aspiring mind did not obtain its intellectual nourishment from the subtleties of scholastic theology, which he only sought as a necessity, "like a spy in the hostile camp." He drank from the well of Homer, Pindar and Plato, without experi-

encing any of that mental agony which in those days drove his contemporary, the gloomy Wittenberg youth, into a monastery.

In later years Zwingli, to whom the classics became life companions, expressed the hope that the noblest among the pagans would share in the eternal happiness. It was undoubtedly his humanistic inclinations which first gave a prestige to his name among the best of the Swiss league. An enthusiastic admirer once greeted him as master of the Apollonian Lyra, and the 'undoubted Cicero of modern times. As a parson in Glarus (1506), he only gradually allowed theological interests to come to the fore. Besides the aid for the study of the Bible and the Church fathers, which he had received at Basel through Thomas Wytenbach, the Erasmic theology markedly influenced the half humanistic clergyman. Not only the predilection for Hieronymus and Origenes, and the departure from Augustine, who was preferred by Luther to all the fathers, but Zwingli's later doctrine of the Holy Communion was, according to his own statement, to be traced in its origin to the writings of Erasmus, with which the enthusiastic admirer did not fail to make himself familiar through correspondence.

One has formerly perhaps emphasized too much the influence of a Platonizing mystic, Pico di Mirandola, upon Zwingli. At all events, he did not lack altogether the mystic element, for it was expressed

in his interest in the symbolism of figures, although it never gained the significance it held for Luther. Outwardly regarded, Zwingli could well pass as an Erasmian, but without sharing in any way the skeptic trait and the cosmopolitan indifference of the master. He was a devoted confederate from his childhood, and in Glarus he entered fully into the midst of the stormy life which was caused by the unsound position of Switzerland as one of the great powers, and was regarded by Zwingli as well as other patriots as the cancerous sore of the people.

Zwingli had the opportunity on his various journeys to Italy, made as a field preacher, to convince himself both of the military strength of his countrymen and of the demoralizing influence of foreign diplomacy and foreign gold.

As an open antagonist of the deserter and the pensioner nuisances, and of the flourishing trade which was carried on with the blood of the confederacy, the parson of Glarus, known as the fiery popular speaker, was a thorn in the side of the local French party. He had to resign in 1516, and took a position as priest in the famous place of pilgrimage, Einsiedeln. "I have," he said later, "begun to preach the gospel of Christ in the year 1516, before anybody in our district had heard the name of Luther."

In the following year appeared his own copy of the Greek text of the Epistles of Paul which, like

many other books in Zwingli's library with their marginal comments, afforded an insight into the mental activity of the budding reformer. Industrious, step by step, without precipitation, he advanced to growing independence from the interpreters of the Scriptures. - Nothing, however, could be noticed in his public activity of a serious opposition to the ruling Church, and in 1518 he asked for the dignity of a papal chaplain, together with a pension which he received until 1520. In a moral respect he gave some offense, as did so many of his professional companions. It was, according to Staehelin's expression, "a lack of action after recognition," which still attached to him after he had been called to Zurich. While Luther already filled the world with the news of his boldness, while the decisions fell in the Worms diet, we see "the first one among all the Swiss" work with his inherent calmness, but not without inviting his superior, the bishop of Constance, again and again to collaborate in the slow but profound realization of state and Church.

The far-reaching difference between the great Reformation and that of Zwingli showed itself immediately, inasmuch as the latter set himself at the very beginning of his activity a practical task with certain fixed limits, and when he started upon his work at the grand cathedral of Zurich (January, 1519), he made war, above all, upon the moral and

political corruption of the "Swiss Corinth." Thus the town council, the confederate diet, and the bishop of Constance, strove to abolish quickly the indulgence traffic which the Italian Samson intended, in 1519, to introduce in Zurich, and the see showed no resistance.

We have seen how Zurich, in opposition to the French alliance of 1521, maintained its separate position, whereby Zwingli's prestige was essentially strengthened. None the less, in spite of being warned, Cardinal Schinner set on foot an enlistment for the people. In the following year, however, the patriotic preacher began to convert himself into an ecclesiastical reformer by attacking the Lenten commandments, the saint cult and the life in the monasteries. Manuel's anti-papal carnival plays had just been performed in Berne. While in Saxony those first tumultuous attempts of an ecclesiastical innovation met with the resistance of the government and of Luther himself, the authorities in Zurich, accustomed to intervention in questions of such nature, announced religious discussions through which the quarrel of the old with the new tendency was to be fought out. In the first of these debates, which took place under the presidency of the mayor on the 19th of January, 1523, the bishop of Constance was represented by his vicar general Faber, but his objection to the assembly as not competent to make such decisions was not sustained.

Zwingli was seated alone in the center at a table, with the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew texts of the Bible before him; his "closing speeches" (theses) contained in rough outline a finished reformation programme, and he cheerfully called to the opponents: "Well, let us get on with it, here I am."

The first steps were incomparably easier in Zurich than in Wittenberg, which was always under the management of the authorities, and after the second discussion in October, 1523, an especially slow but unalterable execution of the reforms followed. It is highly significant of the greater consideration which the Swiss enjoyed from the see, as compared with Germany, that in spite of the sharp opposition of the rest of the confederacy to the heretical Zurich people, Rome punished the little republic only by refusing to pay a sum due her, and applied the ban neither against Zurich nor Zwingli. More than with the papists, the evangelized state had to deal with the radicals, to whom Zwingli was always a "shorn monster" because he refused to enter into their biblicism, which was bearing itself as if inspired.

As the whole genesis of Zwingli's work had for its foundation the closest union of state and religious purposes, the fact that the state,—according to Zwingli's conception, the community of the people, represented by the town council,—consummated from the beginning the reorganization of the

Church, by virtue of its own sovereignty and as its own task, led to a strong, theocratic amalgamation of Church and state, and to the early formation of a restraint of conscience which the authorities handled with the avowed intention to "make all their subjects equal" in matters of religion.

The Council of Two Hundred exercised, "instead of common Church," the sovereign rights which really belonged to the community. Deportation, imprisonment with hard labor, and even for life, were imposed upon dissenters. Zwingli waited a long time before he interfered forcibly, but to him it was a monstrous wrong to veil the breach with the old Church by the indulgent retention of the customary outward ceremonies.

Here we recognize in the clearest manner that Zwingli had never been attached to the Church with the fervent devotion of a Luther, that the iron resolution of the better knowledge which had penetrated his being possessed nothing in common with the love of the German changed into wild hatred. In the domain of cult he removed everything that was connected with the symbolism of former periods; the "cleansing" of the churches of all idolatry was already resolved upon in 1524, and carried out with such thoroughness that, apart from the proper "idols," neither the images, nor the altars as "conjurers' tables," nor even the organs, were given any mercy.

Enthusiastic friend and cultivator of music as the reformer was in his private life, the church singing and playing of the organ were for him a desecration of that which should be held sacred. Sternly and soberly the new divine service confined itself to the sermon and the prayer; the official garb of the clergymen also disappeared. Four times in the year, the celebration of the Holy Communion took place, in the simplest possible form, as one would perhaps recall the communions of the ancient Christians. Everybody took the bread for himself out of the dish, and the cup with the wine. With full justification the vandalism has been censured which destroyed pictures, rare books and handwritings, besides precious pictures, and sent the valuable metals of the Church to the mint. And although Zwingli emphasized occasionally that worldly authority has no jurisdiction over the soul and the conscience of man, yet the opposite of this theory was maintained under his own leadership in the Zurich state church, which was endowed with censorship and executive authority. Sharp moral mandates regulated the supervision of social and domestic life; it was dangerous to have images in one's own home and to eat fish instead of meat on fasting days. In December, 1528, the small and the great council, the authorities themselves, were cleansed of all "infidels and godless." Old Testament harshness, as well as Old Testament force

penetrated this little state of God, whose prophet was the simple parson in the grand cathedral. One had the feeling of being surrounded by a world of enemies, and the determination to exploit every victory without mercy. "Their tolerance," said Lenz of Zwingli and his ecclesiastical collaborators, "began where their power ceased. They did not fight for tolerance, but for the ruling of their idea."

A new element entered into the Reformation with this, and its vitality began to manifest itself at once by an active propaganda and success. Above all, the confederacy was mightily stirred by the procedure of Zurich; almost everywhere in eastern and northern Switzerland the friends of the people began to stir. These included men like the great Humanist Joachim von Watt (Vadianus), the brave Johannes Kessler in St. Gall, the preacher Oecolampadius, and the Franciscan lecturer Konrad Kuerschner (Pellicanus) in Basel. The innovation first gained a footing with the Appenzellers. As early as 1522, several congregations abolished mass, only one venturing to do so in Zurich in 1525. A few years later the district communities left the choice of creed to each community. But the great majority of governments regarded Zurich's separation with decided disapproval, and the cantons of inner Switzerland,—the so-called "Five Places," Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Lucerne and Zug,—with whom the interest in the mercenary

service and pension administration played some part, besides the old church sentiments, sought in the beginning the intervention of the diet, and when this could not be obtained attempted war. In 1525 Zwingli, who did not feel the scruples of a Luther, wrote an "Advice on the war against the Five Places." The danger passed, and did not cause the expulsion of Zurich from the diet, but the futile disputation at Baden in May, 1526, which Zwingli refused to attend, only accentuated the existing opposition.

The old champion Dr. Eck won here another of his alleged victories, while the representatives of the Reformation, not favorably regarded by the majority, naturally did not acknowledge the result of the sixteen days' word battle as binding. The most important consequence of the discussion was without doubt the estrangement of Berne from the Catholic cause, which resulted from the foolish action of the Five Places, also of Freiburg and Solothurn, in refusing to give up the documents of the discussion. Their publication was left to the fanatic Murner, whose "heretic calendar" and other abusive writings were caused by pamphlets of the reformers. This new friction revived the old split between the municipal policy of the Berners and the original country cantons, and the imputation of the Five Places brought the quarrel with Berne before the latter's own country community and made the

breach permanent. Long before some spokesmen of the new creed had preached in Berne with success; among them were Zwingli's teacher Thomas Wyttenbach, the physician Anshelm, the intellectual Niklaus Manuel, and above all the Suabian Berchtold Haller, who as a priest in the cathedral, had been on the most intimate terms with Zwingli since 1520. The Catholic attack upon their sovereignty led the Berners to a democratic reorganization of their council, and to a complete attachment to the Reformation which, begun in January, 1528, with a disputation lasting three weeks, under the personal presidency of Zwingli, ended in a complete triumph of his religious and political ideas.

This union of the two most powerful towns of the confederacy was succeeded by the victory of the innovation in a number of hitherto hesitant cantons. St. Gall, Glarus, Schaffhausen and Basel, followed in 1528 and 1529. In the last named town there was a change in the revolutionary method, inasmuch as the artisan leagues, influenced by Oecolampadius, armed themselves against the Catholic council, who had guns mounted, and the defeat of the papist institutions was sealed by a wild iconoclasm.

The movement passed beyond the Swiss borders. Determinedly as Zwingli acted against every blending of the confederate policy with the interests of foreign war lords, he was not inclined to resist an old favorite wish of Swiss statecraft, which was an



**King Ferdinand, Brother of Emperor Charles V.
From an engraving by Bartel Beham (1496-1540).**



extension of the confederacy at the expense of the empire, whose republican elements were strongly represented in the South and on neighboring Allemannic soil. Towns like Mülhausen in Alsace, and Rottweil had only recently concluded their permanent league with the thirteen cantons.

Zwingli lived in the proud conviction that he saw in the Swiss the chosen "subduers of kings." "I wish nothing so much," he wrote on one occasion, "as that the republic may flourish, for if this form of state increases, the boldness of the tyrants is kept in check." On the other hand, it was not to be wondered at when the German towns, badly treated by the princes, directed their glances toward the enviable independence of communities like Zurich, Berne or Basel.

From such a political connection which, for instance, had recently (1524-25) caused Strasburg to make application for a Swiss alliance, and from the close affinity of the Suabian and Swiss nature, the fact was explained that in the majority of the South German empire cities, the Zwingli tendency of the Reformation quickly overcame the Luther inclination.

Thus it happened that in Strasburg, where Butzer and Capito, the leaders of the movement begun by Zell looked up to the Zurich "heroes"; and in Ulm, where the brusque Conrad Sam's stentorian voice penetrated even the vast cathedral, they were tied to

Zwingli with "diamond chains of love." It was the same in Constance, Lindau, Memmingen, and a large number of smaller towns, though not without violent struggles with the Suabian adherents of Luther, who crowded around Johannes Brenz, the preacher of Hall. For a time, also, Billicanus in Noerdlingen and Urbanus Rhegius in Augsburg allowed themselves to be converted by the Swiss, but soon turned back again. In Augsburg, where Anabaptist elements joined the Zwingli movement, the cynical preacher Michael Keller did everything he could to feed the excitement of the masses. The consequence was a long, futile struggle between the old Church and the Lutheran and Zwingli reform, in which the evangelistic radicalism manifested itself in anything but an agreeable manner. Keller and other predicants were dragged by their hair out of a Catholic church because he smashed a particular crucifix with an axe, while one of his companions threw his own stole into the street and flung a stone on top of it.

The increasing moral degeneration and the mutual derision of the old and the new rites were in loud contrast to the sharp police measures of the Zurich state church. It was characteristic that almost everywhere in Germany the penetration of the Zwingli doctrine coincided with a violent democratic disturbance. So also in Frankfort where in 1528 councilors and people vied in deriding the pro-

cession of Corpus Christi, and the predicants called upon the congregation to depend upon their own help in view of the unevangelical laxity of the council. This, however, suited the views of Zwingli, who had acknowledged the right of the community, in the extreme case, to remove the authorities if they were recognized as godless.

The Swiss reformer had familiarized himself with the thought world of the citizens, as he encountered it in the spheres of his activity as bearer of the state authority and the ecclesiastical reformation. On one occasion he talked of the fact that, according to the evidence of Athenian, Carthaginian and Roman, as well as most recent Hungarian history, almost always and everywhere the nobility was the cause of political misfortune. He may have imagined a linking of republican South Germany to his Fatherland, which would again have secured for the Swiss towns a resistless preponderance over the small peasant republics. Zurich would have been made the center of a reformation territory alienated in a religious and political respect from Luther, and Upper Germany would have been once more decisively separated from Lower Germany.

We shall see how Zwingli's thoughts flew across this border as soon as the approach of Philip of Hesse made still greater things seem attainable. The South German towns always remained an object of such wishes. In 1524, he expressed the con-

viction to Pirkheimer that Nürnberg and Zurich should be united in one union. The beginning was made by a protective and defensive alliance, called a "castle right," between Zurich and Constance (1527), to which a number of confederate places,—St. Gall (1528), Biel, Mühlhausen, Basel (1529),—afterward joined themselves.

During the Speyer diet the Strasburger and Memminger people applied to Zwingli; at the same time the representative of Ulm established connection with the landgrave in Speyer, who was highly pleased to give a helping hand to the Swiss. On April 22, Philip sent an invitation to Zwingli to hold a religious discussion with Luther and his people, and the Reformer promised without hesitation that he would appear personally to the "most holy prince." In the meantime, the increasing progress and the transgressions of the Reformation into the common districts, which were acquisitions of the entire confederacy; the evangelization of Toggenburg and St. Gall; and the execution of a Thurgau woman who was an enemy of heresy, had exasperated the Catholics. "By the Almighty," wrote Thomas Murner, "the women are more angry than the men. We will soon share the faith with one another, with long spears and good halberds, if they do not want it in any other way."

Quicker than the Protestants (April 22, 1529) the Five Places perfected their foreign alliance,—

a defensive "Christian union" with their former deadly enemy, Austria. There was at this time a thought of drawing Savoy, Lorraine, Palsgrave Frederick, the Bavarian dukes, and other foreign members into it. The chronic financial distress, however, of King Ferdinand, and the invasion by the Turks of Hungary, rendered the alliance for the Catholic cantons practically worthless, when Zurich and Berne with their withdrawal stole a march upon them. The two weeks' campaign, without a stroke of the sword, led to the peace of Kappel (June 25, 1529), which established the equality of the cantons of both the old and new creed within the confederacy, and for the common districts a majority decision secured confession. Thus for the first time was applied the principle of parity which Germany was to adopt only after bloody struggles. This peace was not at all to the liking of Zwingli, who could not be restrained from going out himself with the halberd. His intention was to secure free admission and with it, as he supposed, a complete victory of the gospel in the Catholic territories, and a thorough eradication of the pension system. But the document of the Christian union had been nullified, while the "burgh right" of the Protestants continued, though they had expressly refrained from a religious conquest of the Swiss country. "Lord, now lift the cart yourself," began a song composed by Zwingli.

With more zeal than ever before, he threw himself into politics, which he, as a member of the recently formed secret council, ruled as absolutely as he did the church in Zurich. The plan was to take advantage of the promising alliance with the landgrave. At the religious discussion which the latter inaugurated in October, 1529, at Marburg, Zwingli was depended on for not only an explanation of disputable dogmas, but the eucharistic question had become a symptom of the deeply rooted difference between the German and the Swiss reformation.

Spontaneously, without asking Wittenberg for advice, Zwingli had begun his task and finished it. He entered Luther's sphere at first—and this was a fatal step—as a companion of Carlstadt, whose old dispute with Luther reached its climax in the quarrel over the Holy Communion. Luther had learned in 1521, from his Netherland friends, the eucharistic views of Johann Wessel. As he declared, the Reformer wished, in his fight against the papacy, to give the latter "the biggest knock" by the scriptural proof that only ordinary bread and wine were in evidence at the Holy Communion. He could not ignore the text of the sacramental instructions, which were in his opinion immovable, but his scholastic studies had shown him in former days a way out, through the doctrine of consubstantiation, as advocated by Pierre D'Ailly and

Biel. This avoided the ecclesiastical doctrine of transubstantiation, unacceptable to him, but without nullifying the mystery, the miracle of a direct union of the individual man with God.

It must not be overlooked that the selfsame Utrecht fraternity master Rode, who had brought the writings of Wessel to Wittenberg, visited Oecolampadius and Zwingli in 1523, and that the latter for the first time then formulated, even if only confidentially, his own views concerning the Holy Communion. It is true that Zwingli had been long before,—as he admitted in the expression that he had learned the metaphorical conception of the sacramental words, “on the strength of other peoples’ learned standing,”—under the influence of the Erasmian “philosophy of Christ” regarding this and other dogmas, such as hereditary sin.

Erasmus, who was not inclined to the miraculous, nor to urging an interpretation of the scriptural letter, had appreciated the Holy Communion, as Usteri said, “essentially as a memorial-, union- and community-celebration.” Zwingli was far from accepting the matter-of-fact conception with which the great Humanist regarded religious matters, but the removal of the eucharistic mystery in favor of the memorial celebration not only agreed with his fundamental belief of the social task of Christendom, but with his conception of the infinite majesty of God. He saw in the demand of the bodily

presence a derogation of the most sublime, and in the veneration of the sensual symbol, a relapse into Judaism. However, when Luther would forbid discussion in matters of faith, and in his typically Augustinian manner regard with distrust an explanation of the mysteries which suited the reasoning, Zwingli, although standing on scriptural ground, had no hesitation in assuming an agreement between the divine Word, the laws of nature, and human reflection wherever it suggested itself. Not alone in the question of the Holy Communion, but in his view of hereditary sin as a not condemning "Breste"; in his teaching of a revelation beneficial alike to the pagans; in the unitarian feature of his conception of God; in the almost complete absence of the old idea of the devil, which held so important a place with Luther;—in all this throbbed, as has been said, an "almost modern world of ideas." In a totally different manner than by Luther, the Middle Ages appeared to have been conquered by Zwingli.

The contrast was such a deep one that the quarrel over the Holy Communion, which connected with the strange interpretation established by Carlstadt in 1524, led quickly to a split. Zwingli, who did not, like Carlstadt, let Christ point to his body instead of the bread, explained the "is" in those words as "means," and he intervened in November, 1524, in his letter to the Reutlingen preacher Alber.

At first, it was the adherents of the new teaching who proceeded in a polemic manner; Zwingli, Oecolampadius, and Butzer, had spoken before Luther abandoned his contemptuous calm, to pounce upon these "visionaries" with his club. For the connection of this innovation with the native evangelistic radicalism was as much a certainty to him as its diabolical origin. "Under the papacy," he wrote, "Satan was nothing but flesh, so that also monks' cowls must be sacred; now he wants to be nothing but spirit, so that also Christ's flesh and word shall be nothing."

We must remember that in these years Luther had to suffer more than for a long time previous from those half physical, half psychical "temptations" which he sensed as absolute personal attacks of the wicked enemy. Thus before his participation in the polemic he had stated the alternative: "Summa, the one or the others must be Satan's servants, either they or we." The cool and scornful manner with which Zwingli, like his master Erasmus, treated the Reformer must have cut deep into Luther's heart. In a few explanations of a friendly nature, according to their titles, the Swiss leader refrained from falling into the boisterous tones of his opponent. He knew how to hurt the more poignantly when he opposed himself to the dreamer as the physician to a madman. Further, Zwingli persisted in declaring his opponent's un-

godliness, while he described the victory of his own teachings as secure, although the victor perhaps might have to weep.

Under such circumstances, the religious discussion to which Landgrave Philip invited the contending parties with their leaders at the head, had from the outset no prospect of success. True, Zwingli came with the greatest joy, in face of the danger involved in making his way partly through hostile Catholic territory. He departed secretly without having asked the Zurich town council for leave of absence. We know that not only theological and ecclesiastical interests drew him to Marburg. The Wittenbergers showed themselves all the more reluctant. "To bargain with Zwingli," so judged Melanchthon, "is absolutely futile." He would much rather have dealt with Oecolampadius, and would have liked to have "also a few papists, learned and sensible men," as impartial judges. A personal contact of the landgrave with Zwingli and his companions was thought by him and Luther to be very dangerous, since the young prince belonged, as Luther said, to the "sharp people," that is, was inclined to yield to the logic of common sense. If thus the mood on the Lutheran side was the most unfavorable that could be imagined, no inclination could be attributed to Zwingli of yielding in the matter. Besides a Zurich Humanist, he was accompanied by two councilors from Zurich

and Basel, the Strasburg statesman Jakob Sturm, Oecolampadius, Butzer, and the amiable Kaspar Hedio who, like his friend Capito, had been court preacher for a time, with Albrecht of Mainz, to join afterward the Strasburg reformatory circle. Luther appeared with a number of his faithful theological companions. Besides Melanchthon, there were his old friends Justus Jonas and Cruciger, Frederick Myconius from Gotha, Osiander from Nürnberg, Brenz from Hall, Stephen Agrikola from Augsburg, the superintendent from Eisenach, who inclined towards a union, Justus Menius and others.

After a preliminary discussion in which Luther joined Oecolampadius, and Melanchthon sided with Zwingli, the fight between the two leaders themselves opened on October 2. Luther had written the words, "This is my body," with chalk on the table, and once lifted the velvet cover, in order to show the opponents the place, "past which he verily could not get." In spite of a few sharp remarks, the discussion went on in a dignified manner, but little effect appeared on either side of the old familiar arguments. Finally Luther declared to the opponents that he would bid them farewell and commend them to the just judgment of God, and Oecolampadius reciprocated by way of reply. The landgrave succeeded so far that Luther, on the 4th of October, compiled fifteen articles which demonstrated the agreement of both parties in all funda-

mental questions, with the sole exception of the presence of Christ at the Holy Communion. However, the brotherly love and mutual admission to the sacrament, for which Zwingli asked imploringly, even with tears in his eyes, Luther would not grant; he yielded only Christian love, "inasmuch as everybody's conscience can give it," which he subsequently explained more clearly as the love in the gospel for one's enemy. He persisted in this determination; "you have a different spirit from ours."

Thus he departed without having made peace. Luther's principle, to sacrifice every human consideration to what he believed to be the truth, had once more attained a perfect triumph. We must, in order to appreciate this defect in his greatness, recall to the reader how this same rock-ribbed conviction and irreconcilableness in fighting unchained the ecclesiastical movement had led to its first victories. He whose force had once broken the Roman fetters now made a great breach in the unfinished edifice of the Reformation which was threatened by the gravest shocks.

There could be no further hesitation on the part of the evangelists in taking up in its entirety the open fight with their deadly enemy, the Hapsburg power. An effort had been made in Wittenberg, long before the discussion, to heap suspicion upon the alliance of the "restless Hessian youth" with

Prince-elect Johann and the Nürnbergers. In fact, the assemblies following one another at Rotach, Schwabach and Schmalkalden, held in connection with the Speyer agreement, finally led to the only result that the union with the Zwinglian empire cities and the Swiss, desired by Hesse, did not materialize. Luther had written seventeen articles for the Schwabach assembly which made the dogmatic contrast with the teaching of Zwingli appear far deeper than his Marburg maxims. Moreover, the Zwinglians were not far wrong when they saw in Melanchthon the man whose deep aversion did more than Luther's inflexibility to maintain the breach and to widen it.

In regard to the question concerning the Holy Communion, he had only adapted himself to the forceful friend after overcoming grave doubts. Less difficult for him was the political condemnation of people whose anti-imperial sentiment was, in his opinion, on a level with the tendencies of the Peasants' War.

Luther advocated for his prince-elect, in various ways, the unconditional duty of passive obedience; in this he betook himself to the domain of empire state law and denied to the individual empire prince, whose relation to the emperor he once compared to the position of a mayor to his sovereign, every right of resistance, but on the other hand, he wished to see the right of the principals to depose the em-

peror preserved. In truth, the conclusion had been reached by him that in matters of the gospel one should leave everything to God, and have nothing to do with man's wits and man's help. "Our Lord Christ," he once wrote to the prince-elect, "who has hitherto wonderfully helped your Electoral Grace without the assistance of the landgrave, yea, against the landgrave, will surely help again and advise."

This was a force of conscience and religious confidence to which one can hardly deny a certain pathetic greatness. But in the midst of the world's course, that which was naturally fitting for Luther became foolish and paltry for a prince. Was it right for the chosen politician calmly to content himself with the conviction that God would not forsake his own people, and nothing was to be feared from the emperor? Do we not also find on the Lutheran side, with the Saxonian jurists, a very important theological opinion which, with a reference to the Old Testament, made the protection of their subjects against an authority opposed to God a duty to Christian princes? Bugenhagen thought that if Saul intended forcibly to alienate the Israelites from the divine Word, "Samuel himself would have stabbed him to death, or would have antagonized him with all his power and the people behind him."

It must be said that afterward, however, Bugenhagen was converted to Luther's view. Plain self-defense, carried out with theocratic arguments had

been the procedure of the protesting factions in the last diet; if they had for years based their demands only on the gospel, trampled upon the positive right of the old Church, and defied the outspoken will of the emperor, they now had to contemplate plain submission or defense. Luther stated clearly in one of his verdicts the consequences of resistance: "We should have to drive out," said he, "the emperor and become emperor ourselves, for the latter would defend himself, and there would be no end of it until one side was completely downed." The two Marburg allies, Philip and Zwingli, were determined to do this. For the Swiss reformer, the liberation from the papal and the imperial yoke were inseparably connected with each other. "Papacy and imperialism," declared Zwingli, "are both from Rome." More than once he raised the question of what earthly concern Germany had with Rome. His fiery sympathies were devoted no less to the Greek and Roman champions of the republic than to the God-inspired heroes and prophets of the Old Testament; Christ himself, he explained, had used force against the desecrators of the temple, and if necessary, "we shall not hesitate to follow even the most cruel examples."

Compared with this landgrave, Philip had not altogether lost all regard for the emperor and the empire, but the thought of saving the gospel and of helping it to victory by enrolling all its believers

into the great coalition of anti-Hapsburg powers, had become a part of the reformer himself only since his connection with the Hessian court. Already, in 1528, Philip had tried to make alliances with half of Europe, and after that, with the approach of the emperor, the rumors of projects and unions hostile to heretics increased.

It was characteristic that the landgrave declared after the Marburg discussion that a division among the evangelists was madness and frenzy. It was not as if he had failed to take any interest in dogmatic questions, for he who made the impression upon Luther that "he could weave the most intricate ideas like play," felt as much at home in the Scriptures as any layman of those days when nearly everybody was well versed in the Bible. The readiness of Luther to sacrifice the whole future of the Reformation to the theological conscience, on account of "easily disputable matters," was really too much against the political conscience of the young prince for him to accept. Three ways were open, he wrote to the Strasburg confidant Sturm, "first to deny Christ; second, to bear everything with patience; and third, that we defend ourselves; in this way there is happiness and hope, in the others there is nothing at all."

Concerning this expedient, Zwingli and his princely friend had already come to an understanding in Marburg to spin further the woven threads

in correspondence, whose tone became more and more that of brotherly intimacy. "In the personal care of my good friend," thus the landgrave was accustomed to address his letters. Zwingli expressed the hope that God had "chosen Your Grace for great things of which I may think but dare not speak." Their plan of campaign was conceived on a grand scale, based upon a union of the German and Swiss evangelists among themselves and with France, Venice, Denmark and Geldern. As Zwingli expressed himself: "It would then be all one cause, one help, one will from the shores of the sea up to our land." The repatriation of Ulrich of Württemberg was to be the first shock of resistance to King Ferdinand and the alliance with Venice was to close the Alps to the emperor.

The time when this anti-Hapsburg coalition was to be called into being was most unfavorable. Charles V had made peace with all his opponents, and Suleiman had begun his retreat. In Venice, the offer of an alliance which was presented by a Zurich professor, made a very odd impression. What help could it bring when the old revolutionary Gaissmayr opened to the Zurich people prospects of a campaign against Tyrol? With none of the politeness of the Venetians, the French rejected Zwingli's offers, for whose profound meaning one of their delegates pretended not to possess sufficient understanding, with open derision. That electoral

Saxony and its strictly Lutheran companions made the acceptance of the Schwabach articles a preliminary condition of an alliance to the Highlanders and were rejected, cannot be surprising, for Luther had directly recommended to the prince-elect, in reference to the emperor, that he speak of his meritorious subjugation of the sacramental adherents. The majority of the highland cities themselves suddenly failed to show any inclination to exasperate the emperor by an alliance with the Swiss. All that the far-seeing plans of Zwingli and the landgrave accomplished was the conclusion of a Christian burghmote with Strasburg (January, 1530), and after many difficulties another burghmote between Hesse and Zurich and Basel (July, 1530), while Berne refused to join. On the other hand, Philip thought to promote his Württemberg plans by an alliance with the Catholic Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, while Denmark promised a few hundred horsemen. And with such modest means was to begin the fight against Charles V!

The incongruity of a great power policy such as Zwingli and Philip imagined and the narrow limits of their real power, had revealed itself in all its clearness. The failure was to have more fatal consequences for Zwingli than for the German Protestants, but it seemed that they, with an infatuation hardly credible, wished to deliver themselves defenselessly to the mercy of the emperor, whose

friendly and peaceful phrases were meant to be the reverse of all his previous actions, and calculated only for these political minors, without deceiving anybody else. Luther himself was not by far so formidable as in the time of the Worms diet; the hero of liberty of those days had converted himself, in the eyes of a part of the evangelists, into a "new pope."

V

AUGSBURG CONFESSION AND SCHMAL- KALDEN FEDERATION

AS the "Messiah of the parsons," the emperor set out on his journey to Germany. There can be no doubt that Charles V, who had instigated the eradication of heresy in the peace conclusions with the pope and France, and who had with the imperial crown again taken upon himself the obligations of a guardian of the Roman Church, was determined to settle once for all his account with the Protestants. Their delegates had to experience shameful treatment when they presented the Speyer protest to him in Italy. They were kept in custody for a time and one of them, Michael von Kaden, who handed the emperor a French booklet of reformatory contents, in the name of the landgrave, escaped a worse fate only through flight.

During his journey across the Alps, Charles received from the legate Campeggi quite a different document, that notorious recommendation that the conversion of heretics be brought about in a friendly way, while the recalcitrants should be exterminated by fire and sword. How stubborn these Germans

had always been was best shown in Charles the Great's fight with the Saxons; therefore, it was argued, one ought to provide for the gradual and thorough removal of all danger of infection by the institution of an Inquisition, after the model of the Spaniards. Charles's former father confessor, Garcia de Loaysa, who had been ordered to Rome to watch the pope, saw the only remedy in the application of force, "the real rhubarb for the disease."

It is significant that the zealous monk, as spiritual adviser, took the liberty of using straightforward language and reproached the most industrious of all monarchs with indolence and epicureanism. "Always," he said, "indolence and fame quarrel in your royal person with each other for the mastery." He wished that in Germany, easier than hitherto, "Your love for honor and fame may conquer your natural enemy, which consists in revelry and squandering the best time."

It would not have suited Charles's nature to apply the energetic means that were advised, nor even seriously to prepare them, without the last attempt to secure a peaceful submission of the Protestants had been made. In the convocation of the diet he indulged in the mildest and most friendly words concerning his intentions, "to hear all and everybody's opinions and views amongst ourselves in love and friendliness; to appreciate and to consider them

and to bring them in accord with the one Christian truth; to settle everything that has not been interpreted or done in the right way by either side, to accept and keep through all of us an only one and true religion and, like all of us, live and fight under the one Christ, we should all live in one community, church and unison." This sounded as if the emperor had reconciled himself to the former harshly rejected idea of a national council. The prince-elect of Saxony advocated this conception in relation to the other evangelistic princes. Moreover, he had been for a long time in negotiation with King Ferdinand, which, as was triumphantly told at the imperial court, had excited the mistrust of the landgrave; the legate was pleased that in politics as well as in matters of faith "the spirit of discord" had spread among the heretics.

Everything began promisingly on the Catholic side; at Innsbruck, where Georg of Saxony and the Bavarian dukes greeted the emperor, his Lutheran brother-in-law, the deposed Danish king Christian II, returned to the fold of the Church, and the court at Munich surpassed itself in courtesies of every description, in order to blot out the memory of its anti-Austrian tendencies. The emperor may have really believed that, in view of such a crushing preponderance which lay in the union of the Hapsburg power with the great majority of the empire principals, the handful of heretical princes and

towns would cease their resistance. In such a case he certainly would not let their former insubordination go unpunished. Ferdinand spoke quite directly to the heart of his brother when he pointed out to him that there were many causes for their punishment, "as often as it pleases you, legal reasons, without you need think of religion."

First of all, however, Charles was determined to show the German princes, including the protesting ones, a most friendly face. His total ignorance of their language, it is true, made close relation difficult, but he knew how to win men whenever it was to his interest to do so, despite his usual inaccessibility. Prince-elect Johann, Melanchthon, and other German observers naturally gained the impression in Augsburg that they were dealing with a gentleman whose nature was gentle and benevolent. For Luther he always remained "the dear pious, innocent emperor,"—Germany's true father whose wonderful success quite evidently came from God. "He must have a good guardian angel." The talkative Reformer interpreted his reticence to his advantage. "I contend he does not talk in a year as much as I do in a day." There is something pathetic in the picture of those pious men, inexperienced in the ways of the world, trying to love their emperor from the bottom of their hearts, just as they repudiated every suspicion against his character. They were reluctant to see

in him a deadly enemy of evangelism. It must be the fault, they said, of the "swarm of bees" of parsons who surrounded him, or of his hated brother, that Charles's "good heart" could not win the day. "Italian treachery," wrote Jonas, "is as far from him as the sky." But it was none the less a deceit when the emperor counted upon making the protesting princes waver. At the brilliant entry-festivities in June, Johann of Saxony remained standing erect when his fellow princes-elect made their genuflexion before the blessing of the "glove" of the legate. In the evening of the entry, the emperor invited him and the other evangelical princes to his residence. King Ferdinand acted as his interpreter, informing them that they must impose silence upon their preachers in future. Furthermore, they were obliged on the following day to attend the Corpus Christi procession.

The indignant delegates refused to obey: Margrave Georg roundly declared that he would rather kneel down and have his head chopped off than deny God and his Word, and the landgrave remarked: "Your Imperial Majesty's conscience is no master of our conscience." For their absence from the procession, in which the emperor walked bareheaded under the burning midday sun, they gruffly gave as their motive, the persistence in keeping the ecclesiastical Corpus Christi festival, which was "desperate malice, insolence and recklessness."

Never before had Charles listened to such language; it was a literal confirmation of what Campeggi had previously declared to him, that "the heretics were by nature stubborn to the extreme."

If we ask ourselves what could have prompted these German gentlemen to meet their rightful chief in so rough and defiant a manner, and to challenge a world of enemies with their totally inadequate forces, there is only one answer possible: they were prepared to stake everything upon their religious convictions. They here obeyed purely moral impulses; prosaic reflection over any advantages or disadvantages must have disposed them to yield to the expressed will of the emperor.

It is true that they had not fully abandoned the hope of vindicating their stand before the emperor and even before the Roman Church itself. According to his conception of the diet as a national council, Prince-elect Johann immediately after the arrival of the imperial convocation documents had a programme drawn up by his theologians for the Augsburg discussion, which placed the many-sided agreement of the new teaching with the old Church as much as possible in the foreground, and offered far reaching concessions, especially in the domain of the ecclesiastical constitution.

The intention, however, to bring Luther with them to the diet, at the head of the most eminent Saxonian theologians, could not be realized; the

outlaw, whom even the Nürnberg town council refused a safe escort through the town, had to remain in the stronghold of Coburg and content himself with following the course of events from a distance and often amid tremendous excitement. The affair developed rapidly after the arrival of the emperor. On June 20, the diet was inaugurated with high mass, which was attended by the prince-elect of Saxony, who had been appointed swordbearer to the emperor, and the landgrave. The nuncio Pimpinelli, one of the six cardinals present, refrained in his sermon from mentioning the name of Luther, but said that if one would not regard St. Peter with the keys, then St. Paul must strike with the sword.

The quarrel about preaching had in the meantime been adjusted through an imperial order, according to which only the preachers appointed by the emperor were allowed to mount the pulpit, and they must preach nothing except the pure, divine Word, that is the text of the gospels and epistles. Campeggi, though he had zealously set the emperor secretly against the heretics, used quite moderate language at his first appearance before the diet and, in accordance with the majority of the principals, spoke in favor of the precedence of the religious question before all the other subjects of debate. The Protestants were to read their articles of confession before the emperor and the empire on the 24th of June, but they were interrupted, chiefly at

the instance of King Ferdinand, and since they insisted upon reading, they were asked to go to the residence of the emperor. There, in an apartment of the episcopal palatine, the document which has become known to the world under the name of the "Augsburg Confession" was read aloud in German on the afternoon of the 25th of June, by the Saxonian chancellor, Christian Bayer, "publicly and distinctly, so that all the people present may be able to hear it."

The emperor, who is said to have expressed for the first time regret for his ignorance of the German language, received the articles in German and Latin versions and pledged the signing principals to desist from a printed publication. They were the same princes who had protested in 1529; Prince-elect Johann, with whom signed his son, Johann Friedrich, Margrave Georg, Ernest and Francis of Lüneburg, Landgrave Philip, Wolfgang of Anhalt, and, in addition, the towns of Nürnberg and Reutlingen. A feeling of proud satisfaction over this solemn confession of a cause which had been vainly declared in outlawry and under ban by the highest authorities, was undoubtedly evinced in many of the comments; Luther himself was "mightily pleased to have lived in this hour."

It must be said that the "Confession" was not his in the proper sense of the word; he had only given his sanction to the work of Melanchthon. "I

rather like it," he judged, on the 15th of May, "and I don't know what to improve or to alter in it; neither would this be seemly, as I cannot tread with such a soft and gentle step." Thus he cleverly characterized the contrast of his own defiant candor with the pliability of a theological diplomat. For such Melancthon, through the force of outer circumstances put in Luther's place, had shown himself to be, both in the confessional writing and during the Augsburg discussions. One could perhaps say that the Erasmic element in his learned nature had for the first time an opportunity to display itself fully as he, remote from the dominating proximity of a Luther, was able to act independently.

In that writing, which was originally not meant as a confession, but as an "apology,"—a defense against the Roman accusations,—he made every effort to offer a brotherly hand to the Catholics by emphasizing as much as possible the connection with the old Church, which was also steadfastly adhered to by Luther, and let the irreparable schismatic features either recede or be passed over in silence. So, for instance, the divine right of the papacy, the "character indelebilis" of priesthood, and the seven sacraments, remained undiscussed, while in the doctrine of the Holy Communion, such an ambiguous version had been chosen that the Catholic theologians could only complain of the absence of

an express acknowledgment of transubstantiation. The harsh predestination doctrine was dropped altogether; for the vindication through faith, and for the other evangelistic fundamental views, not only the evidence of the holy Scriptures, but that of the church fathers was invoked. Everything was done to show that the exclusion from the Church of those of the new creed was unjustifiable and to place the whole quarrel in the harmless light of an "error in a few traditions and abuses."

Yet, with all this, Melanchthon was afraid . "many a one may be offended at our candor." As if the offense could be avoided at all without plain submission! Ranke did not judge wrongly "that the teaching as it appears here, is still a product of the living spirit of the Latin Church, which even keeps still within the limits of it." However, even if many of those appreciative comments of Catholic princes and prelates which the Protestant tradition reports were authentic, it was yet a monstrous misjudgment of the essential nature of the Roman Church to assume the possibility of any other agreement than that which is customary between victor and vanquished.

Melanchthon had from the outset relied especially upon the fact that a complete withdrawal from the Zwinglians would not fail to make an impression upon the Catholics and particularly upon the emperor. The Lutheran sermons in Augsburg, which

were ended by the arrival of the sovereign, were chiefly devoted to the fight against the "sacramentarians" and "scriptstormers," while Landgrave Philip, to the great disappointment of the Lutherans, gave preference to the Zwinglian pulpit orator Michael Keller, and sharply repudiated the Lutheran calumnies of the Zwinglians as a revolutionary and warlike party. He reminded Melanchthon and Brenz, as "brothers in Christ," that their harassment could easily cause a bloody persecution of the Zwinglians and perhaps a war between emperor and princes on the one hand, and the Swiss, the towns and the peasants on the other hand.

In the eyes of Melanchthon the Zwinglians were, in spite of their vigorous measures against the Anabaptists, on an equality with the latter and therefore should be rigidly repressed by the Christian authorities. He declared in 1530 his conviction that the state should not only punish seditious, but blasphemous, teachings with death. Jakob Sturm complained in Augsburg that notwithstanding the efforts of Philip, his zealous correspondence with Zwingli remained closed from the ears and doors of the Zwinglians. In vain Butzer and Capito sought a personal contact with Melanchthon; he did not wish to compromise himself with such religiously and politically notorious persons. Consequently the non-Lutheran towns, which on account of their participation in the protest had to be answerable

also to the emperor, were compelled to present their own confession, which was quickly prepared on the 11th of July by the two Strasburg theologians; it applied to the four towns, Strasburg, Constance, Lindau and Memmingen, was given the name "Tetrapolitana," and aimed, in the version of the doctrine of the Holy Communion, to approach the Saxonian confession, at least in the manner of expression. Quite the opposite was the short personal vindication which Zwingli sent to the emperor, and a few other publications of the Swiss reformer in which he made the divergence between Zurich and Wittenberg purposely conspicuous. "One could," Melanchthon wrote to Luther, "indeed think he was mad."

The avowed leader of the Lutherans had in the meantime progressed further along the initially chosen path of a reconciliation with the Catholics, undaunted by the increasing scruples of his own co-religionists. "One may judge," said Maurenbrecher, "Melanchthon's attitude and procedure in Augsburg corresponded far more with the advice of Erasmus than with the sentiments and convictions of Luther." In fact, the aged prince of science strove by letter to admonish his old admirer Melanchthon, as well as the papal legate and other heads of the Catholics, to make peace, although his hope of an imperial invitation to Augsburg was not realized. Apart from the

fact that among the ecclesiastical princes present there were not many friends of such ironical tendencies, and opponents of a religious war, the immediate surroundings of the emperor were not by any means irreconcilably disposed.

On the Protestant side was regretted the death of Gattinara, which occurred before the convention of the diet. Despite his recently conferred dignity of a cardinal, he was looked upon as a man of peace and a friend of ecclesiastical reforms; but Charles's father confessor, the Franciscan Juan de Quintana, and the secretary Alfons Valdés, whom we already know, were men who could be argued with, as Melanchthon learned to his great satisfaction when he ventured near the "Hispanian scriveners." It was by no means his fault that the Protestant princes did not, as he wished, have the question of the confession settled according to the will of the emperor, "in seclusion and quietness," but succeeded in carrying through the solemn reading. Because of this his mediation proposals, brought by the emperor to Campeggi, went to Rome. Besides the lay communion cup and priest marriage, he seems to have asked for the alteration of the mass canon, and a discussion concerning other controversial questions to be dealt with in the council. These demands, although partly advocated by legates, were rejected in Rome at the same time that Melanchthon strove to win the representative of the pope by

cringing subservience. For was it not denying every vestige of Protestant sentiment when he wrote to Campeggi that he and his friends fully agreed in all dogmas with the Roman Church and were prepared to obey her, "if she by virtue of the lenience which she has shown at all times to all people, should silently overlook or concede a few things which we, even if we wanted to, could not alter?" "We respect," he repeated, "the authority of the Roman pope and the entire ecclesiastical constitution with all piety, if only the Roman pope will not disown us. From no other cause are we so hated in Germany than that we defend the teachings of the Roman Church with the greatest constancy." The last sentence was made clearer in a letter to the imperial preacher Ægidius, in which Melancthon declared that he had striven for peace so zealously only for the reason of preventing the threatening union of the Lutherans with the Zwinglians.

One cannot be surprised that such a temporizing policy failed to win any gratitude from either side. While the papists thought the pliant Wittenberg professor, who was not blessed with an affluence of earthly possessions, might be mercenary, a deep animosity spread among the zealous Protestants, and not alone among those of Zwinglian sentiments, against the "sensible, worldwise, disheartened Philippus," who had become more childish than a

child itself. Even from Venice, where his letter to Campeggi had been read, repeated warnings reached him from an Italian adherent of evangelism. But, painfully as he felt these struggles and excitements, which were repugnant to his very being, he clung stubbornly to the hope of yet being able to bring about an agreement, which seemed to him the only escape from the dreaded religious war.

After the confutation of the evangelical confession written by Eck, Faber, Cochlaeus and other Catholic theologians had been delivered, early in August, and acknowledged by the emperor as a sufficient refutation, with the distinct threat by him that either the Protestants must submit or he would discharge the duties of his office as protector and patron of the Church, Melanchthon, seconded by Brenz and other theologians, repeated his proposals for a compromise, to which a certain similarity with the letter of Charles V must be admitted. His most important offer was the return of the Protestants to the jurisdiction of the bishops, and he was prepared to treat his named demands as only temporary concessions until the assembly of the council. Besides the desire for peace, the defects of the improvised Lutheran church régime also strongly suggested the idea of the episcopal authority.

Among the German bishops who were present, a certain opposition rose against carrying the matter with the Protestants to the extreme, as King Ferdi-

nand, electoral Brandenburg, Duke Georg, the Bavarian brothers, the cardinal of Salzburg, and many other princes would have liked to do. The three ecclesiastical princes-elect, the bishops of Augsburg and Trient, partly influenced by Erasmic tendencies, partly by political considerations, were averse to a forcible solution. Once more, on August 16, a committee of fourteen princes, jurists and theologians from both parties was instituted to make possible the impossible. Melancthon, Brenz and the Hessian preacher Schnepf readily came to an agreement over a number of points with Eck, Wimpfeling and Cochlaeus, and on the Saxon side oral confession and fasting did not appear to be unacceptable. The wrangle came with the Holy Communion. The Catholics offered the Lutherans the concession of an utraquistic communion until the assembling of the council, with the consent of the pope; but on condition that on the evangelistic side it should be expressly declared equivalent, and that the usage of either the one or the other form of the sacrament should be without special meaning. The Protestants would have foregone an important integral part of their own doctrine as readily as Melancthon would have renounced the whole liberation from the outward rule of the hierarchy, just as in his agony he would have bowed to harder conditions before the drawn sword of the emperor, but there was a limit to everything, beyond which

his confessional adherents would not follow him. "We have hitherto steadfastly refused it," wrote his faithful Brenz, "may the Lord uphold us in our persistency."

In the face of this, Melanchthon labored in a smaller committee of six members, who made a last attempt at an agreement over his favorite idea,—the establishment of an episcopacy. But louder and louder rang the warning calls from Luther, long "tired of the diet," sent from his Coburg asylum to the friends and princes. Sincerely as he appreciated the good intention of Melanchthon, he clearly saw through the sophisticated "philosophy" of the "Yonker Philippche," whose alternately faint-hearted and optimistic calculations crushed all simple greatness and strength of resolution. "You have," Luther wrote to Spalatin, "begun a work of wonder; that is, the union between the pope and Luther. However, the pope does not want to and Luther declines. If you accomplish it in spite of both, then I will follow your example and reconcile Christ with Belial."

The jurisdiction of the bishops, he thought, would not be any other than that of "Master Hansen," that is, the henchman. He could not contain himself, to use a German expression referring to the foreign tricks of the pope and his legate. "Luther is free"; this was his consolation, in case the Augsburg friends should concede something against the

gospel; "free also may be the Macedonian. Be brave and act manly." By the "Macedonian" was meant Landgrave Philip, in the letters of the Wittenbergers. His and Prince-elect Johann's firmness had in reality made good what Melanchthon and his companions tried to spoil. "Our princes," wrote Brenz on one occasion, "are firm in their confession to the gospel and whenever I reflect upon their stoicism, I blush with shame that we little people are so much afraid of the Imperial Majesty."

It made a tremendous impression when the landgrave left Augsburg secretly on the 6th of August, without having received the imperial permission for his departure. Immediately previous to this he had declared to the emperor's face that he would persist in the presented confession if he had to give up his life for it. "Stick to it, pious ploughman, stick to it," thus Zwingli encouraged his princely ally, who gave him hope of a campaign as soon as the "little flowers would blossom again."

Fundamentally different as was the prince-elect of Saxony from the passionate landgrave, he was hardly inferior to him in firmness concerning matters of the gospel. In truth it was feared for a time on the Protestant side that Melanchthon would corrupt him, but the old gentleman, who made a copy of Luther's little catechism himself, would,—although in religious matters he did not venture to have an opinion of his own like the landgrave,—

never have proceeded without the consent of his Doctor Martinus to a decision over the future of evangelism. To him the whole matter was very simple, in spite of all "fencing tricks" of his theologians; "there are," he said, "two ways,—to deny God or the world; let everybody think what is best."

Luther remarked later that the Holy Ghost himself had changed the peaceable prince at Augsburg into a hero. Melancthon, however, thought it incomprehensible that the Protestant princes, "in strange negligence and in a certain mute indignation," did not pay their attention to the emperor and to the moderate Catholics in favor of peace. There was no lack of threats against the princes themselves; the choleric Joachim of Brandenburg was said to have remarked that if electoral Saxony would not abandon the new teaching, the emperor would jeopardize his country and his people, his life, his honor and his chattels, including men, women and children.

It was the extravagance of the opponents' demands which challenged the resistance even of the most peaceable of the Protestants. The emperor thought, since they joined in the promotion of a council, that he could expect them to return to the old creed until it convened, whereas they had in their minds the maintenance of their condition at the time. The discussions dragged through the

greater part of September; electoral Saxony was not disinclined to leave the administration of the confiscated monasteries to the emperor until the council assembled, but on the Catholic side this concession was immediately answered by further demands, such as the restitution of the old ecclesiastical mass celebration. Still Melanchthon hoped to the last to be able to make an agreement possible by carrying out his favorite idea, an unconditional surrender of the sacramentarians, but finally the emperor and the Catholic majority came forward with a resolution for the final decree of the diet. This gave the Protestants, who had been thoroughly refuted through the Bible; until April 15 to decide whether or not they would yield to the Church in regard to the points yet in dispute,—that is, until the opening of the council. Moreover, they were not to publish anything new in matters of creed before the date named, and should not prevent their subjects from attending the old divine service or suspend the same, and they should proceed against the Anabaptists and sacramentarians, together with the emperor and the empire. The Protestants would have, as Virck remarked, pronounced their own death sentence by accepting such a final decree, which Spalatin called “lying, false and cunning.” They protested before the head of the empire, as they had protested in 1529.

The break was complete; with tearful eyes, but

firmly resolved, Prince-elect Johann bid farewell to his emperor. The remark of the Saxonian chancellor Brueck was later repeated: "Very well, it cannot be otherwise, but we know that all the gates of hell could not do anything against our teaching;" and the emperor, who heard it, asked "Whatever is that,—'gates of Hell?'"

Charles V tried after the departure of the princes to intimidate the towns, whose separation in Augsburg had developed much further than a year before in Speyer. Their old cardinal fault of mutual distrust had increased through the confessional differences, but among those with Zwinglian sentiments were opposing views which were difficult to overcome, while Nürnberg and Reutlingen kept their union with the Saxonian confession secret from the Lutheran sister towns, for the time. The representative of Ulm, Besserer, believed himself to be in a highly impenetrable policy; Biberach had therefore instructed its delegate to join, after the example of Ulm, either the Catholic, the Lutheran, or the Zwinglian side; Memmingen seemed willing to remain a "Bethlehem" of evangelism, despite the dropping out of larger towns; Nördlingen, however, was under the tutelage of the characterless preacher Billicanus, who had renounced his new creed errors in Augsburg, before Campeggi and a Mainz inquisitor.

One would have thought that with such a rupture

the not sparing imperial words would have given pleasure. Charles V remarked that the fist was wanted for it, and active go-betweens cautioned the hearers against taking such remarks as empty phrases. Landgrave Philip believed for a time that an attack was imminent. Nevertheless a number of towns had the courage to offer open resistance. These were Kempten, Heilbronn, Windsheim and Weissenburg, which held to the Nürnbergers, Frankfort, Ulm and Hall, and,—to the vexed astonishment of the emperor,—even Augsburg. The resolve of the last-named town, which had Charles V within its walls and its old deadly enemy Bavaria at the gates, was also a surprise as well as an encouragement to the Protestants. In Ulm the great majority of the guilds decided against the decree, after the mayor had threatened, in case of a refusal, to inflict death and destruction on the town, and kidnap the women and children; and, in the event of a consent against their conscience, they should be visited with God's wrath and eternal perdition. Thus all the large German empire cities joined in the princely opposition. Hardly anything remained for the emperor to do except to proceed in the final decree of the diet published November 19. The Worms edict was to be carried out, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction perfectly restored, and the church property kept in its present state. The supreme court was pledged to the final decree.

Thus the Augsburg assembly closed with the declaration of war of emperor and empire against the protesting principals. If the final decree were enforced, there would be no basis for the assertion that the individual empire state stood on legal ground with its ecclesiastical alterations, and that it could be answerable for its doings to His Imperial Majesty. But it is a question whether the emperor really intended to draw his sword at once against the defaulters.

We are by no means in a position to guess the real intentions of the taciturn gentleman, however much the presumption that he did not unwillingly keep putting off the final decision would correspond with his nature, which disliked every rapid advance and welcomed every postponement. Besides the multiplicity of his tasks and the variety of his interests, this peculiarity of Charles V was of the greatest advantage to the opponents, and not least to the German Protestants. And who would deny that, besides the German Reformation and the elevation of Ferdinand as the Roman king, other burning questions claimed the attention of the emperor and demanded careful examination before every decisive step by him?

The danger of another Turkish attack constantly threatened, and in connection with it were Charles's futile endeavors to enter into truly friendly relations with his old antagonist,

King Francis, who at last, in the summer of 1530, had got back his sons and led the emperor's sister Eleanor to the altar. People discussed the closer family connection already alluded to at the conclusion of peace, but the return of the Spanish emigrant and French agent Rincon from Constantinople, the stirrings of many dissatisfied elements in Italy, the vexatious matrimonial affair of Henry VIII,—all lent fresh color to the suspicion against France. An ambassador of King Ferdinand heard in Rome that Francis I contemplated more eagerly than ever the acquisition of Milan. His offer to take supreme command in the naval war against the Ottomans excited the greatest mistrust.

There was another matter which the emperor had especially at heart, but which could not be accomplished without the consent of France. The general council, which just then was, in his opinion, more necessary than at any other time, naturally met in Rome with an enmity which, if veiled, was all the more obstinate. The assertion was made that Clement VII had, on account of his illegitimate descent or from other personal reasons, dreaded the council. Such an aversion, however, was in the nature of the papacy as it had recently developed itself, despite the favorable experience with the last ecclesiastical assembly. "The Florentine and lateranensic remembrances," said Maurenbrecher,

"could not be compared with the reminiscences of Basel."

Parliamentary institutions are, and always will be, embarrassing to autocratically inclined authority. Thus Clement, according to Loaysa's report, abhorred the very word council as he did the name of the archenemy and was, after he had recognized the unbending will of the emperor, pushed more and more to the side of France, whose repugnance toward the imperial project was soon displayed openly.

Nothing was more drastic than the arguments with which Charles's former father confessor, now Cardinal Loaysa, advocated the necessity of a simple toleration of heresy. He was convinced "that the heretics cannot be cured in any other way from all the previous ones, since Christ died," that is, by force. But as the Turkish peril was far more acute, he continued to advise the emperor to let them be heretics and beasts for the time, and remain hand and glove with them; Charles should content himself with the fact that they would serve him faithfully, "even if they may be worse than devils in relation with God." He should not concern himself with their souls, which were descending into hell, but only convert their bodies to obedience to him.

Pope Clement himself had, while Campeggi was trying to incite the emperor to war, contemplated

the previously rejected possibility of concessions to the Protestants; one of his confidants declared in November, 1530, that priest matrimony and the lay cup were admissible. Such a defeat of the ecclesiastical principles was deemed more tolerable than the fatal council.

Besides these difficulties, which resulted from the general state of the world's affairs, the relation of the emperor to the Catholic empire states was not such as to make them ready to follow him in their entirety into a religious war. Since the worldlies in the diet had brought to light again their old complaints against Rome and the clergy, and roused Campeggi's horror at such a "rebellion" in their own camp, so also the antagonism of the Bavarians against Hapsburg, besides the peaceable inclinations of the bishops, proved unfavorable to a policy of war for which practically only electoral Brandenburg and Georg of Saxony showed any real zeal.

Duke Louis of Bavaria approached the Saxons in Augsburg in order to work in unison with them against the election of Ferdinand as Roman king. This election in favor of which all of the princes-elect except Saxony were won by well known means, was held in Cologne on January 5, 1531; Frankfort, not alone because of the plague epidemic, but on account of its heresy, was not deemed entitled to this privileged honor. Still, in Augsburg, Charles had solemnly invested his brother with the tenure of

the Austrian dominions, Württemberg included; he emphatically wished to impress upon the consciousness of the empire that, as he once wrote to Ferdinand, "both we are one and the same." Only in certain important cases, as the investiture of banner tenures, regulations for the monopolies, declaration of the imperial ban and alliances, the emperor reserved to himself a co-decision. Electoral Saxony's protest against the royal election, presented by the young Duke Johann Friedrich at Cologne, did not meet with immediate success. The exclusion of the heretic from the election had been previously debated, and in this case a bull had been prepared by Clement which denied the heretic the electoral vote, while a second bull was sent by the obliging pope, in which Johann's admission to the election was sanctioned.

After the new king had pledged himself, in his election capitulary, to the Augsburg final decree, and concluded with the five princes-elect a defensive alliance for ten years, in which the eventual punishment of a seditious on account of the election was not forgotten, there was considered in the imperial state council, on the occasion of the coronation in Aix-la-Chapelle, the proposal of a further alliance with all Catholic empire principals, "not only to meet an attack, but also to forestall the digressors."

But the "digressors" were the quicker this time. We know the warlike sentiments of the landgrave

and his union with Henry of Brunswick in favor of the Württembergers. He had got in communication with Leonhard von Eck some time before, for hostile as they regarded each other on the religious question, the Protestants eagerly united with the Bavarians in the yearning of the latter to decide "how one could nullify the election and thwart King Ferdinand so that he could not get any authority in the empire."

More important, however, than all these schemes, which were effective only later, was the renunciation by electoral Saxony of the hitherto maintained principle of passive obedience. The decisive word had really been spoken by Luther in Coburg: "If a war results from it," he wrote to Jonas in September, 1530, "let it be war; we have prayed and done enough."

At that time Butzer happened to be on the way to effect an agreement through a personal meeting with the great Wittenberger, in spite of the disturbing Augsburg experiences. Luther had greeted the indomitable mediator in Marburg as a "cunning rascal," but none the less Butzer succeeded in awakening in his opponent, who told him he would readily die three times if this strife could be ended, a belief in the possibility of an agreement. "Certainly," he remarked to his people, "one had to give the matter the appearance," as if Luther had conceded nothing. Soon after this, Count Albrecht of

Mansfeld, who was left in charge by Prince-elect Johann in Augsburg, entered into confidential negotiations with the Strasburgers concerning a resumption of the alliance project, which had been previously frustrated in Schmalkalden. What had separated these Saxons from the Highlanders,—the latter's alliance with the Swiss,—was now, in its reversal, to benefit the evangelical confederacy. Already it was discussed how the North German princes could help their allied towns with horsemen and how, in return, the latter could assist the former with foot soldiers. The Augsburg events had suddenly dispelled the doubts of the Lutherans. Above all, Luther himself, although reluctantly, changed over to the view of the Saxonian theologians, whose arguments had in the past year left him perfectly calm. He allowed himself to be taught by them that the emperor was not a monarch in the full meaning of the term, but held such a relation to the empire principals as the old Roman consuls did to the senate, the doge of Venice to the council, or the bishop to his chapter. Still less was he able to meet effectively their application of general law rules of purely civil proceedings to questions of state law. As a matter of fact, he advised his princes-elect to participate in the election and not to abet the landgrave in his warlike inclinations. But he added with a sigh: "O Lord, I am too childish in the affairs of the

world." One can recognize distinctly enough the influence of a letter in which the landgrave had explained to the Reformer the legality of a fight against the emperor, in Luther's "warning to his dear Germans against the Augsburg final decree." Although to him still Charles was "the noble blood, a sheep among the wolves," the defense against the papal bloodhounds was warrantable self-defense. The landgrave reminds us in that letter of the Old Testament hero and the Hussites, of Judas Macabæus, and Ziska. "Let it go then," he cried with the fire of the first years of the Reformation, "and let the worst come, be it war or revolution, just as God's wrath decides." Defiantly he styled himself the "German prophet to the delight and pleasure of my papists and asses."

Before the election of King Ferdinand the evangelistic confederacy was established in an assembly of Protestant lords and town delegates in Schmalkalden (December 22-31, 1530), upon the basis of the Swiss-Hessian drafting of the burghmote of 1529: It was notable that from this union, which was made for six years, the emperor was not excluded. Although it said the federation was "not directed against the emperor or anybody else," that is, not meant to be aggressive, its proper purpose was the duty of defense against every attack upon one of its members on account of the divine Word, evangelical teaching, the creed, or any other

pretext. The first ratification was made between electoral Saxony, Hesse, Lüneburg, Wolfgang of Anhalt, two counts of Mansfeld, and the towns of Magdeburg and Bremen. The bravery of electoral Saxony, which the Highlanders could not praise enough, was in sharp contrast to the anxious attitude of Margrave Georg and the Nürnbergers, who had in the meantime again received advice from their theologians. "There are," Butzer wrote to Zwingli, "many otherwise excellent and pious people who, from exaggerated awe for some divine words which they do not understand, yield to their scientists more than is necessary."

The Highlanders did not join immediately, since the removal of the vexatious inequality of the church rites was made a preliminary condition for them by the Lutheran side in Schmalkalden. One can say that the indispensable completion of the Schmalkalden Federation depended upon the result of the struggle which the North German Lutherans had to make with Zwingli for the Suabian empire cities. For while electoral Saxony now desired the addition of the Swiss and offered his hand in case they would accept the "Tetrapolitana," while Luther, Melanchthon, and Jonas showed to their prince-elect the prospect of a "Concordia," Zwingli persisted in his former proclaimed opinion that one could only enter into a union with the Lutherans in such manner as they themselves were

united with the papists against the Turks. He called the Lutheran Holy Communion "an almost more than papistic mass," and rejected Butzer's "wretchedly fought for union," whereupon the latter broke off all discussions of the matter with him.

Quite in Zwingli's sense, an assembly of the Swiss burghmote cities defeated at Basel, in February, 1531, the acceptance of the German alliance. Almost simultaneously an assembly of Suabian council delegates and clergymen in Memmingen protested against the uniformity of "Christian ceremonies" mooted by Luther which, unknown in the old Church, was introduced only by Charles the Great, to oblige the pope.

In spite of this Butzer and his co-religionists succeeded in reaching an understanding with the North German princes, through "decidedly concealing" the existing dogmatic contrast from the world and hiding it especially behind a formal approach to their Holy Communion. This was taught even before the Wittenbergers. Melancthon, for whom now the landgrave was no more the "Macedonian" but the "Heraclid," overcame his hitherto cherished aversion to the "lying and painted-over syncretism" to that extent that he wrote a letter to the Strasburg mediator. It availed nothing that the Nürnbergers now treated the "almost cunning little man, the little Butzer" with the same distrust that

they had felt in the past. The first official charter, as it were, of the Schmalkalden Federation, which was written on February 27, 1531, by electoral Saxony, mentioned not only the foregoing participants, the electoral prince Johann Friedrich and the dukes Philip, Otto and Francis of Brunswick, but the highland towns of Strasburg, Ulm, Constance, Reutlingen, Memmingen, Lindau, Biberach, Isny, and the Hanseatic town Lübeck, although they did not set their seal to the alliance charter until later. Before this, a second assembly met in Schmalkalden at the end of March and the beginning of April, and confirmed the harmony established between the princes and the Highlanders. The Saxonian delegate Minckwitz expressed his wish to the towns that the agreement of Luther with Butzer concerning the sacrament should be uniformly announced through the predicants to the people, and should "be spread over all the world."

On a further federation day at Frankfort in June, Brunswick and Göttingen joined, and in the following winter Goslar and Eimbeck did the same. If, however, the exclusive union of lords and towns related to one another in creed distinguished this new application of the union principle which had been exercised in the empire long before, in similar alliances, new combinations were added in the beginning with the purpose of letting the evangelical cause have the help of Catholic powers in and out-

side of the empire, on the basis of the common interests of both. A protest was made against the Augsburg final decree with reference to a free council with France and England; and Francis I willingly declared his readiness to favor the traditional "protection of German liberty." In August, 1531, Leonhard von Eck met the landgrave in Geissen. It was the same unscrupulous policy of the Swiss-Hessian projects of 1529.

It should be said that in the Schmalkalden Federation the antagonism between an aggressive and a deliberate element made itself noticeable from the very beginning. The relation of Zurich and Berne could be compared in a certain sense to the position of the landgrave to electoral Saxony. Philip was filled with overpowering enthusiasm when the federation was really established; he thought of realizing at once his favorite plan of the repatriation of Ulrich of Württemberg when, in the spring of 1531, news came of another attack by the Turks.

No less a man than the powerful renegade Gritti had offered an alliance with the sultan and Zápolya against Ferdinand. Philip thought he could reckon with certainty upon the Bavarians. "They should not," he wrote to Eck, "be savages, if you like to become king and have it your own way." But at the Saxonian court the unchristian thought of exploiting the Turkish danger was repudiated with indignation, all the greater as the fear of a possible

procedure of the emperor had gradually diminished.

Charles V, on the contrary, had endeavored since the spring of 1531 to reach a provisional understanding with the Protestants by admitting the mediation attempts of the princes-elect of Mainz and the Palatinate, and convoking a diet for the autumn. After long hesitation the emperor granted a concession urgently demanded by the Protestants and favored by Ferdinand. By virtue of the Augsburg final decree, the supreme court had opened a legal war against the heretics by investing a number of proceedings for the restitution of secularized church possessions, and restoration of the abolished ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

A termination of these proceedings, which had been very annoying to the Protestants, was granted by Charles on July 8, to continue at least for the next few months, until the diet assembled. What he heard from his counselor Cornelius Schepper, whom he had delegated to Germany, only strengthened him in his peaceable intentions, to which the threatening news of the attitude of France perhaps contributed more than anything else. Ecclesiastical princes, like Philip of Speyer and Christoph Stadion of Augsburg, warmly recommended as a concession the toleration of the priest marriage and the lay cup. Stadion remarked that if he only had the Lutherans in hand, he would easily calm the Zwinglians, and Schepper ventured

to hope that Melanchthon could be won over by himself.

There can be no doubt of the fact that in Saxony the inclination for a Swiss alliance had completely disappeared again. The landgrave, who still clung to the connection with Zwingli and planned the entrance of the Swiss into the alliance, perhaps even at the cost of the resignation of Saxony, could not overcome the Saxonian aversion after the Frankfort assembly. He complained that this was the consequence of the friendly answer given by the emperor.

On the other hand, the violent separation of the South German towns from the confessional Wittenberg domain of power seemed in 1531 to be unavoidable, for Zwinglianism, under the auspices of Strasburg, had irresistibly conquered the Suabian towns. Before the Memmingen synod, which persisted among other things in the introduction of church discipline, the people of Reutlingen had removed their altars and images; in the summer Ulm followed and there, under the personal supervision of Butzer, Blarer and Oecolampadius, the "destruction of the antichrist" was consummated with the same vandalism as in Zurich. Even Syrlin's famous wood carvings were mutilated and two organs smashed.

From Ulm these three reformers went to Biberach, in order to continue their campaign

against "idols and mass." Blarer, described by Butzer as "apostle of the Suabian country as far as the Constance bishopric reaches" similarly accomplished the reorganization of the church in Esslingen. Meanwhile "Butzerism" conquered in Augsburg, which for a long time had been disrupted by religiously opposing forces, and Lutheranism, whose chief representatives had to withdraw, was replaced by Strasburg predicants. The elector of Saxony helped with reawakened harshness to drive the Highlanders into the arms of the Swiss. "It was," said Escher, "a moment for Zwingli as it would never again present itself so favorably; as a ripe fruit now seemed to descend into his lap which through his refusal in February had been more remote than ever."

But Zwingli had become another man. Instead of being "chief guardian over the whole confederacy," after the wish of his faithful friends, he saw his reign even in Zurich, where it could for a time have been called unlimited, seriously menaced by a steadily growing opposition. Apart from the never wholly suppressed resistance of the aristocratic elements, a republican dissatisfaction also appeared with the dominant position of this one man. Under the régime of Zwingli and his "more clandestine secret-mongers," the votings of the people seemed to be doomed to disappear altogether. The failure of his grandly conceived evangelistic

policy only increased the discontent, beside which Berne was by no means willing to play the part which Zwingli wished to assign to it,—that was, to manage the confederacy together with Zurich, “like two oxen before the wagon.”

Thus he expressed himself in a programme of the new organization of the confederacy, in which he was progressing from his theocratic standpoint to the modern idea of a strong federation authority proportioned to the strength of population, and intended to deprive the Catholic rural cantons of the influence which they had possessed. He estimated the ratio of Zurich and Berne to the original cantons as six to one, and made the frank comment that to him who could not be master it was fair that he should be a servant.

Instead of the harmony demanded by him, the grave crisis of 1531 brought to light a jealous estrangement between the two towns; “each part,” judged Vadian, “is afraid that the other would become too powerful for it.” Not without the fault of the Zurich policy, from the so-called “Muessers-war” of those days was born the cause of a catastrophe which brought the whole Swiss reformation to the verge of destruction.

A Milanese adventurer, the castellan de Musso had established for himself around his little stronghold on a rock commanding the Como lake, a sort of “Tyranny,” after the style of the *condottieri* of the

olden days, but when he pushed his enmity against the neighboring federals to the extent of murdering one of their delegates, and invaded the Veltlin territory, the federals as sympathizers with the confederacy asked the latter for help. Since the "Meusser" (de Musso) had long been looked upon as an imperial partisan, and the refusal of the Catholic cantons to join in the war against him coincided with repeated warnings of the warlike intentions of the emperor, Zurich stamped the affair,—which according to the opinion of the cantons "did not touch the creed by a hair,"—as the beginning of the anti-evangelican reaction planned by Charles V and the Five Places as conspirators with Hapsburg. But before the campaign of Swiss and Milanese forces against the castellan had brought his collapse, the bloody decision had fallen in Switzerland, to which the Five Places were directly challenged by a provisional blockade instituted against them by the towns of the burghmote. Zwingli had vehemently disapproved of this spiteful measure, but in vain; the consciousness of his vanishing authority induced him to ask in July for a discharge from his various offices and, although he yielded to the request of the Zurich people to stay with them, his former joyful and influential participation in political work was all over. One can imagine that under such circumstances the desire of the Suabian towns for a closer attachment to the members of

the burghmote did not meet with the ready acceptance of the latter, and that Zurich agreed only reluctantly to a discussion of the Württemberg affair proposed by Hesse. The Five Places were all the more resolute, being exasperated to the utmost by the cutting off of all supplies, but they were not humiliated. Their request for assistance from the pope and the Hapsburg brothers, from Milan and Savoy, met with no material success, whereupon they undertook the attack themselves. Simultaneously with the declaration of war on October 9, their advance guard began its march.

The people of Zurich were completely taken by surprise. They had only about 1,200 men, near Kappel, when the main force of the enemy, 8,000 strong, advanced on October 11 from Zug. The main banner of the town, around which about 1,500 men had hurriedly rallied, joined the small advance guard, while the opponents, ignorant of the weakness of the defenders in Zurich, had until then confined themselves to artillery fighting. However, when a scout discovered the small number of "heretics and communion cup thieves," the result was no longer in doubt, especially as the defenders had neglected to cover their retreat. Despite their desperate bravery they were crushed by the superior forces.

Among the "bravest and best" who spurned to seek safety in flight, was Zwingli himself. He

participated in the campaign as field chaplain and steadfastly held his own in the midst of the fierce conflict. Twice he was brought to the ground, but rose again. After being struck a third time he was unable to regain his feet. Still living, he was found on the battlefield; when he refused the order to surrender, a captain of the mercenaries of Unterwalden gave him the death blow. A court martial of the enemy condemned his corpse to mutilation and burning.

Thus died Zwingli, like many of the heroes of the Old Testament and the ancient world, for his God and his country. His lot was that which he had praised as the most beautiful fate that could befall a man:

“Wann eerlich nieman hinnen ruckt,
Darm der in tapferer that verzuckt.”

The tragedy of historical heroism was not spared Switzerland's greatest son. One has with justice indicated in Zwingli the numerous and marked contradictions between an almost modern freedom of thought and a frequently repellent harshness of practice. In him met Renaissance and Reformation, humanity and theocracy, love for the confederacy and the divine Word. He knew how to fashion an adjustment of such contradictions into a higher unity for his own being. In his heaven was no place for the Roman pope, but abundant room for Socrates, Aristides, Cato, Scipio, Heracles

and Theseus; he lived in the positive conviction that it could not possibly harm the confederacy if the divine Word was established. But that the attempt to make reality subservient to a theocratic ideal led to the gravest conflicts and disappointments, his experiences could not leave any doubt. He atoned in the noblest manner for his complicity in this catastrophe.

Zwingli's fall contributed to the fight a decisive nature which went far beyond its purely military significance. While there was no question of a complete annihilation of the Zurich power, the moral impression of that fateful day was a tremendous one in Zurich as well as beyond the confines of the city. The conduct of the campaign of the evangelists did not gain any moral support by the union with the Berner fighting forces. After a second ignominious defeat in the vicinity of Zug, they yielded to a peace which, concluded with Zurich on November 16 and with Berne eight days later, proclaimed the nullification of the evangelical burghmote and the protection minorities in the common districts; the rest, however, maintained the principle of the parity of the two creeds, but the old faith was sharply described as the "true Christian one." In a number of common districts and free offices the Catholic cult was forcibly established, the Zwinglians driven out and many killed.

This reaction extended to St. Gall, where merely

the town and county of Toggenburg persisted in the evangelical confession, and to Solothurn, while in Glarus both parties lived peacefully from the first. The evangelization of the confederacy as Zwingli had imagined it had failed absolutely, and the religious schism of Switzerland had become an unalterable fact.

The more thoughtful among the victors had no idea of a complete restoration of the old Church. In the same way that Zwingli had vainly reckoned upon French assistance, the Five Places saw themselves dependent only upon their own strength; and the earnest endeavor of King Ferdinand to induce his brother to take advantage of the victory of the Swiss Catholics was futile. In vain he pointed to the fact that the interests, not alone of the creed, but of the House of Austria-Burgundy, demanded that the emperor, as "the head and body of the Christian religion," should seize this golden opportunity to end the religious quarrel and make himself master of Germany. Charles V confined himself to supporting the Five Places with subsidies, and was joined by the pope, himself full of fear of a possible victory and a Rome campaign of the Protestants. Ferdinand's opinion that the German evangelists would remain weak and powerless without Switzerland, which was their head and their strength, did not seem to be shared by the imperial court. On the contrary, the feeling was strong to restrain the

German Protestants from participating in the Swiss religious war, in which there was plainly great danger, considering the undeniably bad intentions of France and the aggressiveness of the sultan.

On the whole, the policy of Charles V was rarely or never more cautious than in these years, in which, as Ranke expressed himself, fate gave him a free hand for a time in order to enable him to remove the religious error in one way or another. The negotiations with the leaders of the Schmalkalden Federation were continued untiringly by the counts of Nassau and Nuenar. Prince-elect Johann would not think of receiving any help from the Turks without religious peace, and even made his appearance in the diet conditional upon a number of concessions, among which the demand for free preaching and the safe escort of Luther, whose advice he could not dispense with, may have struck the emperor as particularly "exorbitant and shameless." The Protestants were not working for a further discussion of the burning questions, but for the establishment of a peaceful relation between the two parties until the assembling of the council, and they would not yield the point.

While the emperor made discreet preparations for a still very remote union of the Catholic principals, the extension of a Protestant alliance developed under the influence and the aftermath of the Swiss catastrophe. Luther could not restrain a

feeling of satisfaction at the doom of Zwingli, who had died like a murderer. As before he placed his great opponent on a plane with Carlstadt and Münzer. The battle of Kappel was to him a judgment of God and Zwingli a condemned man. The victory of the Catholic Swiss, therefore, was not a "joyful one nor worth such great fame," because they had let the errors of the sacramentarians stand.

On the other hand, he recognized an important advantage in the fact that through these events the landgrave, Strasburg and other Lutherans had been torn from the Swiss. At any rate, he now regarded the champion of German Protestantism in a different aspect. "I praise the landgrave," he once said in an intimate circle, "because he does not ask our advice as before, but thinks: 'Preach, Luther, while I am going to see that my horse will be saddled.'"

Philip had asked Strasburg for the immediate united support of those in Zurich, in case of need, and after the conclusion of peace he offered the help of 4,000 men, "if they thought of avenging themselves and recovering from the harm and ignominious actions which they had suffered."

But the reply that he received showed the landgrave that they did not wish to have any more to do with him. In those days he thought himself seriously menaced from the Hapsburg side, while at the final organization of the Schmalkalden Federation

electoral Saxony's jealousy of Hesse led to a permanent damaging of the common interests. As such it must be described, when in the assembly held by the princes, barons, and Hanseatic towns at Nordhausen, the original plan to intrust the supreme military command to one captain was defeated after the Saxons, with the purpose of preventing the appointment of the landgrave, had proposed the absolutely unwarlike and politically ignorant prince of Anhalt. The Nordhausen scheme, which was used as a basis in the negotiations in Frankfort, divided the captaincy, in case of a "hurrying help," between Electoral Prince Frederick and the landgrave, whereas, in a long war, the prince of Saxony, of Hesse, or of Lüneburg, should be chosen.

Usually the position of a "ruling" captain alternated semi-annually between Saxony and Hesse. He had, if necessary, to call the council of war, of whose nine votes two each fell to Saxony, Hesse, and the highland and lowland towns, and one upon the rest of the princes and barons together, with the clause that the captain in charge for that time could call only one council of war, and in case of an equal number of votes could make the decision. In the event of a war in North German territory, Saxony was to have the command, and Hesse must send his fighting forces to the brother captain. During a war in Hesse or in South Germany, the reverse obtained.

The "hurrying help" was estimated at 2,000 horsemen and 10,000 foot soldiers, and the wages of the troops at 14,000 guilders, of which the princes and the towns had to furnish one-half each. At the fixing and distribution of the money contribution, the old opposition between princes and towns on the one hand, and upper and lower German towns on the other hand, made itself so perceptible that more than one meeting was necessary to settle these questions. Moreover, the Highlanders were still struggling with their confessional scruples, which were chiefly created amongst the Saxons by the Nürnbergers and the margrave people, who were not members of the federation. Only the declaration of Strasburg and other towns that they accepted the Saxonian Confession by the side of the Tetrapolitana as equivalent with the latter, and that they would not negative the doctrine of the Holy Communion as it was contained in the confession, brought an end for the time being to the quarrel.

Since the battle of Kappel, the Lutheran character of the Schmalkalden Federation, and the preponderance of the princely element over the towns, was once and for all decided. We cannot, if we wish to judge justly, place the blame for this segregation of the German from the Swiss evangelism altogether upon the Lutherans. Saxony had once offered its hand to the Zwinglians and had it rejected. However, it is indisputable that in those days and

indeed, later, the peculiar laxity of those Lutheran empire princes, who thought to be able to reconcile the armed protection of the gospel with a loyal attitude toward the emperor, had given German Protestantism the stamp of a certain narrowmindedness and indifference, in comparison with the development of the Reformation outside of Germany. It would be quite incorrect to derive this element from a living national sentiment, since it resulted partly from a rigid confessionalism and partly from an undeniable fear of the danger to the state that lay in supposed "fervent" teachings.

Luther himself had declared war upon all religious transactions in his too-much-followed precept: "Cursed be the love into the abyss of hell, which can only be preserved with disadvantage and harm to the teaching to which in fairness everything should yield, be it love, apostle, angels from Heaven, and all that may be."

Involved in this curse was the subsequent sad fate of the Reformation. One division refused to acknowledge the Zwinglians as brothers, but did not hesitate to cultivate zealously incipient connections abroad. The Schmalkalden Federation belonged in its nature to the category of anti-imperial powers; as a developing agency, it began to count in the great European policy. Already Henry VIII hoped to see the emperor seriously menaced by the antagonism of a prince-elect of Saxony. Charles had al-

lowed the calm years to pass without making proper use of his time; instead of becoming subjugated, German Protestantism had at last awakened to political consciousness, while on all sides the old opponents of Hapsburg prepared for a new attack.

VI

THE PERIOD OF PROSPERITY OF GERMAN PROTESTANTISM

THE momentous period lying between the founding and the crumbling of the Schmalkalden Federation or League showed the Reformation well advanced. It defied the emperor and the Catholics in obtaining certain legal concessions; it extended its domain partly by peaceable means, and partly by the force of arms; it overcame once more the peril threatening from revolution and from evangelistic radicalism. At the same time, a splendid prospect for the future opened with the fall of the papacy in Scandinavia and England. Without its federal organization it would have been impossible to maintain itself, or to use the favorable conditions of the world's affairs for further conquest.

Nothing perhaps throws more light upon the change, as it was brought about by the irresistible penetration of political considerations and motives in the perception of the evangelistic Germans, than the influence which such considerations exerted for a time upon Luther himself. The old lack of

political training, however, and the paralyzing pressure of limited state conditions, could not be outweighed. Familiar and natural as the technic of the political struggle was to every little potentate or town councilor in Italy, these German princes and republics hopelessly faced the world-encircling activity of imperial statesmanship. Their salvation lay partly in the fact that, even in times of great distress or temptation, the moral substance of the Reformation, the sanctuary of the awakened conscience, could never be wholly lost to them.

Such a moral support alone, however, would not have sufficed to balance the inadequacy of their resources of power, had not the numerous opponents of the House of Hapsburg prevented Charles V for another decade and a half from a thorough settlement with the German heresy. We already know the surprising combination of a European opposition in which not only very heterogeneous, but directly hostile, elements fused into a partly sought and a partly unlooked for alliance. We know further the merits of the papacy and the Porte concerning the preservation of the German Reformation. A letter from the Augsburg diet dealt at length with this feature, on the occasion of the rumors of a new invasion by the Ottomans: "Very well, the Turks must get us evangelists peace. They are in other respects such enemies to us that even God our Lord could hardly defend himself."

It was to be accepted as a certainty that Suleiman would try to offset the failure of his last campaign against Ferdinand, and at least to make a Turkish vassal state of the whole of Hungary. The grand-vizier wrote to King Ferdinand; Zápolya prostrated himself before the emperor (sultan), and therefore considered himself his slave. All the efforts of Ferdinand, to conclude honorable peace with the Porte, were of no avail; even his offer of a yearly tribute was not accepted; the grand vizier disdainfully refused the pension offered him; and the ambassadors, who were not empowered to permit a complete evacuation of Hungary, left with the impression that God the Almighty would like to make of Hungary a Christian and Turkish "Freithof" (churchyard).

Charles V, nevertheless, had good cause to recommend a renewal of peace overtures most urgently to his brother, because more enmity than support was to be expected from the "Christian princes." Moreover, Hungary, Germany and the south of Italy, seemed to be threatened; while the Venetians, although they had given the assurance that in case of need they too would show themselves to be Christians, were not at all willing to endanger their Syrian and Egyptian commerce through a quarrel with the Porte. "As contemptible as the king of France is," Loaysa wrote to a confidant of the emperor, "I would rather have him as an ally than

these commercial barterers who think more of four square feet of land than of God." And yet we must say that it was this French policy which caused the king, with all his desire for a Turkish peace, to come to an understanding with the German *ketzeri* (non-believers).

Francis I knew how to harass the activity of his adversary and threaten him with a sudden blow which was never delivered. Certain news about the veiled French policy indicates that the king, in 1532, wished to prevent the sultan from moving against Ferdinand, and that he would have combined his own attack upon the emperor with the advance of Zápolya in Hungary, and the German adversaries of Hapsburg in the empire itself. The council question was, as he expressed it, already wholly in his hands; he and Clement VII had agreed to a union between his second son Henry and the papal niece, Catherine of Medici. He had become estranged from Clement by recognizing the duke of Ferrara in his possession of Modena as well as through his obstinate demands of the council.

In the meantime, through the approachment between Bavaria and Hesse, a formal alliance of the dukes of Wittelsbach and the Schmalkalden princes was consummated in Germany against King Ferdinand in October, 1531. This had in view an eventual decision, at a regular diet of the German states concerning the German "Error of religion." The

great thought of 1529 seemed to take new life with Zwingli's death. Bavarian and Hessian mediators went to France and England, Philip applied to King Frederick of Denmark, who had taken prisoner the exiled Christian II, brother-in-law of the emperor; he applied also to Duke Charles of Geldern, the arch enemy of the Hapsburgs. They intended, further, to interest Switzerland, the duke of Lorraine, and the Venetians. Zápolya took a hand in this plan; he offered an alliance to his "dearest brethren and friends," the Bavarian dukes, on the strength of which the Turks would, if Austria should attack Bavaria, invade Carinthia and Croatia. Half of the conquered lands were to be divided between Zápolya and the dukes, provided that Bavaria should be spared from devastation in the case of a Turkish campaign. Neither Zápolya, nor the sultan, nor the other allies, were allowed to conclude an armistice or peace.

It was the opportunity for suspicious personages like Nickel von Minckwitz, the peace-breaker, who went to Bavaria as a Turkish emissary, or for the intriguer Laski, who acted as agent for Zápolya and at the same time for the king of Poland, had an eye on the crown of Hungary, and knew how to ingratiate himself not only with Hesse, Saxony, Bavaria and France, but likewise at the court of Ferdinand. Though he assumed the guise of an emissary of peace, he was really a spy.

There was a groundless rumor that Saxony had sent an ambassador to Turkey, but Suleiman, in his undertakings against the Hapsburgs, counted with full assurance upon an anti-imperial alliance between France, England, Zápolya, Saxony, Hesse and the other princes of the empire. The Bavarians strove not only at the diet of Regensburg, but through their adherents in Bohemia, to bring to naught all aid that Ferdinand intended to give against the Turks.

On May 26, 1532, at the Cloister of Schayern, a formal alliance was made between France, Saxony, Hesse and Bavaria. Philip represented to the Bavarians that the Turkish invasion would offer the finest opportunity, under the guise of mobilizing against it, to restore his lands to the duke of Württemberg, and to acquire the Roman crown for Bavaria. At the same time the landgrave held the opportunity open for himself, in case Bavaria should withdraw, to make peace with the emperor and Ferdinand, through Granvela as mediator. "Saint John with the golden mouth" should not be spared with Eck or Granvela. What right had the German politicians who used such means to complain of French deceit, and to boast about the old and tried loyalty of their nation?

The emperor was now urgently urged to reach an understanding with the Protestants at almost any price. Because of this, King Francis endeavored to

prevent the sultan from setting an Austrian campaign on foot. The Bavarians tried the same thing after their proposition to surround the emperor with troops at the diet of Regensburg, in order to force him to come to terms, had not been accepted by Saxony. It showed the strange shifting of the political conditions in the empire, and the landgrave labored to the utmost to secure for himself the possibility either of an anti-imperial or a pro-imperial policy while Dr. Eck fanned the hatred of the Catholics against the new Protestant allies, and branded the admission of the religious question, made by the emperor under duress, as treason to the faith.

The emperor, however, no longer hesitated to take the step long counseled by Loaysa, since the curia itself had lately spoken mildly of the German ketzeri, having set entirely aside the pretended designs of submission by the Lutherans, which they actually tried to believe themselves, or to make the representatives of the king believe. Pope Clement had already, in the summer of 1531, agreed with Cardinal Cajetan that some concessions to the Germans should be made concerning sins that were not direct violations of the divine right, and that they should also be allowed the "Laienkelch," and the "Priesterehe" (marriage of priests). In the spring of 1532, the Roman theologians who were intrusted with the examination of the "Augsburg Confes-

sion" found that much of it was quite Catholic, and that other things could be construed as not being directed against the faith.

On the part of Rome, to the great consternation of the papal nuncio Alexander, the emperor was given a free hand in his dealings with the Protestants, which were continued through the former mediators Mainz and the Palatinate, first in Schweinfurt and later in Nürnberg, although the Schmalkaldian princes did not appear in person at the diet of Regensburg, which was opened April 17, 1532. The demands of the Protestants were radical enough; they insisted upon the reception into the peace treaty of their present and future believers in their confession; and further, the discontinuance of the persecution of the Lutherans in Catholic countries.

Luther advised his prince to be lenient, characterizing the first demand as unobtainable, and the second as not being quite fair. A difference of opinion about the first point had already risen between the Lutherans in Saxony, Brandenburg and Nürnberg on one hand, and Hesse and the Upper Country on the other hand, who considered the exclusion of future faithful believers an insult to the religion and treason to the children of God. The emperor, whom the mediators finally appealed to for a decision, was placed in a very embarrassing position at the Reichstag. From the beginning the

members of the diet had made a stand against the ruler, who had to wait from the end of February until the middle of March to open the diet, the date of which had been set for the 6th of January. The Catholics reproached him with the shortcomings of his imperial government and the impudence of his Spanish friends. They now demanded the maintenance of the "Augsburger Abschied" and an early meeting of the council, and in case of necessity, if the pope should delay any longer, to call a national council "through the imperial power."

Thus the Catholics, with all their anger against the Protestants, were almost in the position of the Protestants themselves as opponents of the emperor and pope. "The emperor and the members of the diet," thus wrote the representative of the town of Frankfort, "are liberal against each other." But how could one in all seriousness contemplate an internal war in Germany while the sultan's army had been advancing already for several months? Charles seemed to have feared for awhile that the Protestants would really use the Turkish war, in order to seize arms themselves against him and the Catholics,—a suspicion which Alexander declared to be without grounds. For instance, the people of Ulm, not to mention Saxony, declared that even if the peace negotiations came to naught, they would do their duty against the Turks.

Especially was the aid of the Protestant towns

necessary in order to secure the indispensable artillery. As a consequence, Charles finally decided to give his consent to a religious peace, which was concluded at Nürnberg on July 23 and signed by Mainz, the Palatinate and Prince Johann Friedrich. The landgrave, whose emissaries alone refused to recognize the agreement yielded a few weeks later. Peace was now to be maintained until a general council could be called, probably within a year; otherwise until the next imperial diet. Moreover—and on this the Protestants specially counted—the emperor agreed to suspend all religious trials against Saxony and its adherents until that date. This last pledge, however, had to be kept secret in order not to offend the Catholics; moreover, it contained a “rider,” which took considerable from its value: the Protestants were obliged to appeal to the emperor or his representative in every case, in order to obtain a discontinuance of such trials.

In spite of this, the so-called first religious peace was an important success for the Protestants. The emperor, who heretofore had been the most obstinate representative of intolerance toward the ketzeri or non-believers, had bowed to the law of necessity and formally recognized the new religion for the time being, although it need not be said that his inmost conviction was absolutely opposed to giving these rebels against God and the empire any protection of their alleged rights. He had yet to

travel over a long and crimson road, until he recognized the absolute necessity of a lasting religious peace, which had been in the mind of a Roman cardinal and adviser of the emperor as early as 1532.

Loaysa, shortly before the Nürnberg convention, had dared to propose an agreement by which everybody should be allowed to worship as he pleased until the said council, and if, through the fault of the pope, no council should take place within three years, the ketzeri should be allowed from that time forward to adhere to their belief unmolested by the princes and the imperial diets.

Of course, Charles V might have believed that, with the concessions of 1532, he had gone far enough, but he had gained his point, which was then of transcendent importance,—an imperial war against the Turks. This was the holy war which he, as Loaysa remarked, had desired “during his sleep and during the day, more than anything else upon this world.” Before a decisive struggle between the emperor of the Occident and the emperor of the Orient, all other wishes and complaints had to be thrust aside.

“The King of Spain has been bragging for a long time that he was going to march against the Turks. But I shall, with the help of God, lead my armies against him. If he has the courage, he may meet me on the field of battle, and whatever God

wills, shall happen. If he does not wish to meet me, he shall send tribute to my imperial majesty." Such was Suleiman's answer to King Ferdinand, whose ambassadors had delivered a last offer of their master's, to the effect that Hungary should be left to Zápolya for life, and upon his death should be given back to Austria. The grand vizier received them with genuine Turkish brutality, and did not omit to ask whether or not the emperor had made his peace with Martin Luther. Suleiman, who had with him his golden throne and imperial crown, made by Venetian hands, had thoroughly prepared this campaign and had announced it with high-sounding braggadocio. A year previous Stamboul had reverberated from land to sea with the roar of cannon, "just as if the day of judgment had come," upon the occasion of the commander-in-chief making an inspection of his fleet of war.

But a Christian army had been raised, the like of which had not been seen for many a year. It contained some 80,000 troops of the emperor, King Ferdinand, and the empire. Campeggi was delighted with the splendid companies which he saw march day after day through Regensburg, headed toward the East.

The first to report were the forces from Regensburg, who brought of their own free will almost twice their quota, while Strasburg did not send even the required contingent. The emperor, quite ill

with a sore leg and the gout, from which he had been a sufferer for years, took the baths at Abach to strengthen himself for the campaign. He showed in his speeches supreme confidence as to the *Weltherrschaft* (mastery of the world).

Suleiman was destined to suffer this time a far more humiliating defeat than he did before Vienna. Beyond the walls of the West-Hungarian town Güns, which was defended by about 700 men under the Croatian Nikolaus Jurisitsch, all the arts of siege and storming by the immense Turkish army came to naught. Ever since August 7, the Osmanlis held their place before the brave little fortress, and when the last grand assault was made on the 28th and a part of the walls were captured, the Mussulmans suddenly retreated. They were on the eve of an overwhelming victory when they became frightened by the unearthly cries of the terrified and despairing inhabitants. The grand vizier allowed the commander, whom he treated with all honors, to keep the town and everything in it. Then he departed leaving only a small guard behind. "Not an hour longer," wrote Jurisitsch to Ferdinand, "could the town have held out."

It seems that the Turks were not eager to measure their strength in an open battle with the main army of the emperor. While their light cavalry was marching upon Vienna, the majority were annihilated in the Vienna forest by the German troops.

Suleiman appeared before Grätz, in order to cover his retreat, which he undertook through Carniola and Croatia amidst terrible devastation. The Turks afterward tried to explain away their humiliating defeat by saying that Suleiman thought he had to follow the emperor, the night owl, into the secret mountain passes. The siege of Gran by Gritti was given up.

On the water the Osmanlis were beaten by the always victorious Andrea Doria, who drove their fleet from the Ionian Sea and captured a number of fortified places in Morea.

On September 24, the commander-in-chief of the empire, Palsgrave Frederick, placed the captured Turkish flags at the feet of the emperor. "With half of their foot-troops," said the brave Schaertlin of Burtenbach, "Hungary could have been captured. It was inconceivable to the contemporaries why the emperor did not follow up this victory, so easily won, in order to start immediately upon his march to Italy. Only a short time before, he declared, while mounted in full armor on his war steed, that he would personally drive the Turkish dog off this earth, and that nobody could prevent direct encounter with him.

One can easily imagine the despair of King Ferdinand when his imperial brother, instead of taking Hungary from Zápolya with all the forces at his command, started hurriedly for Italy. Ferdinand


accompanied him for a short time, in order to attend to some business, as he wrote to his sister Maria. He added, "You know that the most important business is always done at the last moment. Of course the undisciplined state of the large Christian army would have made it difficult to continue the campaign while the German contingents refused to serve beyond the imperial frontier in Hungary, and the Spaniards and the Italians were from the beginning not the terror of the enemy, with whom they had little to do, but of the German lands through which they had to march. The Italians, whom the emperor wanted to leave behind with his brother, marched home on their own accord and committed shameful and enormous cruelties on their way, in the Turkish fashion. This is Spanish assistance."

Charles's opinion was different. He considered the unexpected retreat of Suleiman, which Ferdinand declared to be the bitterest experience of his life, a salvation. He wrote to his sister Maria, "I must satisfy the pope, everything else must be postponed." Thus he abandoned the great and easily attainable aim, to chase the phantom of the council and an understanding with the pontiff,—two things which could never go hand in hand.

Clement VII did not hide his dissatisfaction with the emperor. He was extremely glad to see him in Hungary, apparently engaged in a long drawn out



Gustav Vasa.
(Gustavus I., King of Sweden (1496-1560)).



war. Obeying the necessity, the pope attended a meeting at which the emperor thought he could bring about the security of the Italian situation, the detachment of the pope from France and, at the same time, succeed in calling a council. But none of these expectations were realized. These two heads of Christendom spent several months together at Bologna, but neither the secret pact which was consummated between them in February, 1533, nor a defensive alliance of the emperor with the Italian states, which Venice alone did not join, could remove the fact that the pope had practically refused a council and was ready to strengthen his relations with France. It was the same with almost all the other Italian princes and republics, which leaned toward France or were at least tired of being under imperial guardianship.

The real ideas of the pope showed in that strange proposition of a separation of Italy which he made to Ferdinand in May, 1532. The latter should let Zápolya have Hungary and take in return a part of the Venetian territory, while Francis I would receive portions of Milan and Piedmont and could eventually, in conjunction with the emperor, conquer Venice itself. This important city should come neither into the possession of Ferdinand nor of France, but might be given to the Order of the Knights of St. John.

Seemingly the intention of the pope was to help

the king of France to regain his position in Italy, and to rid himself of the dominating Spanish rule. As a French ambassador expressed it, "the king should rule in Milan and the emperor in Naples." The interview of Henry VIII with Francis at Boulogne and Calais, which took place in October, 1532, amidst magnificent splendor, doubtless contributed much to the abandonment by the emperor of the war in Turkey and his journey to Italy, though this did not lead to any decisive results. Anne Boleyn, now margravine of Pembroke, accompanied her royal lover; she was not received by the sovereign's sister, Margaret of Valois, queen of Navarre, but enjoyed the honor of having a long political conversation with King Francis, whom she served better—as the imperial ambassador Chapius remarked—than Wolsey, without asking a yearly honorarium of 25,000 ducats.

Much farther reaching was the meeting between Francis I and Clement VII. Charles, who heard of this offensive proceeding at Bologna, frankly told the pope that nothing good could result from it. It typified the sentiment of the French court that the imperial ambassador in London was told a rather insulting story by his French colleagues, to the effect that the emperor had offered the sultan a partition of the *Weltherrschaft* (world's rule), and the general submission of other Christian princes. Chapius wrote to Charles V, "At this

court there is not a single man who sides with the king and queen, who would not say publicly that his eminence will betray your majesty." One is justified in thinking that Henry VIII's atrocious proceedings in his divorce action should have seriously strained the relations between the pope and the open friend of England, Francis I.

The marriage between Henry and his mistress, who was expecting to become a mother, a prospect which could no longer be hidden, took place secretly in January, 1533, an accommodating priest officiating. The indiscretion of Anne herself caused her entourage to become aware of her secret. After she had gone to mass in April, amidst royal honors, the festival crowning followed on June 1, in Westminster, but the ceremony was marked by insulting demonstrations on the part of the Hanseatic merchants who, like the rest of the English people, were true to the exiled Queen Catherine.

Without further regard to the divorce suit pending in Rome, Henry had his marriage with the Spanish woman declared null and void by the new Archbishop Cranmer of York. A short time afterward, he appealed from the pope to a general council, before the same archbishop. The pope could do nothing less than to declare such a proceeding without force, and threaten with excommunication the couple illegally married and the recalcitrant prelate, if the marriage was not annulled by them

within six weeks (July 11). In the heat of passion, the king had spoken sneeringly of the pope and had condemned, while talking with Chapius, the custom of kissing the pope's toe and the demand of the papacy as being supreme over all the worldly empires. When the papal nuncio reminded the king of his former friendship for the holy chair, the sovereign replied that upon studying the question closer he had come to believe exactly the opposite, although, he added, the pope still had a chance to convert him to his former opinion. If it were easy for Francis I to observe the growing misunderstanding between England and Rome, it was not to be wondered at that the pope adhered to his distrust of the emperor and looked with friendly eyes upon France. The pontiff's much spoken of sojourn at Marseilles, where Francis joined him, in October and November, 1533, must have been embarrassing on account of the English condition of affairs. It made a deep impression upon Clement that an English ambassador was not punished when he insinuated to him, the guest of the French king, that he should recognize the appeal of Henry VIII for a council. The highly honorable marriage of his niece with Henry of Orléans, however, caused him to overlook the fact that Francis avoided the demanded break with England, just as he continued afterward to bridge the difficulties between Rome and Henry VIII. But how could the pope have

failed to see that an alliance with France against the emperor would bring him into a certain connection with the Protestants, the German allies of Francis I? The question whether the advancement of the landgrave in favor of Ulrich of Württemberg had been really mentioned at Marseilles cannot be answered with certainty, but it is highly probable that it was, since several Italian contemporaries reported that Francis had pointed out to his guest, with his approval, the feasibility of a war against the Hapsburgs which would start in Germany and be continued in Italy. But in February the French ambassador Bishop de Bellay found Clement again "a prisoner of the emperor." The bishop added: "In reality I am not a papist, but I am really sorry to see him in such a plight." How astonished the sympathetic Frenchman was when he heard that on March 23, 1534, after a consistory lasting seven hours, the final judgment was given in favor of Queen Catherine and against Henry VIII!

When Charles V returned again to his Spanish solitude, the situation of the Protestants throughout the world was as favorable as it could well have been. The steps that were taken both by the emperor and the pope for calling a council were without results. Nuncio Rangone, who went to Germany, was accompanied by a representative of the emperor, a noble Netherlander who acted more in the capacity of a guardian than an adviser. Not only

the Protestant princes but many Catholics showed an indifference toward an early calling of a council. The Protestants could not, of course, regard it as free and impartial. They made the condition that it should meet in Germany, and they did not feel themselves bound to accept any of its decisions that were against the Scriptures.

Luther, who saw in Pope Clement only a scoffer of religion, a rough fighter and accomplished poisoner, and who believed Catherine de' Medici to be the pope's own daughter born out of wedlock, never believed that a council would meet. Furthermore, he did not take kindly to the conciliatory arguments of Erasmus, which were then quite popular. The Reformer's opinion of the philosopher may be given in a few words: "Erasmus, enemy of all religion and an adversary of Christ, a complete counterpart of Epicurus and Lucian."

The armistice between the two parties, as embodied in the religious peace of 1532, seemed to be favorable for a renewal of the old mediation propositions, but the differences were really so great that they could not be overcome by the peace programme published by Erasmus, nor through the dispute which Duke Georg arranged in 1534 between the Erasmian Julius Pflug and Melanchthon, at Leipzig. Though for a time the Erasmian neutrality between papacy and Lutherism was regarded as a worm but raised later to a welcome support of

"territorial papism," the church laws of Cleve in 1532 and 1533 built, quite against the wish of their makers, only a bridge for the advance of Protestantism.

It was still the time of war, not of peace. On the part of the Catholics the fight was conducted half-heartedly. The Suabian Alliance, the much feared tool of the Hapsburgs and of Catholic reaction, had lost its power since quite a number of cities of the alliance had gone over to Protestantism. Moreover, there was the alliance which, through Rhenish princes, was concluded in November, 1532, in Hesse—Mainz, Trier and the Palatinate—and was for the purpose of abolishing the Suabian Alliance by the withdrawal of those three princes. But how could these South German cities have belonged to the Suabian and the Schmalkalden Alliance at the same time?

In May, 1533, Nürnberg, Ulm and Augsburg formed a union for securing religious freedom. The so-called Württemberg cause led to the dissolution of the Suabian Alliance at the diet of Augsburg, from December, 1533, to January, 1534. That Catholic defensive alliance which Brandenburg, Georg of Saxony, Erec and Ernest of Brunswick, concluded at Halle in November, 1533, was neither a substitution for the Suabian Alliance nor was it a counterbalance against the Schmalkaldians. The *Kammergericht* (imperial court) continued, without

taking any notice of the religious peace, its war of law against the Protestants, against Strasburg, Nürnberg, Magdeburg and other towns, as well as against Ernest of Lüneburg and Margrave Georg. Although the emperor had, in November, 1532, ordered a suspension of all suits in religious matters, he claimed after receiving Protestant complaints that he could give no exact general definition of what was meant by "religious matters." Finally, in January, 1534, the evangelical representatives formally disavowed the openly partisan court, but not as Hesse and Strasburg proposed for all suits, but only for those of a religious character.

It was due exclusively to the energy of Landgrave Philip that German Protestantism gained an immediate advantage in a really favorable situation. For Saxony, the natural head of the Protestants through its rank and territorial power, maintained also under the son and successor of Prince Johann, who died in August, 1532, its disinclination toward any policy that overstepped the limits of a forced defense.

John Frederick, only a year older than the landgrave, was in his outwardly awkward appearance the opposite of the clever and elegant Hessian prince, a type of that generation of evangelical gentlemen who spend their time in theological studies, hunting and drinking. From his early youth an admirer of his Doctor Martinus, it gave him

special pleasure to cultivate the latter's friendship when he became reigning prince; but a deeper impression of such an intercourse was left in him later when a great misfortune befell his frivolous nature. John Frederick, who was neither a soldier nor a politician, worked—as Luther expressed it—“like a donkey,” without recognizing the higher points of view which the traditions of a territorial principality, the remnants of faithfulness toward the empire and a far reaching dependence on theological reasoning, gave him.

It is easily understood that even the first attempts of the landgrave to make this peace loving and obstinate prince an ally of his policies met almost insurmountable obstacles. Philip pointedly characterized the rough court manners of that time in a letter to his friend “Utz” of Württemberg concerning a meeting which took place in Saxony: “I drank very hard at Weimar, but held my place while the prince became sick. Of course I had to suffer later, too.” In the same way that many military successes of the German soldiery were brought to naught through their avarice, the political successes of the German princes were often counteracted by their dissipated living. The same thing happened to Philip. He was highly enthusiastic over the Württemberg cause, since the young Duke Christian had escaped from the imperial court before they could take him to Spain.

Ulrich's innocent son, who had to atone for the unfortunate policy of his father, appeared in the fall of 1532 at his uncle's in Bavaria, after an adventurous flight, and a year later at the Suabian Bundestag in Augsburg, in order to demand, with the support of a French ambassador, his rights in Württemberg. Previous to this he had insisted upon the entire dukedom as his possession and protested against the pacts of 1520. Zápolya also supported him,—a fact which showed the trend against the Hapsburg power, and the Bavarian dukes, while they had avoided giving immediate assistance, figured upon receiving Turkish subsidies for the Württemberg war, which the landgrave had in truth carried on with foreign money.

The reserve of the Bavarians, who now tried to get in touch again with the emperor and Ferdinand, explained itself through the fact that they strove to procure Württemberg, in direct opposition to the landgrave, for their nephew Christoph as a Catholic land, but they claimed that the heretic Ulrich should be barred under any circumstances. Philip had quite shrewdly maintained his relations with Bavaria up to the moment when he effected an understanding with France, and thus got the best of so clever a politician as Dr. Eck. He once urgently recommended his friend Ulrich to make certain concessions to the Bavarians, with the argument that an oath under duress might be for-

given. He knew also how to obtain the aid of Francis I at a meeting at Bar-le-Duc in January, 1534, without entering upon any obligations which would go further than the restitution of Ulrich of Württemberg. The sale to France of the County Mömpelgard, besides a few other lands, to be rebought, should serve to conceal the French subsidies in the amount of the sale, which was stipulated far too high.

More assurances came from England, from Christian III, king of Denmark, from Lüneburg, from Catholic princes of the empire, from the bishop of Münster, Duke Henry of Brunswick and the archbishop of Trier. The electorate of the Palatinate only pretended to King Ferdinand that it was going to join; even Joachim of Brandenburg gave his opinion about the Hessian undertaking, and said that Ferdinand should not expect any assistance from the prince. A great contrast to this attitude of most of the higher Catholic princes was the obstinate opposition of Saxony. Luther and Melanchthon had angered the landgrave with their precautions at the meeting in Weimar but, nevertheless, Melanchthon watched the bold advance of his "namesake" with the utmost sympathy.

It was no secret that in Württemberg itself the return of the former reigning prince and the fall of the "Spanish" régime were fully deserved, although the present government had taken great

pains to make the people forget their proscribed prince. A law had been passed which forbade anyone even to speak of him, whereupon a derisive song appeared which asked whether one would have to leave the country if he happened to "dream of Duke Ulrich."

Only after much difficulty and some force did Palsgrave Philip, Ferdinand's governor general, manage to raise a small army of about 9,000 men and 400 horses. Many of the soldiers remarked that their spears might strike the landgrave instead of Duke Ulrich. The two aggressors started from Cassel in April and scarcely had they penetrated into Württemberg, with about 20,000 men and 4,000 cavalry, when a decision came.

Near Lauffen, on the left bank of the river Neckar, the brave governor general met the far superior enemy. After the first encounter he had to leave his troops, seriously wounded; the next day the royal army retreated and a few minor actions took place. An eyewitness reported that "everyone became quiet and a great cloud of dust could be seen in the direction of Asperg." It could not be called a battle, but the easily won success was further reaching than many a long and bloody conflict. In the beginning of June the last fortified places, Asperg and Hoheneifer, were taken and the whole country fell in the hands of the victors. The two liberators, also Duke Ulrich, the true owner

of the land, who immediately returned, were celebrated in festival songs. Luther was perfectly cured of his disinclination toward the undertaking of the landgrave; he wrote, "God is evidently with this cause and has, against all expectations, turned our fear into victory."

One cannot understand why the emperor went to Spain after his failure with the pope, leaving Germany and Italy in a very insecure state, and why King Ferdinand remained in Bohemia instead of going to the succor of his army in Württemberg.

When the ambassador of Ferdinand arrived in Rome to ask assistance of the pope, the latter was very angry and refused every aid as long as nothing was done against the Catholic Church. Ferdinand wrote to his brother: "This malevolent practice comes from France and England; I hope to God that it is not the doings of the pope." He found himself entirely isolated and really believed the rumor that the landgrave wanted the Roman crown, either for himself, or for the dauphin (the French crown prince), or for Duke William of Bavaria, and that he would start a revolution against the emperor with the help of the Baptists. The fear that the Württemberg campaign was only the forerunner of a European war against Hapsburg, was by no means vague, for a year previous the eventuality of a simultaneous attack as Württemberg, the Austrian hereditary territories, Bohemia, the

Netherlands, Italy, and Spain was discussed. Francis was deeply dissatisfied because the landgrave halted in the midst of his victorious march.

After Asperg fell Philip wrote: "I desire neither an uproar nor to become French or to make war upon other people." He knew very well that a continuation of the war would not have been against Ferdinand alone, but against the emperor and it would soon have left him in as isolated a position as Ferdinand was at this time. To his sister Elizabeth, a daughter-in-law of Georg of Saxony, he wrote: "Hurry up and see that we secure peace; do not let this trouble go any further without my fault." This merry and intriguing woman had really a good deal to do with the treaty, which was concluded in June in the Bohemian city of Kaaden, by mediation of the electorate of Saxony, Mainz and Duke Georg. Württemberg was returned to Ulrich as an Austrian dependency, which would revert to Austria after the Württemberg male line became extinct. This clause was contrary to the law prevailing in the empire and was a rather hard condition for Ulrich to meet, but on the other hand Ferdinand did not insist on the maintenance of Catholicism in Württemberg, which he had originally demanded; it was only agreed that Ulrich should permit foreigners and abbots to enjoy their religion unmolested. The treaty of Kaaden, however, was by no means confined to the cause of Württemberg; while the

electorate of Saxony and its sympathizers at last recognized Ferdinand as king of Rome, he sanctioned anew the observation of the religious peace of Nürnberg, above all, the complete discontinuance of the obnoxious supreme court proceedings. Still profane people, Baptists and other unchristian sects, were not to be tolerated under any circumstances.

The Strasburg and other upland people, not without reason, considered the last mentioned condition dangerous, in spite of the landgrave's assurances, particularly so since, so far as they were concerned, the supreme court did not discontinue the lawsuits, although the king had ordered a cessation. The evangelical people could not by any means claim a full or final victory, but the landgrave's boldness and preparedness made a powerful impression throughout the empire. Witzel, a renegade, said: "A thousand books written by Luther could not have been of such benefit to the cause."

It was an ugly outcome of this affair that between Philip, who did not seek nor find for himself any advantage worth mentioning, and his protégé Ulrich, the old friendship was changed to discord. The duke, who felt very bitter over the Hessian claim of reimbursement for the war expense, did not consider himself under any such obligations, and since the treaty of Kaaden had believed that he no longer owed any gratitude. He even went so far as to tell the man who saved him

that his ally did not undertake the campaign from friendship nor in the interest of the good cause, but simply through fear that he would be attacked himself. Eck tried to produce strife in his own way, for the purpose of "pinching the Lutheran rascal right under the skin," as he expressed it. He meant to say that he wished to make the foolish prince leave the country again, and also to check such reformation as might be expected from the visit.

Ulrich's religious change was not only external but years of exile had not by any means diminished his consciousness of grand princely power, which permitted him to carry through the new order of church conditions with aggressive energy and without consulting congress. Reformation in Württemberg was peculiar, inasmuch as Ulrich, whose personal inclination drew him rather toward Zwingli and his followers, succeeded with some difficulty in securing the coöperation of Schnepf, a Hessian Lutheran, with Ambrosius Blarer from the uplands. They compromised on a eucharistic formula and the division of territory for their activities.

In 1537 an "idol day" was celebrated at Urach, where Blarer succeeded in having all pictures removed, contrary to the views of Schnepf and Johannes Brenz. The last named explained that there should be no objection to pictures because there were "living idols, the virgins" permitted in

the presence of young men, in the church yards. In other respects the previously described character of the new church system appeared to be particularly strong in Württemberg. Ulrich was blamed for having squandered the property taken from the church, but this accusation was unjust. It is true that he did not spend the money exclusively for church or charitable purposes, but he used some of it for fortifications and other state matters, besides endowing schools and meeting his obligations toward the Schmalkalden Union. He even assumed the obligations to King Ferdinand for the Suabian Union's arrears, that is to say, a portion of the war expenses, which previously were incurred by Ferdinand. Moreover the Austrian government repeatedly utilized the tax capacity of the Württemberg clergy for state purposes. After the Reformation the state was strict in enforcing police regulations in church matters; the ducal bailiffs had to supervise not only the mode of living but the teachings of the clergymen and at Stuttgart for instance, those who did not attend church service on Sundays and holidays were either fined or imprisoned in the tower. Similar punishment was meted out for attending mass at other places. The duke's harsh and stubborn manner still retained for him the nickname of "wild man" and made an unpleasant impression on those around him. For a time he repulsed the good intentions of his friends and made

a confidant of Eck, the vile politician. He drove his own son, as a Catholic and menacing pretender, out of the country to the French court, where the noble and gifted prince, hardly relieved from his previous homelessness, had to pass eight years in a new, although somewhat friendly exile. Owing to the uncertainty of their position all these evangelical counselors of the empire tried to keep in touch with Hapsburg's enemies, particularly with France, for the purpose of maintaining "rank and reputation."

Charles V would have liked very much to punish the German rebels, but his attention was soon taken up by other perils. Droysen said: "During these years he was really like a fighter who, attacked simultaneously by several people, quickly repulses this one and that one by clever movements, in order to gain for a moment a free hand against the third and fourth opponents, without finding time to vanquish even one of them completely." He was involved in the struggle for the Danish crown, but more urgent than this question was the defence against a new attack by the Turks. These hostilities did not come from the Turkish headquarters; Suleiman made peace with Ferdinand in 1533, for the purpose of launching the long intended and planned war against Persia, and raising his victorious banners over Tebris and Bagdad. In the meantime it was less the "Caliph of Rome" personally than his Occidental ally, the "Bey of France," who saw to it

that Turkish arms did not rest in Europe. The French ambassador, who had orders to demand a million ducats of the sultan for a campaign against the emperor, did not reach the grand master, who was fighting in Persia, until the spring of 1535. At the beginning Francis I seemed satisfied to have a Turkish fleet of more than 300 vessels appear on the coast of southern Italy to terrorize Naples, and occasionally to kill and loot, besides carrying away prisoners.

The fleet was under the command of the so-called "King of Algiers," Chaireddin Barbarossa, a pirate from Mytilene who, jointly with his brother, had previously subjugated a portion of the North African coast and expelled Muley Hassan, the ruler of Tunis, who was independent of Stamboul. Soon afterward a messenger of the corsair prince was seen at French headquarters. In Spain and Italy anxiety and indignation prevailed; the emperor decided to risk everything for the purpose of destroying the impudent aggressor, and did not care if his enterprise was regarded with mischievous joy as a very perilous adventure. Even his sister, Maria, refused to believe the startling news; France and England made preparations to attack the weakened opponent after his presumptive defeat. Charles perhaps never went to war before with such unbounded confidence. As the champion of his commander-in-chief, Christ, he moved

across the sea in June, 1535, glowing with the Crusaders' ambitions, which were more vivid in Spain than anywhere else.

Among some 400 vessels were about eighty formidable men-of-war, of which twenty-four were furnished by Andrea and Antonio Doria and ten by the pope. Goletta fell on the 14th of July, and on the 20th of the same month the imperial army of scarcely 26,000 men met the enemy, twice as strong, who had been gathered by Chaireddin although he was personally very unpopular. The emperor reported: "We died from fear"; but his troops fought all the more furiously to gain the wells, which the enemy strove to keep from them.

In spite of this victory, there were many anxious moments in front of the mighty walls of Tunis. It was an unexpected case of good fortune that, instead of a new assault by the Mohammedans, news came of Chaireddin's expulsion by the Christian slaves in the city, who had liberated themselves. The emperor's soldiers, upon entering the city, disgraced their Christian triumph by a terrible slaughter, which reminded one of the old Crusaders' deeds when storming Jerusalem. While the shackles were removed from thousands of Christian prisoners, multitudes of Mussulmans were made slaves in their places. For the first time Charles V enjoyed the supreme happiness of victory. Not as on previous occasions was his work done by others, but he

personally, at the head of an army nearly in despair, had faced and overcome all perils and hardships of the war, under the rays of a flaming African sun. No wonder that his gout returned, but he wrote to his sister: "God has given me good plasters to cure me completely."

Nevertheless, it was during those days of splendor that, for the first time in his career, he formed the idea of renouncing all grandeur and luxury, and retiring to a convent. He aged before his years, and his mother's blood made itself felt within him.

While the campaign against Tunis was under way there were bloody struggles in Westphalia and Denmark. Almost at the same time the church authority of the Baptists and the power of the Lübeck democracy crumbled under the active work of the Protestant princes, including the landgrave, who was more than once wrongly suspected of seeking an alliance with the democratic elements. At that time he turned into a path which gradually led him to the verge of treason against the evangelical cause. His experiences during the war of Württemberg, the hostile separation of the electorate of Saxony, Württemberg's ingratitude, and Bavaria's underhanded politics, left a resentment in his heart. In July, 1534, he wrote to his sister that he desired nothing more ardently than to leave the evangelical union entirely and to live in peace with the emperor.

Lenz spoke of Philip's trip to Vienna during the

spring of 1535 as the "most disastrous step of his life." He arrived at the same time with Henry of Brunswick and the crown prince of Brandenburg. As a matter of courtesy, he observed the fast day while visiting the king. He was most affably received and, after giving assurances of his loyalty, saw a prospect of imperial grace and a command in Hungary. Philip's most ardent wishes were for an heredity agreement with Charles and Ferdinand and a family connection, although he temporarily refused to support the emperor openly against France.

The most valuable asset for Hapsburg was his complaint against the elector John Frederick. He hinted to an imperial ambassador that the elector was no longer of great importance, "since I severed my connection with him." It is true that Ferdinand thought more of the landgrave than he did of the elector. This was asserted by Philip's sister, who had urged him to sign the treaty of Kaaden, and to come to an understanding with Hapsburg. Soon afterward a friendly letter from the emperor was received in Hesse. This turn in Hessian politics was very unsatisfactory to the Bavarian chancellor who, in spite of the Linz agreement entered into by Ferdinand and his dukes, promoted the remarkable plan of a closer connection on the part of Bavaria with France and the upland cities, although the landgrave furnished favorable explanations, while soon

afterward Duke Ulrich arrived at Vienna for the purpose of obtaining investiture and imperial amnesty.

In November, the elector of Saxony determined to take the same journey. At Vienna John Frederick had not only been complained of by the landgrave, but by some Catholic princes and particularly by his cousin Georg, who spoke of him as desiring the Danish or German king's crown. It was said that this anxious and haughty gentleman contemplated placing himself at the head of a great popular uprising, as champion of the evangelical truth. At Kaaden he greeted King Ferdinand with ostentatious veneration; now, through his investiture with the Saxon electorate, closer personal relations with the king were formed. The sovereign, however, refused the elector's request to extend the Nürnberg religious peace to the counselors of the empire not previously mentioned in the document. The friendly relations existing between Protestant princes and Ferdinand, who had formerly been considered, even more than the emperor, their irreconcilable enemy, coincided with the Austrian nobility's steadily increasing evangelical inclinations.

As early as 1523, Luther had written to a Mr. von Staremburg; now there were among the king's confidants men of Lutheran sympathies like Rogen-dorf, or the very influential Johann Hofmann of Grünbühel, Styria, who was mainly instrumental in

inaugurating the intercourse with Protestant princes.

The imperial ambassador expressed the opinion that there were few people connected with the court who did not show in some manner their inclination toward the new doctrine. Johann Faber, who was bishop of Vienna after 1530, told the Venetian ambassador that most of the noblemen and people were heretics; he said: "Were it not for the king and myself they all would be Lutherans or worse."

Prior to the religious peace Aleander asserted that Germany was much more accessible than during the Worms congress. Two years later Vergerio complained that the long existing hatred against the pope's name had reached its limit and further intensity was impossible. He was told at King Ferdinand's court, however, that only a hint would be necessary to arouse the whole of Germany against Rome; even the women and children did not desire anything more ardently than the Church's downfall.

It was not alone among Ferdinand's surroundings that representatives of the curia heard such remarks. Aleander talked of a comedy which, during the winter of 1531, the Portuguese ambassador at Brussels had performed before him and the most prominent gentlemen of the imperial court. It was announced as a joy festival of love, but from beginning to end there were words denouncing

Rome and the pope; one of the actors had procured for himself a genuine cardinal's hat, from the house of the Roman legate. Aleander said: "They all laughed so much that the entire world seemed changed into joy and I, with a bleeding heart, imagined that I was in the center of Saxony, listening to Luther, or assisting at the grewsome looting of Rome."

The ambassador declared many of the courtiers dared not speak openly of Luther, but found a certain satisfaction in lauding Erasmus to the skies. It was evidently fortunate for the Roman Church that Clement VII, then on the point of exchanging France's friendship for that of the emperor, died on the 25th of September, 1534. His successor was not regarded as superior to him in personal attainments. Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, who was elected on the 13th of October, after a short conclave, and took the chair under the name of Paul III, was a student of the Italian renaissance, and was reared under Alexander VI, the lover of his sister Julia and builder of the finest palace in Rome. A very poor opinion of the new pope was expressed by a statesman of Venice, who said: "His holiness has so much affection for his own descendants that it would be almost impossible to find the same feeling more strongly represented in any other man." This master of nepotism at once made cardinals of two grandsons, aged fourteen and sixteen

years respectively, but he was intelligent enough to appreciate the necessity of a Catholic reformation. As pope he advised the council as he had done when a cardinal. This curious friendliness toward a council on the part of a pope caused considerable suspicion. Paul's determination, however, to proceed seriously with reform of the church government was shown in 1535 and 1536 by his nomination of cardinals, when he brought into the holy college such men as Bishop du Belloy of Paris, Auditor Ghinucci, the Contarini of Venice, the Pole, the Englishman and others.

Such an accumulation of mental and moral ability had not been seen for a long time in the much neglected curia. An Italian author told the Lutherans that this selection made by Paul III proved him not to be the antichrist. At that time a papal nuncio, the apologist Vergerio, met Luther. Vergerio was instructed to work against a German national council, and to interest German princes as well as Protestants in the general council. Naturally the Protestants did not deviate from their demand for a free and Christian council to meet in Germany. John Frederick sent word to the papal messenger that the real value of such an assemblage lay in the opportunity which it offered to make other nations acquainted with evangelical truth. Luther told the nuncio at Wittenberg: "We do not require the council any more but we need Christianity so

that those who have not yet learned to distinguish truth from their own errors may recognize the truth."

Vergerio invited Luther and Bugenhagen to dinner; the Italian, who carefully studied the entire demeanor of his great opponent, was much surprised by the appearance of the "beast before him elegantly dressed with satin sleeves, furs, chain and rings." Luther had previously told his barber that he desired to look very young, in order to annoy the Roman gentlemen. He succeeded completely in both his wishes, and Vergerio, who saw something satanic in the glowing and rolling eyes of the man he feared, was shocked at the power and passion of the plebeian. It may easily be imagined how little the Italian aristocrat was pleased with Luther's rough features and inconsiderate words. When the nuncio reproached him for being too arrogant, the Reformer raised his voice and replied: "This wrath from my mouth is not mine but God's wrath."

At that time German Protestants were favorably regarded in different quarters. Their leaders formed connections in Austria and even Rome condescended to negotiate, after having long opposed them, and Francis I clothed his attempts at political approach in a religious garb.

There was joyful excitement in Wittenberg reform circles when, in the summer of 1535, royal

invitations were sent to Melanchthon and Butzer. The previous history of the evangelical movement made caution advisable. Prepared by Humanism, a lively interest in the German Reformation had developed among the higher classes of the nation. While the theological faculty of Paris, frequently the protector of Gallic independence against Rome, declared war on German heresy from the beginning, followers of Erasmus and friends of mystical subjectivism gathered for a more or less careful opposition. Their spiritual head, the venerable Jaques Lefèvre from Étampes, had long before aroused suspicion among guardians of the faith of the Sorbonne, through his independent exegesis of the Bible. Guillaume Briçonnet, bishop of Meaux, offered him and other followers of the gospel an asylum at Meaux. There seemed to be a brilliant future for these efforts, since decided sympathies were shown even at the royal court. First of all there was Margaret, the clever sister of Francis I, who tried with all the warmth of her heart to bring her mother and her adored brother into the "desired haven" of the new doctrine. In December, 1522, Louise of Savoy entered in her diary that, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, she and her son had commenced to penetrate the deeds of the hypocrites. In those days Francis I saved more than one condemned heretic from the pyre; but his interest in religious matters was slight and he never

became a fanatic, nor did he give serious thought to evangelical views. In 1529 he created the College Royal; the Universities of Bordeaux and Nîmes were also built by him, but while he was liberal in promoting the sciences, particularly philology, while he raised French to the language of the state, and while he judged with generous mildness the home poets and Italian artists, political considerations made him a fierce oppressor of the evangelical people in France. His sympathy with them had never been deep and the frivolity surrounding him, in which he was considered a master, had nothing in common with the godliness which was developing among his subjects through coöperation of the national temperament, and increasing pressure.

Just as Margaret had done, Anne de Pisseleu, who as duchesse d'Étampes was the first of the many famous mistresses at the French court, used for awhile her influence in favor of the persecuted people. Nothing could have contrasted more sharply with the strict morality shown by the evangelical people than the shamelessness with which Francis I exhibited his lustful life. When the city of Paris had arranged a festival in honor of Queen Eleanore, who was just married to him, he found pleasure in jesting for hours with his mistress at an open window, in view of all the people. That was a Gallic custom, and of the same nativity was the wonderful poet who called laughing a distinguish-

ing gift of people, and offered an inexhaustible wealth of wit and obscenity against "misanthropes and enemies of laughter."

François Rabelais, just as far from the beauty cult of Italian renaissance as from the moral gravity of German Reformation, described more vividly than anybody else the actions of a generation unwilling to be disturbed in the enjoyment of life by any uncomfortable passion, and he also showed himself a true Frenchman by combining a certain share of sobriety with all his exuberant jollity. The free spirit, the courage of which went "as far as the pyre but not including it," that tried to find protection against French judges of heretics in Rome; not in Germany or Geneva, could not possibly sympathize with the reformed French people whose tendency was inimical to the world. That free spirit made fun of those who admired the pope as well as of those who scoffed at him, and regarded not only the monks as creatures of "anti-nature," but also the "crazy followers of Calvin."

King Francis did not become angry with the mirthful philosopher, despite his attacks on Church and state. Even Margaret, who became the wife of Henry of Navarre in 1527 and opened an asylum in her miniature kingdom for the persecuted gospel, was the authoress not only of pious poems but of indecent novels. Her headquarters at Pau and Nerac were by no means the exclusive gathering

places of persecuted followers of the Reformation. In the protecting neighborhood of the "tenth muse and fourth grace" were seen Lefèvre, Des Periers the skeptic, and a few brooding mystics whom Calvin would not have permitted to live in Geneva. Lotheissen said: "At Nerac and Pau everybody could be saved according to his own idea and everybody was permitted to pray in his private chapel." Rabelais declared the same thing about his ideal Abbey Thélème, the happy home of beauty and spiritual freedom.

Much more than during the German Reformation, the religious movement in France brought to the front elements of the free spirit, men who clung to antique philosophy and rejected all belief in revelation, lauding only freethinkers, much to the annoyance of the evangelical people and those belonging to the old Church, for these skeptics did not belong to either party. For a while the city of Lyons was considered the headquarters of such "atheists and epicures," as they were called. There Rabelais met the celebrated poet Clément Marot, who very adroitly dodged martyrdom; Étienne Dolet, the noble "Cato Christianus," who through his study of Lucretius had acquired a bitter hatred against all religious persecution and, in spite of royal favor, did not escape his fate; Des Periers, the author of the "World's Bell," who was driven to suicide; and Servede, a Spaniard who, through

a few articles against the Trinity written in 1531 and 1532, was regarded with horror by all Catholic and Protestant theologians. While he was not satisfied with pioneer medical work, he became more and more convinced that he was destined to restore real Christianity.

Nearly all these freethinkers were stragglers of the humanistic movement, which was overtaken by the Reformation, and at the same time they were precursors of the approaching religious indifference, so that they really were not in touch with their increasingly intolerant age. In Germany the gospel was eagerly accepted by the common people; in France the feeling evidently was not so general and deep; the lower classes in some sporadic cases participated in the movement as, for instance, Jean Leclerc, a wool-carder, who appeared with some success as a preacher at Meaux and at Metz; but the vast majority of the nation, so far as can be judged, did not take kindly to such a spectacle, while the government, in itself much stronger than the state powers in Germany, did not have the disadvantage of a dangerous mood on the part of the masses in fighting heresy. After Briçonnet, the earnest mystic, had driven his protégés from Meaux and asked that inquisitors be sent there, terrible persecutions commenced, and though they did not destroy the evangelical party they forced it into an increasingly

vigorous opposition to the Catholic and monarchical France.

The endless list of French martyrs to the gospel began with Jean Leclerc, who was castigated with rods on three consecutive days, in 1523, at Meaux, and then branded because he had fastened to the gate of the cathedral a paper against absolution and the Roman antichrist. When at Metz, in the following year, "driven by God's spirit," he broke the "idols," the outraged church brought all the horrors of criminal "justice" to bear against the offender. His right hand was chopped off, his nose torn from the face with red-hot tongs, and his arms and breast lacerated, before he was consigned to the pyre. The victim's fanatical belief and his stoical disregard of death were as much in keeping with the French character as the persecutors' awful cruelty.

With all the passion of a southern Frenchman, Guillaume Farel, a friend of Lefèvre and the real precursor of Calvin, conducted a holy war against images, ceremonies and processions, at Mömpelgard and in western Switzerland. He was not frightened by coming several times near to death under the mistreatment of fanatical priests and women.

The zealous actions of many reformed people, the mutilation of a picture representing the Madonna at Paris, and the distribution of exasperating

placards, were particularly offensive to the king, whose attitude toward the evangelical people varied between rigor and indulgence until, in October, 1534, these placards made him forever the merciless opponent of the reformers. The diabolical invention of a Paris jurist, which enabled the persecutors to pull heretics up and down over the fire for a long time, delighted the spectators who, according to the report of a contemporary, surrounded and cursed the victims in the midst of their torture. The terrific eloquence of many of the martyrs was feared and it was customary first to remove their tongues.

These cruel persecutions appeared to Melancthon and Luther as sufficient reason for not rejecting the invitation of Francis I. In 1534, Melancthon not only wrote to the queen of Navarre but drafted an opinion regarding a settlement of the religious strife in France, in which, according to his own confidential explanation, he assumed the appearance of yielding in order not to rebuff in advance the Catholic Frenchmen. Independent of the confession, a certain veneration of the saints and most of the ceremonies, he was willing to continue the hierarchical constitution of the Church. He found the pope's "monarchy" for the preservation of one belief advantageous, and expressed the opinion that bishops ought to be created, if there were none. That he did not approve of "barbarous freedom" was shown by his sharp words about the

authors of the hateful placards, whom he called "fanatical, dangerous people who offer only absurd opinions."

Melanchthon tried in every way to familiarize himself with his great task, and even went so far as calling the French nation the first of all and its kingdom the head of Christendom, while Butzer and Hedio offered their advice to Francis I in similar fashion. Henry VIII, who at that time was occupied with his plan for a northern league, trembled at the thought of a possible reconciliation between the German Protestants and the Roman chair. The policy of the electorate of Saxony, however, could not become involved with France in so conspicuous a manner if its aim of growing closer to Hapsburg was to be realized. John Frederick curtly refused his professor permission to make a visit to France. In a personal letter to his chancellor Brueck, he explained that Melanchthon, "with his great wisdom," might grant more than Luther and the other theologians would be willing to see, and the French mediators, being followers of Erasmus rather than of the evangelical leaders, would try to take advantage of his well known "vacillation."

Thus Wittenberg was not permitted to interfere in the development of the French reformation, but at the same time a young Frenchman, who only a few years before was won over to the gospel's cause,

worked at Basel for a defense of his co-religionists and their doctrine. Devoted to Francis I personally, he proclaimed the truth and final victory of the so-called new religion with far more energy than the apologies and peaceful propositions of Melancthon. At the age of twenty-six years Jean Calvin was ready and prepared for the great mission which soon afterward, in 1536, irresistibly as in God's plan, removed him forever from the quiet of his existence as a scholar.

It could not be expected that Francis I, at the congress of Schmalkalden in December, 1535, where he sent an ambassador, would gain any support for his intended renewal of the war against the emperor. The offer of Henry VIII to join the union was strongly resented, particularly by the elector of Saxony, although in this case there was a much better prospect of not only a political but of a religious understanding than with France. Henry felt bitter because the curia did not show any desire to oblige him and, after breaking completely with Rome, created a new state church which, according to Scherr's scathing but true opinion, "never was able to eradicate the traces of its impure origin."

A superabundance of violence and falsehood marked the development of the English reformation. It is impossible to forget the despot responsible for it at its opening, and the disgraceful love affair which caused a church separation. Behind

the solemn declarations of king and parliament appeared again and again the figure of the ambitious and malicious trifier, although soon afterward his wife became one of the numerous victims of a merciless personal government.

In England, perhaps more than anywhere else, the road to a state church had been smoothed long before, and Henry's desire for absolute supremacy, nursed by Wolsey's former assistant Thomas Cromwell, a capable jurist and financier, did not meet with any serious resistance from the English clergy. In 1531, their convocation declared the king to be the only sovereign and protector of the churches of England, with the clause "as far as Christ's law permits this," and the crown, backed by parliament, soon succeeded in removing this last flimsy rampart of a purely ecclesiastical power.

Henry became more and more involved by the peculiar complications of his personal inclinations with the old fight between church and state. He considered it outrageous that a prince should submit to a creature like the pope, whom God intended rather to be made submissive to him. It was asserted that the king's majesty had to care for the salvation of his subjects as well as for their physical welfare and, through his parliament, could extend legislation to both departments. The "Defensor Pacis," the boldest apology of state omnipotence produced by the Middle Ages, was reclaimed from

the past and proclaimed in English. As the reforming king's right hand man appeared Thomas Cranmer, since 1533 archbishop of Canterbury, a capable ecclesiastical diplomat and a secret friend of the gospel, who was also married clandestinely. At that time he developed the marvelous flexibility of his nature for the purpose of procuring, as an English "counter pope," the sanction of the church for the new system, and for the new marriage of his master. At the same time, in an underhanded way, he smuggled some elements of the evangelical doctrine into the political reorganization of the English church.

After passing, in February, 1533, a law abolishing for England the papal jurisdiction and all appeals to Rome, Henry answered the papal ban bull by a supreme court act, dated the 18th of November, 1534, elevating the king to the dignity of the "supreme head on earth of the church of England immediately under God." The unification of ecclesiastical and worldly power made itself felt there much more strongly than in Protestant Germany, particularly so since the new order of succession to the throne was closely connected with the reorganization of the church.

Astonishment was expressed at the firmness with which the expelled Queen Catherine and her daughter Maria maintained their legal rights, in the face of all the indignities heaped upon them by their

opponents. Anne Boleyn swore that she would humiliate the proud "Spanish blood"; she was not satisfied with a death threat against mother and daughter and seemed to contemplate having the stubborn young princess executed during Henry's absence. She constantly urged the king to apply the law strictly against the two traitresses. Catherine died on the 8th of January, 1536, and her death was naturally ascribed to poison administered by her venomous enemy. Henry VIII celebrated the event by appearing before the court dressed from head to foot in yellow, with a white feather in his hat, and giving the most offensive expression to his joy.

Nearly the whole nation were in favor of justice, and the impudent arrogance of Anne, who even treated her uncle, the duke of Norfolk, "worse than a dog," was not likely to lessen the intense aversion against her husband. There was rebellion not only in Ireland, but at the very gate of England, and the emperor's intervention was hoped for. In view of the dislike of the new system, the reform tendency had also to suffer. The imperial ambassador declared that Anne Boleyn was the "originator and principal nurse" of the trouble.

Under such conditions Henry VIII strove to obtain the backing of the Schmalkalden Union. He had made overtures to Melanchthon, who dedicated to Luther's royal opponent a new edition of his

loci communes and would gladly have gone to England. The explanations between the English ambassadors and the Wittenberg people did not lead to any result; Luther was determined in defending the cause of the expelled queen; as long before as 1531 he explained to Melanchthon that the king had no right to annul his marriage, but should rather take a second wife in addition to the first one, because polygamy was not prohibited by God.

The malevolent cruelty with which Henry broke down all resistance against his sovereign will gradually made an impression on Protestant Germany. At first the harshness of the newly created laws affected only prominent representatives of English Catholicism; during the spring of 1535 several venerable convent ecclesiastics paid by martyrdom for their attachment to the despised papal name, and soon afterward fell the heads of the aged Bishop Fisher of Rochester and the noble Thomas More who, after Wolsey's overthrow, kept the great seal for several years. Through a strange irony of fate, More became convinced of the papal primate's godly origin by the king's letter against Luther. Both men had to die because Paul III made a cardinal of the accused bishop and Francis I begged for his life; they disdained the opportunity of saving themselves by accepting the acts of succession and supremacy.

Fisher was one of the most zealous of polemics

against Luther, while More was the arch enemy of all heretics; nevertheless their execution was regarded as judicial murder, even in Protestant circles, and in Germany it was reported that they had to die because of their evangelical sympathies. The horror increased when it was learned that Queen Anne Boleyn had been beheaded. Her husband's heart had turned to new charms and the fact that her child, born on the 7th of September, 1533, was not the prophesied son, but a daughter, sealed her fate, although she kept up her fight for years and toward the end was even backed to a certain extent by her old enemy, the emperor. Cromwell also tried to form a connection with Charles V, but by a remarkable chain of circumstances he was led to cause, not his master's divorce from the concubine, but her death. The unpleasant reply received from the Wittenberg theologian probably contributed to the king's decision to make a violent end of the difficulties which his forgotten passion for Anne had caused him. On the strength of a series of careless utterances, such as occurred almost daily at that frivolous court, she was accused of being unfaithful to her marriage vows, and after a short lawsuit, the first victims of which were her brother and her alleged lovers, the "queen without a head," as she once called herself, died on the 19th of May, 1536, by the executioner's sword. A court of justice, presided over by Cranmer, declared her

marriage invalid owing to the king's previous illegitimate relations with her sister.

The brutal despot, feeling no shame, accepted with hideous cheerfulness the blot upon his own honor, as well as the tragic end of the wife he had once loved; his ever willing tools were fully worthy of him. On the day following the execution the royal wretch became engaged to Jane Seymour, and the wedding took place soon afterward.

Even such eager representatives of an Anglo-German alliance as the Strasburg, people were startled when Henry had his "second wife" executed, for they had heard of her sympathies for the gospel. At any rate, during that year the prevailing influence of the electorate of Saxony prevented a firm connection of German Protestantism with foreign powers, whose frequent offers flattered the allied princes of the empire and gave them a higher opinion of their political worth. John Frederick maintained so distant an attitude toward the Schmalkalden Union that he was suspected of not desiring its existence after 1537. In fact, the union's relation to the South German "sacramenters" was as disagreeable to him as a connection with foreign states; at the same time the explanations between the Lutheran and the upland theologians assumed a higher political importance. Since a sharp separation took place between the church parties, many people believed that a real community

of interests, and, so to speak, of faith and belief, could not exist even in worldly affairs without perfect concord on each basic dogma. The only exception made was in favor of emperor and empire, which was due to inherited piety. The means, however, which Henry VIII used for the purpose of taming his theologians and other counselors were unknown at that time in Germany.

Nobody would have had the courage to threaten Luther in an effort to make him deny his convictions. The Reformer frankly confessed that a union of the evangelical people against the "murderers and bloodhounds, the papists," would be highly desirable; nevertheless his conscience urged him to examine again and again, with the deepest misgiving, the friendly offers of the upland people.

On one occasion Amsdorf, as plain spoken as ever, declared that the alleged desire of the Strasburgers to agree with Luther was a disgraceful falsehood. In the uplands and Switzerland, Wittenberg's claim to a kind of supreme power in the matter of belief caused considerable dissatisfaction, which led to distrust and harsh opinions about Luther particularly. Zwingli's friend, Leo Judae, the Swiss translator of the Bible, claimed that since the days of the apostles nobody had talked of the holiest things so shamefully, ridiculously and irreligiously as Luther; he added: "If we do not defend ourselves from the start we cannot expect this.

man to be anything less than a new pope who, according to his own pleasure, decides about everything and then makes changes, sending this one to the devil and pardoning that one into heaven."

The position of Protestantism on the whole was somewhat peculiar during those stirring years. According to Ranke northern Germany first of all assumed a "peculiar" worldwide historical appearance by becoming the real home of German Reformation. In southern Germany also the new doctrine maintained itself in a large number of territories, though they were mostly small, while neither Austria nor Bavaria could be swung from the moorings to the old Church.

At the side of the absolutist tendencies of the evangelical princes appeared at the same time a frequently victorious element of the classes, particularly the reigning nobility who secularized on a small scale. In Sweden and Denmark the final introduction of reformation, after the hierarchy was vanquished, led to a division of the spoils between the kingdom and the aristocracy.

Unique, however, was the Catholicism of state which Henry VIII with iron power forced upon England; in spite of the retained Roman dogmas it was the beginning of national independence from Rome. It must be remembered that about the same time Calvin established his theocratical dictatorship at Geneva. There the idea of an evangelical state